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Handbook of the War *for* Public Speakers

EDITED BY

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

AND

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY

for the

Committee on Patriotism
Through Education

of the

National Security League

NEW YORK

NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE

19 WEST 44TH STREET

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Price 25 Cents

Committee on Patriotism Through Education

One of the sub-divisions of the National Security League is the SECTION ON PATRIOTISM THROUGH EDUCATION, which is intended to be a rallying point for teachers, educational administrators and professional men who are interested in a proper understanding of the conditions of national defense and the present war, by their countrymen of the United States.

The central authority in this section is the COMMITTEE ON PATRIOTISM THROUGH EDUCATION appointed by the League; at present it consists of the following persons:

ROBERT M. McELROY, Educational Director, *Chairman*.
MRS. THOMAS J. PRESTON, JR., *Secretary*.
HENRY J. ALLEN, Wichita Beacon.
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MRS. PHILIP NORTH MOORE, National Council of Women.
THOMAS F. MORAN, Purdue University.
CALVIN W. RICE, Society of Mechanical Engineers.

The purposes of the Committee are set forth in a *Report* made at Washington, January 27, 1917, and *Outline of Plan* made in New York, May 12, 1917, which will be sent on application. The Committee aims to organize throughout the country a system of public discussion on the place of the United States among nations; and particularly on the causes, progress and desirable outcome of the present war between the United States and the Central Powers.

This effort takes the particular form of organization of public meetings and public addresses wherever needed throughout the Union. This *Handbook* and its accompanying volume, *America at War*, are a kind of laboratory course for speakers and writers in this cause.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ADDRESS THE

Committee on Patriotism Through Education
19 West 44th Street, New York City

War Service
Mar 11 1918

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HOPE, WARNING AND PROPHECY

By Abraham Lincoln.

Of our political revolution in '76 we are all justly proud. It has given us a degree of political freedom exceeding that of any other nation of the earth. In it the world has found a solution of the long-mooted problem as to the capability of man to govern himself. In it was the germ which has vegetated and still is to grow and expand into the universal liberty of mankind.

It has long been a grave question whether any government, not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies.

Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We, even we here, hold the power and bear the responsibility. We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud and God must forever bless.

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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION.

This little book is designed primarily to be of service to those who take part in the campaign of patriotic education initiated by The National Security League. It seeks to set down in brief outline the essentials of that great argument which it will be the work of the participants in the campaign to develop; to enrich with their personal contributions, and to bring home to the mind and conscience of the citizens of the Republic.

The present book is introductory to a larger volume, under the title *America at War*, which will place at the disposal of users of this *Handbook* a much fuller collection of material, together with more detailed analyses of the principal issues, and an extensive classified list of references. There will also shortly be distributed by the League a volume entitled *Out Of Their Own mouths*, a remarkable collection of utterances by German statesmen and writers illustrating the spirit, political principles and war aims of the leaders of German opinion. It is hoped that the three volumes will complement one another in a convenient and serviceable way.

The task to which these books are meant to contribute is a task more fundamental than any other, when a democracy prepares for war—that of informing the understanding, of awakening the moral vision and the moral passion, of the entire people, concerning the cause for which they fight. It is essential to bring to the mind of every honest and loyal citizen the momentousness of the present crisis; to make him or her understand what deep concerns of humanity are at stake; to bring all to feel that America has never entered upon a more just or more necessary war.

In this task, the chief obstacle is likely to be the traditional American feeling of isolation from the rest of the world. The war is (we hope) to be fought wholly on another continent; and it has arisen as a sequel to a European conflict. To some Americans, consequently, it ap-

parently still seems a thing remote from our own national life and interests. Those who think thus must be reminded that, for peoples as for individuals, the narrowness of self-centered vision is in the long run as ruinous as it is contemptible. The present war has come to affect the collective interests of the human race; its outcome will determine the character of the relations between nations, and the course of the political and moral evolution of mankind for generations to come. The people of the United States happen to be a part of the human race; it is not to be believed that, at this world-crisis, they will forget the fact—or permit others to forget it; nor can they indulge the folly of imagining that America's future could be secure if Europe should be dominated by the ambitious designs and sinister power which brought about the present war, and forced the United States to enter it.

In the practical use of this *Handbook*, the speaker or writer will not overlook the arrangement. The Table of Contents furnishes an easy guide to the classification of the material. The "Summary Statements" suggest the vital matters in each of the principal topics. "The List of Events" will enable the speaker to place diplomatic and military happenings exactly. The greater part of most of the chapters consists of classified "Extracts" drawn from many sources; these, as will be seen, are meant partly to provide pertinent evidence, in which German writers furnish material for self-conviction, upon certain of the main questions about the war; partly to furnish useful illustrative material; and partly to make easily accessible some of the best and most thought-arousing passages which have been written or spoken, during these historic months, concerning the meaning of America's war, the tasks confronting the Government, and the duty of the citizen. It has been thought needless to include the principal addresses of President Wilson on the war; these, it has been assumed, are already in the possession—and it is to be hoped, are in the memories—of all Americans deserving the name. The "Vital Questions" in §2 include a variety of topics upon which inquiries are likely to be made in conversation or before an audience. The general and chapter references carry the reader to wider fields in which material can be found to supplement and expand the necessarily brief statements in the *Handbook*. The

recommended books have been selected with a view to their convenience and accessibility as well as to their intrinsic value. The Committee on Patriotism through Education undertakes to reply to any user of the book who is perplexed by a question to which he cannot find an answer in this book, if he will write to the Committee (31 Pine Street, New York City).

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART,
ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

August 20, 1917.

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1] A. LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS LEADING TO WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1914-1917.

1914.

August 4. Proclamation by the President of the United States of neutrality of the United States.

November 13. Proclamation by the President of the United States of neutrality of the Panama Canal Zone.

1915.

January 20. American neutrality explained and defended by Secretary of State Bryan.

January 28. American merchantman William P. Frye sunk by German cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich.

February 4. Germany's proclamation of "war zone" around the British Isles after February 18.

February 10. United States note holding German Government to a "strict accountability" if any merchant vessel of the United States is destroyed or any American citizens lose their lives.

February 16. Germany's reply, stating "war-zone" act is an act of self-defense against illegal methods employed by Great Britain in preventing commerce between Germany and neutral countries; disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences.

February 20. United States sends identic note to Great Britain and Germany suggesting an agreement between these two powers respecting the conduct of naval warfare.

February 28. Germany's reply to identic note.

March 28. British steamship Falaba attacked by submarine and sunk; 111 lives lost; 1 American.

April 8. Steamer Harpalyce, in service of American Commission for Relief in Belgium, torpedoed; 15 lives lost.

April 22. German Embassy publishes a warning against embarkation on vessels belonging to Great Britain.

April 28. American vessel Cushing attacked by German aeroplane.

May 1. American steamship Gulfight sunk by German submarine; 2 Americans lost.

May 7. Cunard Line steamship Lusitania sunk by German submarine; 1,152 lives lost, 114 being Americans.

May 9. Germany's note in regard to treatment of neutral vessels in war zone.

May 10. Message of sympathy from Germany on loss of American lives by sinking of Lusitania.

May 13. American note protesting against submarine policy culminating in the sinking of the *Lusitania*; expects Germany to disavow such acts and declares United States will not be expected to "omit any word or any act" necessary to maintain the rights of its citizens.

May 13. Publication of Bryce Committee's Report on German Atrocities.

May 25. American steamship *Nebraskan* attacked by submarine.

May 28. Germany's answer to note of May 13 on the subject of the impairment of American interests by German submarine war.

June 1. Supplementary note from Germany in regard to the *Gulflight* and *Cushing*.

June 8. Resignation of William J. Bryan, Secretary of State.

June 9. United States sends second note on *Lusitania* case.

July 8. Germany sends reply to note of June 9, and pledges safety to United States vessels in war zone under specified conditions.

July 9. English passenger steamer *Orduna* attacked without warning by a German submarine; not hit.

July 15. Germany sends memorandum acknowledging submarine attack on *Nesbraskan*, and expresses regret.

July 21. Third American note on *Lusitania* case declares Germany's communication of July 8 "very unsatisfactory."

July 25. American steamship *Leelanaw* sunk by submarine; carrying contraband; no lives lost.

August 19. White Star liner *Arabic* sunk by submarine; 16 victims; 2 Americans.

August 24. German Ambassador sends note in regard to *Arabic*. Loss of American lives contrary to intention of the German Government and is deeply regretted.

September 1. Letter from Ambassador von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing giving assurance that German submarines will sink no more liners without warning.

September 4. Allan liner *Hesperian* sunk by German submarine; 26 lives lost; 1 American.

September 7. German Government sends report on the sinking of the *Arabic*.

September 14. United States sends summary of evidence in regard to *Arabic*.

October 5. German Government regrets and disavows sinking of *Arabic* and is prepared to pay indemnities; orders issued to German submarine commanders are so stringent that a similar incident is out of the question.

October 20. German note on the evidence in the *Arabic* case.

December 4. United States Government demands recall of Capt. Karl Boy-Ed, naval attaché, and Capt. Franz von Papen, military attaché, of the German Embassy, for "improper activities in naval and military matters."

December 10. United States Government renews demand for recalls and urges immediate action.

December 10. German Ambassador informs Secretary of State

that the Emperor has been pleased to recall Boy-Ed and von Papen.

December 30. British passenger steamer Persia sunk in Mediterranean, presumably by submarine; 2 Americans lost.

1916.

January 7. German Embassy issues a memorandum stating submarines in Mediterranean have received orders to conform to general principles of international law.

January 18. United States Government addresses informal and confidential notes to diplomatic representatives of Allies setting forth a declaration of principles regarding submarine attacks and asking whether the Governments would subscribe to such an agreement.

February 10. Germany sends memorandum to neutral powers that armed merchant vessels will be treated as warships and will be sunk without warning. Asks neutral powers to warn their citizens not to intrust their lives or property on such vessels.

February 15. Secretary Lansing makes statement that by international law commercial vessels have right to carry arms in self-defense.

February 16. Germany sends note acknowledging her liability in the Lusitania affair.

February 24. President Wilson replies to letter (February 24) of Mr. Stone, chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, in which he refuses to advise American citizens not to travel on armed merchant ships, because this would renounce the inalienable rights of American citizens.

March 8. German Ambassador communicates memorandum regarding U-boat question, stating it is a new weapon not yet regulated by international law.

March 23. Diplomatic response of Allies declining to accept proposals contained in Secretary Lansing's note of January 18.

March 24. French steamer Sussex is torpedoed without warning; about 80 passengers, including American citizens, are killed or wounded.

March 25. Department of State issues memorandum prepared by direction of President in regard to status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas.

March 27, 28, 29. United States Government instructs American Ambassador in Berlin to inquire into sinking of Sussex and other vessels.

April 10. German Government replies to United States notes of March 27, 28, 29, on the sinking of Sussex and other vessels.

April 18. United States delivers what is considered an ultimatum, that unless Germany abandons present methods of submarine warfare United States will sever diplomatic relations.

May 4. Reply of Germany acknowledges sinking of the Sussex, and in the main meets demands of United States announcing new orders issued to its naval forces, but declares it would expect the United States to demand and insist that Great Britain observe the rules of international law.

May 8. United States Government accepts German position

as outlined in note of May 4, but makes it clear that the fulfillment of these conditions cannot depend upon negotiations between the United States and any other belligerent Government.

October 8. German submarine appears off American coast and sinks British passenger steamer *Stephano*.

October 28. British steamer *Marina* sunk without warning; 6 Americans lost.

November 6. British liner *Arabia* torpedoed and sunk without warning in Mediterranean.

December 12. Germany and her allies offer to enter into peace negotiations.

December 14. British horse transport ship *Russian* sunk in Mediterranean by submarine; 17 Americans lost.

December 16. President Wilson transmits German peace note of December 12 to entente powers.

December 18. President Wilson's peace note sent to belligerent powers.

December 26. Germany replies to President Wilson's peace note.

December 30. Reply of the entente allies to the central powers' note of December 12.

1917.

January 10. Entente powers reply to President Wilson's note of December 18.

January 22. President Wilson addresses the Senate, giving his idea of steps necessary for world peace. "Peace without victory."

January 31. Germany's note announcing her intention of ruthless use of submarine, outlining barred zones and prescribing conditions for American vessels.

February 3. President Wilson addresses joint session of Congress on the German submarine order and announces the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany.

February 3. Dismissal of German Ambassador.

February 3. American steamship *Housatonic* torpedoed and sunk by submarine after warning.

February 4. President Wilson notifies neutrals of break with Germany; hopes they "can find it possible to take similar action."

February 7. Senate indorses President Wilson's position in severing diplomatic relations.

February 7. British ship *Vedamore* sunk by submarine; 10 Americans lost.

February 10. American Ambassador James W. Gerard leaves Germany.

February 13. American schooner *Lyman M. Law* sunk in the Mediterranean, presumably by Austrian submarine.

February 14. German Ambassador von Bernstorff sails from New York.

February 25. Cunard liner *Laconia* torpedoed and sunk without warning; 12 persons, including 2 American women, lose their lives.

February 26. President Wilson addresses joint session of Congress, recommending "armed neutrality."

February 28. Associated Press makes public a proposed alliance between Germany and Mexico in the event of war between United States and Germany.

March 1. Resolution introduced in the Senate relating to the authenticity of the "Zimmermann" letter.

March 2. Authenticity of the note signed "Zimmermann" attested by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing.

March 9. Proclamation by the President of the United States, calling an extra session of Congress on April 16, 1917.

March 12. United States gives formal notice that it has decided to place an armed guard on all American merchant vessels sailing through barred zone. American steamship Algonquin sunk without warning by German submarine.

March 16. American steamship Vigilancia sunk without warning by German submarine; 5 Americans lost.

March 17. American tanker Illinois sunk by German submarine. American freighter City of Memphis sunk by German submarine; 8 lives lost.

March 21. Proclamation by the President of the United States, calling an extra session of Congress on April 2, 1917. American steamship Healdton sunk in safety zone without warning; 21 persons lost, 7 being Americans.

March 24. United States orders withdrawal from Belgium of Minister Brand Whitlock and members of American Relief Commission.

March 26. United States refuses Germany's proposals to interpret and supplement the Prussian treaty of 1799.

April 1. American steamer Aztec (armed) sunk without warning; 11 lives lost.

April 2. President Wilson addresses joint session of Congress on the existence of a state of war.

April 3. Executive order (No. 2571) constituting the Public Health Service a part of the military forces of the United States.

April 5. Executive order (No. 2584) of the President of the United States establishing defensive sea areas and regulations for carrying this order into effect.

April 5. American steamer Missourian (unarmed) torpedoed and sunk without warning.

April 6. Resolution of Sixty-fifth Congress, first session, declaring that a state of war exists passed and signed by the President.

April 6. Proclamation by the President of the United States, declaring war and defining the status of alien enemies.

(H. H. B. Moyer, Compiler, *The United States at War*, 8-13.)

E.—SOME VITAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWERS.

These questions are such as are likely to be put to the public speaker; the cross-references lead to sections of the *Handbook* in which there is material for an answer. Additional answers

can be found in the general and chapter references, especially in *America at War*, where the extracts and citations are more minutely subdivided than in this book.

[§2] Aids to an understanding of the general question.

(a) Has the United States the duty of maintaining a democratic government? (See Lincoln's *Hope, Warning and Prophecy*.)

(b) Can a democratic government successfully wage war? (*Hope, Warning and Prophecy*.)

(c) Is the United States really isolated from the other continents? (*Introduction*, §§62, 99.)

(d) How can one verify the dates of important events in the negotiations of the United States before our entrance into the war? [§1]

(e) What are some of the best books on the causes, progress and effect of the war? [§§9-12]

(f) Where can one find the official documents on the war? [§§13-15, 17]

(g) How can one find the best periodicals dealing with war questions? [§15]

(h) Where are the President's messages to be found? [§9]

[§3] Why the United States had to enter the war.

(a) Could the United States honorably have kept out of war with Germany? [§§18-20]

(b) Could the United States safely have kept out of the war? [§§21-25, 29, 30, 33, 34]

(c) Were American citizens entitled to travel in British ships while Great Britain was at war with Germany? [§§19-21, 27]

(d) Was Germany justified in submarine warfare as necessary for success in the war? [§§23, 24, 27, 29-31]

(e) Was the *Lusitania* on a lawful voyage when sunk? [§29]

(f) Did the United States begin war on Germany? [§§19-25, 27-30, 33]

(g) Did the United States ever admit the right of submarines to sink merchant ships without warning so as to allow the escape of crews and passengers? [§§27, 30]

(h) How many American ships were attacked by German submarines while the United States was at peace (up to April 1st, 1917)? [§28]

(i) How many American lives were taken by German submarines while the United States was at peace? [§28]

(j) Did the United States give fair warning to Germany that it would consider submarine warfare hostile? [§§1, 27, 29, 30]

(k) Did the Germans give the Americans a proper warning not to sail on the *Lusitania*? [§29]

(l) Was the United States in honor bound to protect its citizens against submarine warfare? [§§29, 30]

(m) Did Germany do only what any other country would have done? [§31]

(n) Did the Confederate commerce destroyers in our Civil War set an example which the Germans followed [§31]

(o) Ought the United States to have laid an embargo on the shipment of arms to the Allies? [§32]

(p) Did the German government act in a manner friendly to the United States in other countries of America? [§§33, 34]

(q) Were German officials responsible for destruction of lives and property in the United States? [§§22, 33]

(r) Did Germany respect the integrity of territory of the United States? [§34]

3. [§4] Why the United States must continue in the war.

(a) Are the past overt acts of Germany against the United States the only reasons for war? [§36]

(b) Were the power and international influence of the United States endangered so that she was obliged to go to war? [§37]

(c) Could the United States have simply closed her ports and refrained from hostilities? [§38]

(d) Has the United States reason to fear the military methods of Germany? [§39, 100]

(e) Would treaties have any force or validity if Germany's principles were dominant? [§40]

(f) Is the United States concerned in the possible annexation by Germany of Belgium and northern France? [§41]

(g) Would the Monroe Doctrine be menaced by a German victory? [§§42, 61]

(h) Would it be safe to allow Germany to form a mid-European combination including Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey? [§43]

(i) Are we fighting the people of Germany? [§44]

(j) Do many educated Germans consider Germans superior to all other peoples? [§§46, 47]

(k) Do representative Germans believe God is the special friend of Germany? [§47]

(l) Since Germany has a written constitution and a Reichstag elected by universal male suffrage, how can it be called an autocracy? [§48]

(m) Is it the assumption of the Prussian Constitution that the king rules by Divine Right? [§§48, 49]

(n) What are the principles governing the conduct of war by German armed forces? [§§52-56]

(o) Were the Germans obliged to treat the Belgians with frightfulness in order to ensure their own safety? [§53]

(p) Did the Germans carry off men and women into servitude? [§54]

(q) Have the Germans made a practice of sinking hospital ships? [§39]

(r) Were German authorities morally responsible for the Armenian massacres? [§55]

(s) Did the Germans expect wide conquests in Europe and elsewhere? [§§51, 56, 57]

(t) What countries compose the Central European Federation which Germany hopes to establish? [§§43, 125, 57]

(u) What was the primary reason for the United States' going to war in April, 1917? [§58]

(v) Does the Monroe Doctrine resemble the German principles of conquest? [§59]

(w) Is the war worth fighting to prevent the triumph of the dominant German theories of the state and society? [§§40, 43-45, 61, 62, 64]

(x) Is the United States bound to make war in order to maintain the political principles to which we are committed? [§§45, 62]

(y) Are the foreign-born and the children of the foreign-born interested in the war of the United States against Germany? [§§63, 64, 65]

(z) Can Americans of Irish descent honestly be "for the United States but against England" in this war? [§63]

(aa) Are the sons of Germans bound to take up arms against the Germans? [§§64, 65]

(bb) Are the German people unanimous in support of conquest and aggression? [§66]

4. [§5] Who is responsible for the war in Europe?

(a) Had the Germans designs upon the Balkans before the war? [§§69, 70, 80]

(b) Had Germany and Austria threatened war to secure their supremacy in the Balkans before 1914? [§§70, 71, 80]

(c) Was the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne the real cause of the war? [§§72, 73]

(d) Was Germany really threatened with Russian aggression in 1914? [§§74, 76, 81, 82]

(e) What is the official German theory of the responsibility for the war? [§75]

(f) Is this theory justified by the facts? [§76]

(g) Did Russia make all the concessions to Germany and Austria which she could reasonably have been expected to make? [§§73, 79, 82, 83]

(h) Can the German government give any satisfactory reason for its refusal to accept these concessions? [§§76, 79, 81c, 84]

(i) Why did Germany prefer to make Russia's mobilization, rather than the issue concerning Serbia, the ground upon which she declared war against Russia? [§77]

(j) Was the war really "forced upon Germany"? [§§76, 77, 78, 79, 81-84]

(k) Was Belgium bound to refuse Germany's demand for the passage of German troops over Belgian soil? [§§78, 85]

(l) Was Germany bound to respect the neutrality of Belgium? [§§78, 85]

(m) Are other nations under special obligation to Belgium for her action on August 3, 1914? [§§78, 85]

(n) Of what nature were the grounds alleged by Germany for her declaration of war upon France? [§77n]

(o) Had these allegations any basis in fact? [77n]

5. [§6] What the Government must do to make the war successful.

(a) Do the previous military preparations of the United States tend to prove that it desired war with Germany? [§§87-94]

(b) Would a volunteer army have been better than an army raised by draft for the purposes of the war? [§§87, 95-98]

(c) Is the organization of the Federal Government able to carry on a great war? [§§90, 93]

(d) Have other governments besides the Federal Government any duty in this war? [§91]

(e) Is a democratic government able to successfully meet a centralized monarchy? [§§92, 93, 99]

(f) Can a democratic country keep its usual procedures of government unmodified during a great war? [§93]

(g) Has the United States the means to carry on so great a war? [§§88, 93, 100]

(h) Is raising men by draft constitutional? [§§95-97]

(i) Is raising men by draft democratic? [§§95-97]

(j) Is the draft system fair? [§§96, 97]

(k) Did the volunteer system make good in the Revolution? [§98]

(l) Is it necessary for us to send armies abroad? [§§58, 99]

(m) Suppose the Allies were defeated, would that do any harm to the United States? [§§51, 57, 59-61, 63, 100]

6. [§7] What the citizen must do to make the war successful.

(a) Are the obligations of naturalized citizens different from those of native born citizens? [§§63-65, 102, 110]

(b) Are alien enemies entitled to go freely about the country? [§§33, 103]

(c) What can Americans do to help the soldiers? [§§104, 111]

(d) What can Americans do to help the country? [§§105, 109, 111]

(e) Can we have "business as usual" during the war? [§§106, 114]

(f) Who is going to do the work while the men are at war? [§§107, 111]

(g) What can children do for the cause? [§§108, 116]

(h) What can women do for the cause? [§§107, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119]

(i) How can the business of the country be organized for war? [§§121, 114]

(j) Have we raised our boys to be soldiers? [§113]

(k) How is labor to be organized during the war? [§§107, 111, 112, 114]

(l) How can the food supply be kept adequate during the war? [§§106, 112, 115-117]

(m) What can farmers do for the cause? [§116]

(n) What can the housewife do for the cause? [§§115, 117, 118]

(o) What can we do to help the sick and wounded? [§§104, 111, 118-120]

(p) Is it a proper or necessary part of our war policy to relax our child-labor laws? [§121]

7. [§8] World-Peace after World-War.

(a) What is the great hope which inspires Americans in this war? [§123]

(b) Are the Germans favorable to a just peace? [§124]

(c) Should the United States support a peace which left Germany in control of the Balkans and Turkey? [§§57-59, 125, 126]

(d) Has the United States done its duty toward securing world peace? [§§127, 131-134]

(e) What are the difficulties in the way of world peace? [§§129, 130-135]

(f) Are we fighting for the equality of nations? [§§130, 138]

(g) What is the plan of the League to Enforce Peace? [§131]

(h) What is the plan of the World Court League? [§§132-134]

(i) What is the difficulty with pacifism? [§§133, 137]

(j) Why has the United States a special responsibility for peace? [§§130-136]

SELECT LIST OF AUTHORITIES SUITABLE FOR PRIVATE COLLECTIONS AND SMALL PUBLIC LIBRARIES.

[§9.] A.—A TEN DOLLAR LIST.

These books may be ordered through any bookseller or directly from the publishers.

American Association for International Conciliation. *International Conciliation*. Nos. 83-114 passim. (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for Int. Con.) Substation 84, free on application. Very convenient set of the documents issued by the various countries at the outbreak of the war.

Beck, James M. *The War and Humanity*. (2d. ed., N. Y., Putnam, 1917; \$1.50.) On America's concern in the war.

Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *Germany and the Next War*. (N. Y., authorized Am. translation, Longmans, 1912; \$.75.) By the chief exponent of the philosophy of Prussian militarism, a general who has had a command in the European war.

Chéradame, André. *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked*. (N. Y., Scribners, 1917; \$1.25.) On Germany's war aims and the menace of a German peace.

Hart, Albert Bushnell, Editor. *America at War*. For speakers, writers and readers. (N. Y., 1917, \$1.50.) Companion volume to the *Handbook*: analysis of the war; abundant classified references; full and comprehensive extracts from speeches, documents, articles and books.

Meyer, H. H. B., compiler. *United States in War; Organization and Literature*. (Wash. Gov't. Printing Office, 1917.) Free on application to Library of Congress. A very useful

pamphlet, giving condensed information concerning the organization and activities of the various bodies, governmental and other, which the war has called into existence, with other material on the war.

- Morgan, John H. *German Atrocities, an Official Investigation*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1916; \$1.00.) By the professor of constitutional law in the University of London. Based upon Belgian, French, British, and especially German, official documents.
- National Security League. *Patriotism Through Education Series*. (N. Y., Nat. Security League, 31 Pine St., 1917—free to members of the League on application.)
- Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. *Armenian Atrocities, the Murder of a Nation*. (N. Y., Dutton; \$25.) Brief but authoritative account of the massacres in Armenia, and of the relation of German officials thereto.
- U. S. Bureau of Public Information. *How the War Came to America*. (Washington, June 15, 1917; free on application.) "Red, white and blue" pamphlet.
- Visscher, Ch. de. *Belgium's Case: a Juridical Enquiry*. (London and N. Y., Hodder and Stoughton, 1916; \$1.25.) A careful review of the German occupancy and oppression of Belgium and of the moral and legal aspects of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *Why We Are At War*. (N. Y., Harpers, 1917; \$0.50.) A convenient collection of the President's speeches and messages.
- Wood, Leonard. *Our Military History, Its Facts and Fallacies*. (Chicago, Reilly & Britton, 1916; \$1.00.) Brief account of the difficulties and sacrifices of volunteer armies.

[§10] B.—A TWENTY-FIVE DOLLAR LIST.

The foregoing ten-dollar list of books, together with the following:

- Archer, William. *Gems of German Thought*. (N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1917; \$1.25.)
- Beck, James M. *The Evidence in the Case*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1914; \$1.00.) Searching analysis of the responsibility for the European war, by an eminent lawyer, formerly assistant attorney-general of the United States.
- Beith, John Hay. [Ian Hay, pseud.] *Getting Together*. (Garden City, Doubleday, Page, 1917; \$50.)
- Cobb, Irwin S. *"Speaking of Prussians."* (N. Y., Doran, 1917; \$.50.)
- Dawson, Wm. H. *What Is the Matter with Germany*. (London, Longmans, 1915; \$1.00.) By a writer who has long interested himself in German affairs.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell. *The War in Europe, Its Causes and Results*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1914; \$1.00.)
- A brief account of the conditions of the war and relations of the United States.
- Headlam, James W. *The Issue*. (Bost., Houghton, 1917; \$1.00.) Germany's war-aims, in case of a "German Peace."

Holmes, Edmond. *The Nemesis of Docility*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1916; \$1.75.)

An acute study of the psychology of the German character.

O'Brien, Charles. *Food Preparedness for the United States*. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1917; \$.60.)

Rinehart, Mary Roberts. *The Altar of Freedom*. (Bost., Houghton, Mifflin, 1917; \$.50.) An appeal to American mothers, by one of them.

Rogers, Lindsay. *America's Case Against Germany*. (N. Y., Dutton; \$1.50.) An untechnical presentation of the legal aspect of America's case, and a review of the diplomatic correspondence, with citations of the principal passages.

Stowell, Ellery C. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914. The Beginnings of the War*. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1915; \$5.00.) Careful review and analysis by an expert in international affairs.

3. ADDITIONAL BOOKS.

(a) [§11] Discussions.

Barker, J. Ellis. *Modern Germany: Her Political and Economic Problems*. (5th ed., N. Y., Dutton, 1915.)

Beck, James M. *The Evidence in the Case*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1914.) Searching analysis of the responsibility for the European war, by an eminent lawyer, formerly assistant attorney-general of the United States.

Beveridge, Albert J. *What is Back of the War*. (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1915.) Personal impressions on the ground early in the war.

Bullard, Arthur. *The Diplomacy of the Great War*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) A gossip sketch of the historical background of the war.

Chitwood, Oliver P. *The Immediate Causes of the Great War*. (N. Y., Crowell, 1917.) Résumé of the outbreak of the war.

Coolidge, Archibald C. *Origins of the Triple Alliance*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) On the building up of Germany's position in Central Europe.

Freeman, William. *Awake, U. S. A.! Are We in Danger? Are We Prepared?* (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) Study in popular form of international complications and dangers.

Hart, Albert Bushnell. *The War in Europe; Its Causes and Results*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1914.) A brief account of the conditions of the war and relations of the United States.

Kilbourne, Maj. Charles E. (Ed. in chief), *National Service Library*. (5 vols., N. Y., Collier & Son, 1917.) All volumes by military officers, on organization and methods of modern war.

- Lippmann, Walter. *The Stakes of Diplomacy*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.) On the actual forces that control American diplomacy.
- North American (Philadelphia). *The War From This Side*. (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1915.) Reprint of good editorials.
- Reynolds, Francis J. and others. *The Story of the Great War*. (5 vols. to 1916, N. Y., Collier & Son, 1916.) Admirable narrative of conditions, diplomacy and warfare, illustrated.
- Seton-Watson, Robert W., and others. *The War and Diplomacy*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1914.) Study of the political causes of the war.

(b) [§12] First-Hand Narratives.

- Anonymous. *A German Deserter's War Experience*. (N. Y., Huebsch, 1917.) Details of German army life.
- Davis, Richard Harding. *With the Allies*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.) Famous American war correspondent.
- Hay, Ian [pseudonym for Ian Hay Beith]. *The First Hundred Thousand*. (Bost., Houghton Mifflin, 1916.) British troops in training and at the front.
- Hedin, Sir Sven. *With the German Armies in the West*. (London, Lane, 1915.) By the famous Scandinavian traveler, inside the German lines.
- Kreisler, Fritz. *Four Weeks in the Trenches*. (Bost., Houghton Mifflin, 1915.) Life in the Austrian army.
- Powell, E. Alexander. *Fighting in Flanders*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.) By an English journalist.
- Seeger, Alan. *Letters and Diary*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) An American soldier and poet in the trenches, where he lost his life.

(c) [§13] Collections of Documents.

- American Association for International Conciliation. *International Conciliation*. (Nos. 83-90, 94-96, 101-104, 110, 111, 114; N. Y., the Assoc., 1914-1917.) Very convenient and valuable.
- Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*. (N. Y., Doran, 1915.) Official publications of the belligerent countries; inexpensive.
- American Journal of International Law*. Special supplements to IX (July, 1915); X (Oct., 1916). (N. Y., Baker, Voorhis.) Reprints of government publications.
- Fess, Simeon D., Compiler. *The Problems of Neutrality When the World Is at War*. (House Docs., 64 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2111; Wash., Govt. Printing Office.) Documents on the controversy with Germany.
- The German White-Book. How Russia and Her Rulers Betrayed Germany's Confidence and Thereby Caused the European War*. (Boston, 1914). Official justification of Germany, published in English.

Scott, James Brown. *The American View of the War Against the Imperial German Government*. (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1917.) Official documents form Part. II.

Scott, James Brown. *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*. (2 vols.; N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.) Good collection for the first period.

United States, Department of State. *Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce*. (5 Nos.: May 7, 1915; Oct. 21, 1915; Aug. 12, 1916; Oct. 10, 1916; April 4, 1917. Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1915-1917.) The official United States set of war documents.

(d) [§14] **Select Brief Documents and Extracts.**

Bang, J. P. *Hurrah and Hallelujah!* (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) Compilation of passages showing German attitude, chiefly by theologians and preachers; by a Danish professor of theology.

Bingham, Alfred (Editor). *Handbook of the European War*. (Handbook Series; White Plains, Wilson, 1916.) Continuation of Sheip's book (see below), useful and quotable extracts.

Hart, Albert Bushnell (Editor). *American Patriots and Statesmen—From Washington to Lincoln*. (5 vols.; N. Y., Collier, 1916.) Patriotic and prophetic utterances down to 1865.

Members of the Faculty of the University of Minnesota. *Facts About the War. Memoranda, Synopses and Significant Items*. (Minneapolis, Univ. of Minn., 1917.) "Prepared especially for the use of patriotic speakers and writers."

"*Out of Their Own Mouths.*" (N. Y., Appleton, 1917.) A collection of utterances of German statesmen, scholars, and publicists, illustrating the spirit of German leaders, their standards of international conduct and their aims in the war.

O'Regan, John R. H. (Editor). *The German War of 1914. Illustrated by Documents of European History, 1815-1915*. (London, Oxford, Univ. Press, 1915.) Valuable documents on neutrality and the war.

Reeley, Mary Katharine (Editor). *Selected Articles on World Peace, including International Arbitration and Disarmament*. (Handbook Series; 2 ed.; White Plains, Wilson Co., 1916.)

Sheip, Stanley S. (Editor). *Handbook of the European War*. (Handbook Series; White Plains, Wilson Co., 1914.) Brief discussions and classified extracts. Useful.

The New York Times. *Current History, The European War*. (10 vols. to March, 1917, N. Y. Times Co.)

Bound volumes of this periodical *Current History*, with special introduction and volume indexes. A repository of most interesting and valuable articles, speeches and documents.

4. [§15] SERVICEABLE PERIODICALS.

In the references at the end of each chapter will be found titles of a few select articles to periodicals; in *America at War*, the companion book to this *Handbook*, these references are much more numerous and are classified under numerous sub-titles. The number can be still further enlarged by using the following standard indexes to periodicals.

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. (White Plains, Wilson Co., monthly.)

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Supplement. (White Plains, Wilson Co., 5 times a year.) Both those works are from time to time condensed into "*Annual Cumulations*" and five-year volumes.

The periodicals most useful to the speaker and writer on the war are the following:

American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals*. (Bi-monthly.)

American Journal of International Law. (Quarterly.)

American Political Science Review. (Quarterly.)

The American Review of Reviews. (Monthly, illustrated.)

Atlantic Monthly.

Collier's Weekly.

Current History. (Monthly, Published by *N. Y. Times*, and gathered into volumes. [See §14])

History Teacher's Magazine. (Monthly.)

Independent. (Weekly, illustrated.)

Literary Digest. (Weekly.)

Outlook. (Weekly.)

5. [§16] COMPENDIUMS AND BOOKS OF REFERENCE.

The speaker and writer will find it convenient to have at command a few periodicals and other digests of information, compiled from time to time. Several of these authorities contain chronological lists of notable events, so that a particular date or happening may be verified. They also include summarized narrative and tabular statements.

The American Library Annual, Including Index to dates of current Events, Library work, Committees, Bibliographies, etc. (N. Y., Bowker, Annual since 1901.)

The American Year Book; a Record of Events and Progress. (N. Y., Appleton, Annual since 1910.) Includes convenient summaries and discussions of international events and issues. Well indexed.

Information Annual, A continuous Cyclopedic and Digest of Current Events. (N. Y., Cumulative Digest Co., Annual since 1915.)

The International Year Book: a compendium of the World's Progress. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, Annual 1896-1902, and since 1907.) Articles on current international questions.

McLaughlin, Andrew C., and Hart, Albert Bushnell (Editors). *Cyclopedia of American Government.* (3 vols.; N. Y., Appleton, 1914.) Three thousand five hundred articles, with recent bibliography, includes discussions of international law and international relations.

The World Almanac and Encyclopedia. (N. Y. Press Publishing Co., Annual since 1873.) Many useful lists and tables.

Department of Commerce. *Statistical Abstract of the United States.* (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, Annual since 1878.) Official material on population, trade, industry, commerce, etc.

6. [§17] GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS BEARING ON THE WAR.

Besides the regular government issues since the outbreak of the war the government has set on foot a variety of publications containing reprints of documents and speeches, and suggestions for patriotic service. Most of these publications are listed and described in Library of Congress, *The United States at War* (see below), especially sections 4, 12, 33, 35, 37-38, 41, 50, 51, 55, 59-60, 66, 69, 73, 86-90, 94, 100, 103, 111-112, 123, 128-130, 137, 139, 141, 152, 154, 156. The following are the most important for the speaker or writer (except the *Congressional Record*, they are free on application):

Bureau of Education. *Home Economics Letters.* (Wash., since April 4, 1916.) On duties of civilians.

Committee on Public Information. *Official Bulletin.* (Wash., daily since May, 1917.) Contains official precedents and notifications.

Committee on Public Information. *Manual of War Service.* (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1917.) Description and doctrine of the army and the navy.

Committee on Public Information. *War Message and Facts Behind It.* (Rev. ed., Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1917.) President's Message with comments and explanations.

Committee on Public Information. *War Information Series.* (Wash., The Committee, 1917.) Speeches, articles and reprints.

Congress. *Congressional Record.* (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, frequent parts during sessions of Congress, and bound volumes afterwards.) Verbatim record of the debates of the two houses of Congress, obtainable on terms stated in *U. S. at War*.

Department of State. *Diplomatic Correspondence With Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce.* (5 Nos.: May 27, 1915; Oct. 21, 1915; Aug. 17, 1916; Oct. 10, 1916; Mar. 4, 1917.) (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1915-1917) The official United States set.

Library of Congress (H. H. B. Meyer, compiler). *The United States at War, Organizations and Literature.* (Wash., Govt.

Printing Office, 1917.) The most helpful guide to the war publications of the government and of private societies.

National Board for Historical Service. *History and the Great War—Opportunities for History Teachers*. (Wash., Bureau of Education, Circular, Sept., 1917.) Relation of present war to the world's history.

Secretary of the Navy. *Annual Reports*. (Wash., Govt. Printing Office.) Details of naval organization and operations.

Secretary of War. *Annual Reports*. (Wash., Govt. Printing Office.) Details of military organization and operations.

CHAPTER II.

WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD TO ENTER THE WAR.

A.—SUMMARY STATEMENT.

[§18] This generation of Americans, like other generations before it, finds itself called upon to face the perils and the tragic sacrifices of war. What are the reasons which impose upon us, a people more than others devoted to peace, and happy and prosperous in the enjoyment of it, the hard necessity of such sacrifices?

The participation of the United States in the European conflict has been made necessary by two classes of circumstances. The first of these, sufficient yet less significant, consists of past events—of hostile acts against us committed by the German Government. The second, and incomparably more important, class of reasons for our entrance into the war and our continuance in it consists in the character of the future to which we should have to look forward, the kind of world in which we and those who come after us would have to live, in the event of the victory of Germany and her allies. The former—the past events which forced war upon us—are set forth in this chapter.

1 [§19] Some two hundred and fifty American citizens, exercising rights unquestioned under the law of nations, and traveling under the presumed protection of their Government, have been killed by agents of the Imperial German Government. (For the total losses of American ships and lives, see §28.)

2 [§20] The German Government was solemnly warned by the Government of the United States on February 10, 1915, that such acts were "an indefensible violation of neutral rights," and that our Government "would take any steps it might be necessary to take, to safeguard American lives, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas." (For the American note, see §27.)

3 [§21] In spite of this protest and warning, more than once repeated, such unlawful killing of Americans continued at intervals during two years. (For protest over *Lusitania*, see §29.)

4 [§22] In addition to the submarine attacks, the German Government, through its diplomatic representatives and other agents, carried on throughout 1915 and 1916 a secret campaign against our domestic security and order, by fomenting strikes, hiring criminals to destroy munition plants and other property, subsidizing a propaganda of disloyalty among citizens of German birth, placing spies in our offices of government, and organizing upon American soil unlaw-

ful conspiracies and military expeditions against countries with which we were at peace. (For details of this conspiracy, see §33.)

5 [§23] On January 31, 1917, the German Government proclaimed that it would destroy without warning, and without safeguarding the lives of passengers and seamen, ships of any nationalities (regardless of the character of their cargoes and their destinations) which might be found by German submarines in certain vast areas of the high seas.

6 [§24] This renewed and enlarged threat, and defiance of the warnings of our Government, was speedily carried out, several American ships, some of them bound for American ports, being destroyed, with loss of American lives, during February and March, 1917.

7 [§25] These acts constituted acts of war by Germany against the United States, and were formally recognized as such by the two houses of Congress on April 4th and 6th, 1917. *We are at war, then, in the first place, because Germany made war upon us.* We had no alternative, except abject submission to lawless coercion.

B.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS.

[§26] A WARNING TO GERMANY (1902).

By Richard Olney, Former Secretary of State.

We are now entering upon a contest for industrial supremacy, the most intense and arduous the world has ever seen. Fortunate will it be if this contest does not, like so many others, degenerate into grim-visaged war with all its unutterable brutalities and horrors! The errand here of your Royal Highness, with the hearty welcome tendered and the favorable impression produced, should do much to preclude so dire a result. Under its influence the two countries are recognizing each other as generous and worthy rivals—are joining in a sort of handshake as a courteous but significant preliminary to the combat before them—and are thus in a way pledging themselves that, whatever the stress of the contest, it shall not transgress the rightful rules of the game nor overstep the limits which Christianized and civilized peoples ought to observe under whatever provocation.

(Welcome to Prince Henry of Prussia: Independent, Sept. 25, 1916.)

[§27] AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE WAR-ZONE DECREE. (FEB. 10, 1915.)

It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and

destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized. * * *

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

(From note sent by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to the Imperial German Government.)

[§28] RECORD OF AMERICAN SHIPS ATTACKED AND LIVES DESTROYED BY GERMAN SUBMARINES (TO APRIL 1, 1917).

By Congressman John Jacob Rogers.

AMERICAN VESSELS ILLEGALLY ATTACKED.

Name of Vessel	Date	Particulars
Gulflight	May 2, 1915..	Torpedoed
Nebraskan	May 25, 1915..	Torpedoed
Leelanaw	July 25, 1915..	Torpedoed and shelled
Seaconnet	June 16, 1916..	Damaged by mine or torpedo
Oswego	Aug. 14, 1916..	Fired on 10 times by submarine
Lano (Philippine) ..	Oct. 28, 1916..	Sunk by submarine
Columbian	Nov. 7, 1916..	Sunk by submarine
Colena	Nov. 26, 1916..	Fired on
St. Helen's	Dec. 10, 1916..	Attacked by submarine
Rebecca Palmer ...	Dec. 14, 1916..	Fired on; slight damage

Sacramento Jan. 9, 1917..Fired on
 Housatonic Feb. 3, 1917..Sunk
 Lyman M. Law..... Feb. 13, 1917..Burned by submarine
 Vigilancia Mar. 16, 1917..Torpedoed
 City of Memphis... Mar. 17, 1917..Sunk by gunfire
 Illinois Mar. 17, 1917..Torpedoed
 Aztec Apr. 1, 1917..Torpedoed

SHIPS SUNK WITH LOSS OF AMERICAN LIVES.

British ship Falaba, torpedoed March 28, 1915 (warned); 1 American lost.

British ship Lusitania, torpedoed May 7, 1915 (no warning); 114 Americans lost.

American ship Gulflight, torpedoed May 1, 1915 (no warning); 2 Americans lost.

British ship Armenian, torpedoed June 28, 1915 (ordered to stop; tried to escape); 23 Americans lost.

British ship Iberian, sunk July 31, 1915 (tried to escape; stopped by shell fire); 3 Americans lost.

British ship Anglo-Californian, sunk July 4, 1915; 2 Americans lost.

British ship Hesperian, torpedoed September 4, 1915 (no warning); 1 American lost.

British ship Arabic, torpedoed August 19, 1915 (no warning); 2 Americans lost.

Italian ship Ancona, torpedoed November 9, 1915 (no warning); 7 Americans lost.

British ship Persia, believed to have been torpedoed; sunk December 30, 1915 (no warning); 2 Americans lost.

British ship Englishman, torpedoed March 27, 1916; 6 Americans lost (1 more whose nationality is doubtful).

British ship Sabota, sunk by gunfire October 20, 1916; 1 American lost.

British ship Marina, sunk by gunfire October 28, 1916 (warned); 6 Americans lost.

British ship Russian, torpedoed December 14, 1916 (no warning); 17 Americans lost.

British ship Eaveston, sunk by shell fire February 5, 1917; 1 American lost (1 other whose nationality is doubtful).

British ship Vedamore, torpedoed February 7, 1917 (no warning); 10 Americans lost.

British ship Turino, torpedoed February 7, 1917 (no warning); 1 American (?) lost.

French ship Athos, torpedoed February 22, 1917 (no warning); 1 American lost.

British ship Laconia, torpedoed February 25, 1917 (no warning); 2 Americans lost.

Norwegian ship Sjostad, believed torpedoed March 2, 1917 (no warning); 1 American lost.

American ship Vigilancia, torpedoed March 16, 1917 (no warning); 5 Americans lost.

American ship Healdton, torpedoed March 21, 1917 (no warning); 7 Americans lost.

British ship *Crispin*, torpedoed March 29, 1917 (no warning); 68 Americans on board, 1 killed, 18 missing.

Total, 216 American lives lost.

On the *Lusitania* there were also 24 children born of foreign parents on American soil.

(*Congressional Record*, April 5, 1917; corrected for this *Handbook*.)

[§29] WARNING TO GERMANY AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE LUSITANIA.

(MAY 13, 1915.)

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands, as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial Government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality, or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly admit. We

are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial Germany Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. . . .

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

(Sent by the State Department.)

[§30] INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS.

By President Woodrow Wilson. (Feb. 24, 1916.)

You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amidst difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course

which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to undersea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those Powers with regard to their treatment of the merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future.

But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right while war is in progress to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgement of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted, and everything that it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile.

It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allow expediency to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation, and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.

(Letter to Senator Stone.)

[§31] WOULD ANY OTHER COUNTRY HAVE DONE WHAT GERMANY DID?

From The Outlook (June 6, 1917)

Some have said with reference to Germany's use of the submarine: "Under the same circumstances Germany would use it again as she is using it now, and so would any nation,

including the United States, which was being blockaded by a superior fleet and was in danger of being crushed as a result of the blockade."

If this statement is true, so far as our nation is concerned, the United States has no excuse for having entered the European war. If this statement is true, Germany is right in declaring that military necessity knows and needs to know no moral law. If this statement is true, ravaged Belgium, ruined Rheims, and the martyred Lusitania should no longer be considered as the watchwords of aroused and menaced civilization, but only thought of as the cynical catch phrases of hypocritical national egotism.

Such a theory as this has in it the seeds of moral treason. Even the thoughtless betrayal of an American ideal may cause more lasting injury than the betrayal of a military secret.

"Subtle sedition" is the characterization rightly applied to this theory by the New York Globe, and in vigorously combating it the Globe cites a chapter of American history which should be made familiar to every one tempted to doubt the moral character of the American spirit. The Globe's summary of this chapter of our history is so pertinent that we republish it:

"During the Civil War the Southern Confederacy was blockaded far more rigorously than is Germany, for there were no back entries as are provided by Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland. The Southern people were not only deprived of a chance to buy military supplies, but to buy anything. No less than three thousand vessels watched every inch of Southern coast. We denied to neutrals the privilege of shipping to their own or neutral ports when in our opinion the cargoes, contraband or non-contraband, were destined for the Confederacy. . . .

"Suffering from the rigor of our blockade and in danger of being crushed to a degree that no one proposes to crush Germany, the Confederate Government sent out cruisers to prey on our commerce and to stop contraband coming to Northern ports. But two things that Germany has done the Confederacy in its extremity never did, or, so far as known, ever considered doing. It did not stake out huge areas of the ocean and declare that any neutral ship venturing therein was subject to instant destruction. It did not authorize its cruiser commanders to carry on the destruction even against their enemies, much less against neutrals, without regard to what happened to civilians.

"Captain Raphael Semmes, with the Alabama, went raging up and down the high seas. No ports were open to which he could send prizes and their crews, yet when he made a capture he provided for the safety of the captured. He was a sailor, not a pirate or a murderer. It was inconvenient for him to visit and search, and the crews he took on board impeded his movements. But he never thought of doing otherwise. He was an American, not a German of the Prussian school. There were things he would not do. He applied on the sea the same spirit displayed on land by General

Longstreet in the Peninsula campaign, when he forbade the mining of the road along which the Union armies were advancing, for the reason that such mining was contrary to the then code of war."

As the New York Globe infers, the man who does not understand the difference between the record of Captain Semmes and the record of the man who sank the *Lusitania* has something fundamentally the matter with his Americanism.

[§32] SHOULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE LAID AN EMBARGO ON THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO THE ALLIES?

By the U. S. Bureau of Public Information. (June, 1917)

In the first year of the war the Government of Germany stirred up among its people a feeling of resentment against the United States on account of our insistence upon our right as a neutral nation to trade in munitions with the belligerent powers. Our legal right in the matter was not seriously questioned by Germany. She could not have done so consistently, for as recently as the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 both Germany and Austria sold munitions to the belligerents. Their appeals to us in the present war were not to observe international law, but to revise it in their interest. And these appeals they tried to make on moral and humanitarian grounds. But upon "the moral issue" involved, the stand taken by the United States was consistent with its traditional policy and with obvious common sense. For if, with all other neutrals, we refused to sell munitions to belligerents, we could never in time of a war of our own obtain munitions from neutrals, and the nation which had accumulated the largest reserves of war supplies in time of peace would be assured of victory. The militarist state that invested its money in arsenals would be at a fatal advantage over the free people who invested their wealth in schools. To write into international law that neutrals should not trade in munitions would be to hand over the world to the rule of the nation with the largest armament factories. Such a policy the United States could not accept.

(Pamphlet: *How the War Came to America*.)

[§33] GERMAN INTRIGUES AGAINST AMERICA IN TIME OF PEACE.

By the U. S. Bureau of Public Information. (June, 1917)

Evidence of the bad faith of the Imperial German Government soon piled up on every hand. Honest efforts on our part to establish a firm basis of good neighborliness with the German people were met by their Government with quibbles, misrepresentations, and counter accusations against their enemies abroad. And meanwhile in this country official agents

of the Central Powers—protected from criminal prosecution by diplomatic immunity—conspired against our internal peace, placed spies and agents provocateurs throughout the length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions of trust in departments of our Government. While expressing a cordial friendship for the people of the United States, the Government of Germany had its agents at work both in Latin America and Japan. They bought or subsidized papers and supported speakers there to rouse feelings of bitterness and distrust against us in those friendly nations, in order to embroil us in war. They were inciting to insurrection in Cuba, in Haiti, and in Santo Domingo; their hostile hand was stretched out to take the Danish Islands; and everywhere in South America they were abroad sowing the seeds of dissension, trying to stir up one nation against another and all against the United States. In their sum these various operations amounted to direct assault upon the Monroe doctrine. And even if we had given up our right to travel on the sea, even if we had surrendered to German threats and abandoned our legitimate trade in munitions, the German offensive in the New World, in our own land and among our neighbors, was becoming too serious to be ignored.

So long as it was possible, the Government of the United States tried to believe that such activities, the evidence of which was already in a large measure at hand, were the work of irresponsible and misguided individuals. It was only reluctantly, in the face of overwhelming proof, that the recall of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador and of the German military and naval attachés was demanded. Proof of their criminal violations of our hospitality was presented to their Governments. But these Governments in reply offered no apologies nor did they issue reprimands. It became clear that such intrigue was their settled policy.

(Pamphlet: *How the War Came to America*.)

[§34] GERMANY'S ATTEMPT TO ROUSE MEXICO AND JAPAN. (JAN. 19, 1917.)

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico:

That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

(Signed) ZIMMERMANN.

(Intercepted despatch of the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the German Minister in Mexico.)

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CHAPTER III.

WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST CONTINUE IN THE WAR.

A.—SUMMARY STATEMENT.

[§36] Though the immediate occasion of the entrance of the United States into the war was Germany's aggression upon our maritime rights, and her announced determination to continue to murder our nationals upon the high seas, a mere enumeration of Germany's acts of war against us does not make clear the deeper grounds for our decision, nor the reasons why we must continue to bear our part in the struggle until its essential objects are accomplished. Germany's wrong-doing against us served to bring the American mind at last to a full realization of the larger issues of the struggle in Europe, of the great human interests at stake, and of the spirit and character of the enemy we have to face. A failure to intervene would have been equivalent to a deliberate acceptance by us of the following results of such failure:

[§37] (1) Submission to Germany's denial of our rights would have meant, not simply the sacrifice of our material interests; it would have meant that the American Republic would have become a legitimate object of contempt to all peoples, in view of so unmistakable a proof that the most solemn declarations of our government were empty words, without power or genuine purpose behind them. Thereafter the United States would have neither received nor deserved consideration in the councils of the nations. The ability of America in the future to serve those ideals for which it stands would thus have been incalculably weakened.

[§38] (2) By submission, even without armed aid to Germany, we should have made ourselves effectual allies of the Central Powers against Great Britain, France, Belgium, Russia and Italy. For, if Germany could coerce us into closing our ports against exports to Europe, her submarine campaign would be virtually won. Germany compelled us to choose whether we would fight for her or against her. For the consequences of her victory we should thus have shared the moral responsibility. But to avert those consequences was a duty to which we were called by every consideration of loyalty to our national ideals and of prudence in safe-guarding our national security.

[§39] (3) A partial or complete victory of Germany would mean that the German manner of initiating and conducting war would be vindicated by success, and would be the model to be followed in future wars by Germany herself, or by any other ambitious nation which might be tempted by her victory to imitate her methods. The essential principle of those methods

is that no considerations of humanity, good faith, honor or chivalry are to be allowed to stand in the way of any military advantage of Germany; that neutrals have no rights which a belligerent is bound to respect, if it finds it advantageous to violate them; and that the presence of German armies on foreign soil is to be made so terrible to the civilian population that all peoples may be made afraid to oppose so ruthless a force. In their details, these methods have included the killing of innocent hostages in occupied territory; the drowning on the high seas of women and children of neutral nationality; the deportation of thousands of non-combatants, including women and young girls, from their homes, to serve at forced labor in Germany; the massacre of more than half a million Armenians (by Turkish troops subject to the control of resident German officials); the sinking of hospital ships and drowning of wounded soldiers and Red Cross nurses. It must be made clear by this war that any country that adopts such principles and employs such methods will bring upon itself, not merely the condemnation, but the effectual opposition, of the whole civilized world.

[§40] (4) A German victory would be based wholly upon treaty-breaking and violation of international law and international compacts. It would therefore mean that all such laws and compacts would hereafter have little or no force. After this great example of their futility, and of the advantage to be gained by regarding solemn treaties as "scraps of paper," no nation could afford to place reliance in them. A victory over Germany is therefore essential to all peace-loving peoples that desire that, among nations, as among individuals, respect for contracts shall be enforced and a reign of law shall prevail.

[§41] (5) Germany's victory (if her European antagonists should be compelled to accept the terms upon which, in that case, she would unquestionably insist) would involve the annexation of part or all of Belgium and of the most valuable part of Northern France. America could not without shame stand by and see these wrongs triumphantly consummated.

[§42] (6) Victorious Germany, with ambitions unsatiated, would menace the security of the United States, and especially the Monroe Doctrine. That danger this country would be compelled to face without allies or friends anywhere, if it had refused to support the common cause of humanity in this crisis.

[§43] (7) A peace without either such a defeat of Germany as will weaken the German power and influence over central Europe, or else a radical transformation of the temper as well as the form of the German government, would mean that the most formidable political and military combination in the world—a compact body of more than one hundred and fifty million people, comprising Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, and, probably, eventually other countries—would be controlled in its foreign and military policy by the spirit and the ambitions of the hereditary rulers and the military leaders of Prussia. Their prestige would be heightened through success in a great war; they would be confirmed in their belief in the profitability of aggression; they would be animated by bitter hostility to the democracies which had recently opposed them. Under

such conditions it would be impossible that the world should be "safe for democracy," or that there should be any prospect of a lasting peace. The object of this war should be, if it be possible, to end war; but the success of Germany would cause the shadow of war to rest for generations upon mankind. The affairs of the entire globe would be dominated by a vast Empire seated upon nine seas—a Power contemptuous of other peoples, without regard for its plighted word, alien to the spirit of kindness and fraternity, looking upon force and sinister intrigue as the only means for the adjustment of the relations between states, and inimical to the ideals of free government.

[§44] To the unhappy and misguided people of Germany, Americans wish no ill. But the world can never be secure and wholesome again, nor its peoples dwell together in quietness and confidence, until those who have first misled and corrupted the German conscience, and then brought this immeasurable disaster upon mankind, are utterly discredited, by the failure of their methods and the defeat of their purposes and ambitions; so that all men may know that henceforth the human race will not permit so evil a spirit to triumph upon the earth.

[§45] What, then, is now being settled on the battlefields of Europe, is the character of the coming world-order. Is it to be ruled by the temper and the moral and political ideas of which the Prussian system has become the chief embodiment in the modern world, or by those to which America is dedicated—by the spirit of William the Second or the spirit of Lincoln? A war in which such a question is at issue is the concern of every people that loves peace and justice and freedom; but of none is it so greatly the concern as of the people of the United States. It is America's war more than it is any other nation's; for in it is at stake all that America has stood for, and that has made the name of America a symbol of hope to mankind.

B.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS.

I. GERMAN SPIRIT AND GOVERNMENT.

[§46] THE SUPERIORITY OF GERMANIC CULTURE.

By Various Germans.

One single highly cultured German warrior, of those who are, alas! falling in thousands, represents a higher intellectual and moral life-value than hundreds of the raw children of nature (*Naturmenschen*) whom England and France, Russia and Italy, oppose to them.—(Ernst Haeckel, celebrated zoologist.)

Our belief is that the salvation of the whole Kultur of Europe depends upon the victory which German "militarism" is about to achieve.—(Manifesto signed by 3,500 professors and lecturers.)

We must win, because, if we were defeated, no one in the

whole world could any longer cherish any remnant of belief in truth and right, in the Good, or, indeed, in any higher Power which wisely and justly guides the destinies of humanity.—(W. Helm.)

No nation in the world can give us anything worth mentioning in the field of science or technology, art or literature, which we should have any trouble in doing without. Let us reflect on the inexhaustible wealth of the German character, which contains in itself everything of real value that the Kultur of man can produce.—(Werner Sombart, a well-known German economist.)

Archer's *Gems* (?) of *German Thought*, passim.

[§47] THE GERMAN GOD.

By Various German Writers.

Now we understand why the other nations pursue us with their hatred: they do not understand us, but they are sensible of our enormous spiritual superiority. So the Jews were hated in antiquity, because they were the representatives of God on earth.—(Prof. W. Sombart.)

There is a gospel saying which burst the bonds of its original historical meaning and takes new wings in the storm of the world-war, a saying which we may well take as the consecration of our German mission: "Ye are the salt of the earth! Ye are the light of the world!"—(Prof. A. Deissmann.)

Germany is the centre of God's plan for the world.—("On the German God," by Pastor W. Lehmann.)

It was the hidden meaning of God that He made Israel the forerunner (Vordeuter) of the Messiah, and in the same way He has by His hidden intent designated the German people to be His successor.—(Dr. Preuss.) (The foregoing taken from Archer, *Gems* (?) of *German Thought*, passim.)

In a modern German school book we read that "Christ shall be a German Christ for us Germans," and that God has a special mission for Germany, as distinct from the rest of the world, in virtue of which Germany "cannot succumb and die, but must live and conquer."—(J. P. Bang, Professor of Theology at the University of Copenhagen, *Christianity and Nationality*.)

The more exclusively Jesus is preached, the less does He help to form States; and where Christianity attempted to come forward as a constructive force, that is, to form States, to dominate civilization, there it was furthest away from the Gospel of Jesus. Now this means, for our practical life, that we construct our house of the State, not with the cedars of Lebanon, but with the building stones from the Roman Capitol. . . . Hence we do not consult Jesus when we are concerned with things which belong to the domain of the construction of the State and of Political Economy. This sounds harsh and abrupt for every human being brought up a Christian, but appears to be sound Lutheranism.—(From Friedrich Naumann's *Briefe über Religion*, 5th ed., Berlin, 1910, 86, 87; in Friedrich von Hügel's *The German Soul*, p. 58.)

Lift up your heads! Look to the heights, bend your knees before the Great Ally, who has never forsaken the Germans, and who, if He has at times allowed them to be sorely tried and discouraged, has again raised them from the dust.—(Speech of William II at Königsberg, June 30, 1903; from Gauss, *The German Emperor*, 231.)

Just as the great King (William I) was never left in the lurch by the old Ally, so our Fatherland and this beautiful province will always be near His heart.—(Speech at Breslau, Sept. 8, 1906; *ibid*, 246.)

[§48] WHY GERMANY IS NOT A DEMOCRACY.

1. Because Prussia, which dominates the German Empire and comprises two-thirds of its population, is ruled by a king who professes to hold his crown by divine right. The Prussian Constitution exists only by the king's pleasure, and may be revoked by him whenever he sees fit.

2. Because the entire executive power of the German Empire is wielded by the Imperial Chancellor, appointed by the Emperor, to whom alone he is responsible, and by whom alone he can be removed.

3. Because the greater part of the legislative power of the Empire is wielded by the Bundesrat, which represents solely the rulers of the twenty-five federated states. In this body most legislation is initiated; its consent is necessary to every law passed by the Reichstag; and through it the Princes of Germany, and chiefly the Emperor (as King of Prussia), who directly controls one-third of its votes, have an absolute veto upon the action of the Reichstag.

4. Because the Emperor, in conjunction with the Bundesrat, has power to declare war without consulting the Reichstag. In case of alleged attack by a foreign country, he may—as in 1914—declare war without even the consent of the Bundesrat.

5. Because the electoral districts of the Reichstag (which have not been changed since 1871) are so unequal that, while a Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 voters, a deputy from the Junker districts of East Prussia represents only 24,000. This gives a wholly disproportionate voting power to the agrarian interests and the landed aristocracy.

6. Because the kingdom of Prussia is likewise ruled by an executive responsible neither to Parliament nor to the people, but only to the sovereign.

7. Because the upper house of the Prussian Diet consists of members of the nobility, created and selected by the king, and is for all practical purposes completely subject to his control.

8. Because the House of Representatives in the Prussian Diet is elected in the following manner: the voters in each district are divided into three classes according to the taxes paid by them. Those few who pay the first third of the entire tax constitute one class; those who pay the second third, another; while the third class consists of those who pay the remainder of the taxes. Each of these groups, voting separately, elects an

equal number of delegates to a convention, which chooses the representatives of that constituency in the lower house of the Diet. By this unequal franchise, the 4% of the population, making up the first class, have as much representation in the Diet as the 82% making up the third class. In one district, for example, 370 rich men had the same voting capacity as 22,000 poor men; in some districts a single individual constitutes the first class, and exercises one-third of the voting power.

9. Because the Great General Staff of the German army, which is subject to no civil or elective authority but only to the Emperor, is practically one of the principal organs of government, exercising in many matters an authority superior to that of either the Diet or the Reichstag. An eminent German publicist, Professor Delbrück, has recently declared: "The essence of our monarchy resides in its relations with the army. Whoever knows our officers must know that they would never tolerate the government of a minister of war issuing from parliament."

(Summarized for this *Handbook*. For an excellent brief account of the German constitution, see *Germany, Last Stronghold of Autocracy*, by Professor C. D. Hazen of Columbia University, in *New York Times*, June 22, 1917, from which some of the above statements are abridged. Another convenient summary may be found in "Germany's Long Road to Democracy," *World's Work*, June, 1917.)

[§49] A KING "BY DIVINE RIGHT."

By Emperor William II. (Aug. 25, 1910.)

Here it was that the Great Elector, by his own right, created himself the Sovereign Duke in Prussia; here his son crowned himself as King; and the sovereign house of Brandenburg thus became one of the European powers. . . . And here my grandfather, again by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon his head, once more distinctly emphasizing the fact that it was accorded him by the will of God alone, and not by Parliament, or by any assemblage of the people, or by popular vote, and that he thus looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of heaven and as such performed his duties as regent and sovereign.

(Speech as King of Prussia, at Königsberg; from Gauss, *The German Emperor*, 279.)

[§50] THOR'S HAMMER-CAST.

By Felix Dahn (1878).

Thor stood at the midnight end of the world,
 His battle-mace flew from his hand:
 "So far as my clangorous hammer I've hurled
 Mine are the sea and the land!"
 And onward hurtled the mighty sledge
 O'er the wide, wide earth, to fall
 At last on the Southland's furthest edge

In token that His was all.
 Since then 'tis the joyous German right
 With the hammer lands to win.
 We mean to inherit world-wide might
 As the Hammer-God's kith and kin.

(Used by Tannenberg as motto for his *Gross-Deutschland*.
 Translation cited from Archer, *Gems of German Thought*.)

[§51] A PAN-GERMANIST'S PROGRAM.

By Otto Richard Tannenberg.

The German people must take possession of Central Africa from the mouth of the Orange River to Lake Tchad, and from the Kamerun Mountains to the mouth of the River Rovuma; of the Near East; of the Malayan Islands; and finally, of the southern half of South America. It will then have a colonial empire commensurate with its power. A politics of fine sentiments (*Gefühlspolitik*) is stupidity; humanitarian dreams are mere silliness. Charity begins at home. Politics is business. Right and wrong are ideas that have a necessary place only in the life of the private citizen. The German people is *always* right, because it is German and because it numbers eighty-seven millions. Our fathers have left us much still to do.

(Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland*, 1911, p. 231, translated for this *Handbook*.)

II. GERMAN METHODS IN WAR.

[§52] GERMAN THEORY OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR.

By German Military Writers.

Whoever uses force, without any consideration and without sparing blood, has sooner or later the advantage if the enemy does not proceed in the same way. One cannot introduce a principle of moderation into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity. It is a vain and erroneous tendency to wish to neglect the element of brutality in war merely because we dislike it.—(Von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, I, 4.)

It would be giving up ourselves to a chimera not to realize that war in the present will have to be conducted more recklessly, less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than ever in the past. . . . Distress, the deep misery of war, must not be spared to the enemy State. The burden must be and must remain crushing. The necessity of imposing it follows from the very idea of national war. . . . That individuals may be severely affected when one makes an example of them intended to serve as a deterrent, is truly deplorable for them. But for the people as a whole this severity exercised against

individuals is a salutary blessing. When national war has broken out, *terrorism* becomes a principle which is necessary from a military standpoint.—(General J. Von Hartmann, cited in Lavissee and Andler, *German Theory and Practice of War*.)

[§53] GERMAN PROCLAMATIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

The following are a few examples of proclamations issued by German military commanders in occupied towns in Belgium and France, illustrating chiefly the practice of taking hostages, to be shot in case of any disorder, or even of injury to railways and telegraph lines (whether or not such injury is shown to be committed by inhabitants of the town). The French text of the proclamation at Brussels is here printed; the others are given only in translation. An extensive collection of these proclamations may be found in photographic reproductions, in *Scraps of Paper*, New York, Hodder & Stoughton, 1916.

Proclamation at Brussels.

A l'avenir les localités situées près de l'endroit où a eu lieu la destruction des chemins de fer et lignes télégraphiques seront punies sans pitié (il n'importe qu'elles soient coupables ou non de ces actes). Dans ce but des otages ont été pris dans toutes les localités situées près des chemins de fer qui sont menacés de pareilles attaques; et au premier attentat à la destruction des lignes de chemins de fer, de lignes télégraphiques ou lignes téléphoniques, ils seront immédiatement fusillés.

Bruxelles, le 5 Octobre 1914.

Le Gouverneur,
VON DER GOLTZ.

Proclamation at Brussels.

In future the inhabitants of places situated near railways and telegraph lines which have been destroyed will be punished without mercy (whether they are guilty of this destruction or not). For this purpose, hostages have been taken in all places in the vicinity of railways in danger of similar attacks; and at the first attempt to destroy any railway, telegraph, or telephone line, they will be shot immediately.

Brussels, 5th October, 1914.

The Governor,
VON DER GOLTZ.

Proclamation at Rheims.

Notice to the Population.

In order sufficiently to ensure the safety of our troops and the tranquility of the population of Rheims the persons mentioned have been seized as hostages by the Commander of the German Army. These hostages will be shot if there is the least disorder. On the other hand, if the town remains

perfectly calm and quiet, these hostages and inhabitants will be placed under the protection of the German Army.

THE GENERAL COMMANDING.

Rheims, 12th September, 1914.

Proclamation at Lunéville.

Inhabitants of both sexes are strictly forbidden to leave their houses so far as this is not absolutely necessary for making short rounds, in order to buy provisions or water their cattle. They are absolutely forbidden to leave their houses at night under any circumstances whatever.

Whoever attempts to leave the place, by night or day, upon any pretext whatever will be shot.

Potatoes can only be dug with the Commandant's consent and under military supervision.

The German troops have orders to carry out these directions strictly, by sentinels and patrols, who are authorized to fire on any one departing from these directions.

THE GENERAL COMMANDING.

[§54] THE DEPORTATIONS AT LILLE.

By Three French Women.

This week has been terrible for our unhappy town: 1,200 to 1,500 people have been carried off every night, escorted by soldiers with fixed bayonets and bands playing, machine guns at the corners of the streets, principally girls and young women of all sorts, also men from 15 to 50, sent off promiscuously in cattle trucks with wooden benches, for unknown destinations and employments, nominally to work on the land. You can imagine the despair and agony of their relations. We learn this afternoon that the horrible business is over and our quarter has been spared.

Horrible affair at Lille, tell it everywhere; the deportation of 6,000 women and 6,000 men; for eight nights at two in the morning, districts invested by the 64th Regiment (spread it in France that it came from Verdun), forcibly dragged off girls of 18 and women up to 45; 2,000 a night. Herded in a factory; sorted out during the day and carried off in the evening; scattered from Seclin to Sedan in abandoned villages, farms, etc.; cook and wash for the soldiers, replacing orderlies sent to the front; working on the land, especially servants and working girls, few girls of good family. Rue Royale, hardly any servants left; crowded in with men of all ages without distinction; horrible immorality; some German officers refused to obey, some soldiers were crying, the rest brutal. Ernest W. carried off, his brother C. was one day in the fortress for having protested, sons have remained; X. is near Hirson. Mlle. B. and Mlle. de B. carried

515: wanted to follow some poor girls who were their protégées; came to my house at four in the morning, no one taken; no one came to No. 14. Protests by the mayors and the sous-prefets. Useless. Same operations at Tourcoing (6,000) and at Roubaix (4,000). The town is in despair.

Mme. J. R. —, aged 25, maker of paper-bags, deported from S—, writes: "All we women were subjected to inspection every five days, like women of the town. Those who did not accomplish their task (namely, sewing 25 sacks) were beaten by the Germans, especially with a cat-o'-nine-tails. This ill-treatment was mostly inflicted by a sergeant named Franz; I cannot give the name of his regiment. There were four to look after us. For the least thing the Germans used to insult and threaten us. . . . One girl, J. G—, of S— (I cannot give her exact address), was beaten with the cat and had a jug of water poured over her head because she asked for something to eat. A certain A— (I cannot give any further description of her) was so severely beaten that she was taken to the hospital, and we did not see her again."

(From *The Deportation of Women and Girls from Lille.*)

[§55] A GERMAN EYE-WITNESS ON THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES.

By Dr. Martin Niepage.

(*A word to Germany's Accredited Representatives by Dr. Martin Niepage, Higher Grade Teacher in the German Technical School at Aleppo, at present at Vernigerode.*)

When I returned to Aleppo in September, 1915, from a three months' holiday at Beirut, I heard with horror that a new phase of Armenian massacres had begun which were far more terrible than the earlier massacres under Abdul-Hamid, and which aimed at exterminating, root and branch, the intelligent, industrious, and progressive Armenian nation, and at transferring its property to Turkish hands.

Such monstrous news left me at first incredulous. I was told that, in various quarters of Aleppo, there were lying masses of half-starved people, the survivors of so-called "deportation convoys." In order, I was told, to cover the extermination of the Armenian nation with a political cloak, military reasons were being put forward, which were said to make it necessary to drive the Armenians out of their native seats, which had been theirs for 2,500 years, and to deport them to the Arabian deserts. I was also told that individual Armenians had lent themselves to acts of espionage.

After I had informed myself about the facts and had made inquiries on all sides, I came to the conclusion that all these accusations against the Armenians were, in fact, based on trifling provocations, which were taken as an excuse for slaughtering 10,000 innocents for one guilty person, for the most savage out-

rages against women and children, and for a campaign of starvation against the exiles which was intended to exterminate the whole nation.

To test the conclusion derived from my information, I visited all the places in the city where there were Armenians left behind by the convoys. In dilapidated caravansaries (hans) I found quantities of dead, many corpses being half-decomposed and others, still living, among them, who were soon to breathe their last. In other yards I found quantities of sick and starving people whom no one was looking after. In the neighborhood of the German Technical School, at which I am employed as a higher grade teacher, there were four such hans, with seven or eight hundred exiles dying of starvation. We teachers and our pupils had to pass by them every day. Every time we went out we saw through the open windows their pitiful forms, emaciated and wrapped in rags. In the mornings our school children, on their way through the narrow streets, had to push past the two-wheeled ox-carts, on which every day from eight to ten rigid corpses, without coffin or shroud, were carried away, their arms and legs trailing out of the vehicle.

After I had shared this spectacle for several days I thought it my duty to compose the following report:

"As teachers in the German Technical School at Aleppo, we permit ourselves with all respect to make the following report:

"We feel it our duty to draw attention to the fact that our educational work will forfeit its moral basis and the esteem of the natives, if the German Government is not in a position to put a stop to the brutality with which the wives and children of slaughtered Armenians are being treated here.

"Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, women and children, only two or three hundred survivors arrive here in the south. The men are slaughtered on the way; the women and girls, with the exception of the old, the ugly and those who are still children, have been abused by Turkish soldiers and officers and then carried away to Turkish and Kurdish villages, where they have to accept Islam. They try to destroy the remnant of the convoys by hunger and thirst. Even when they are fording rivers they do not allow those dying of thirst to drink. All the nourishment they receive is a daily ration of a little meal sprinkled over their hands, which they lick off greedily, and its only effect is to protract their starvation.

"And what becomes of these poor people who have been driven in thousands through Aleppo and the neighborhood into the deserts, reduced almost entirely, by this time, to women and children. They are driven on and on from one place to another. The thousands shrink to hundreds and the hundreds to tiny remnants, and even these remnants are driven on till the last is dead. Then at last they have reached the goal of their wandering, the 'New Homes assigned to the Armenians,' as the newspapers phrase it.

"*Ta'aim el aleman*' ('the teaching of the Germans') is the

simple Turk's explanation to everyone who asks him about the originators of these measures.

"The educated Moslems are convinced that, even though the German nation discountenances such horrors, the German Government is taking no steps to put a stop to them, out of consideration for its Turkish Ally.

"Mohammedans, too, of more sensitive feelings—Turks and Arabs alike—shake their heads in disapproval and do not conceal their tears when they see a convoy of exiles marching through the city, and Turkish soldiers using cudgels upon women in advanced pregnancy and upon dying people who can no longer drag themselves along. They cannot believe that their government has ordered these atrocities, and they hold the Germans responsible for all such outrages, Germany being considered during the war as Turkey's schoolmaster in everything. Even the mollahs in the mosques say that it was not the Sublime Porte but the German officers who ordered the ill-treatment and destruction of the Armenians.

"The things which have been passing here for months under everybody's eyes will certainly remain as a stain on Germany's shield in the memory of Orientals. . . .

"I know for a fact that the Embassy at Constantinople has been informed by the German Consulates of all that has been happening. As, however, there has not been so far the least change in the system of deportation, I feel myself compelled by conscience to make my present report."

What we saw with our own eyes here in Aleppo was really only the last scene in the great tragedy of the extermination of the Armenians. It was only a minute fraction of the horrible drama that was being played out simultaneously in all the other provinces of Turkey. Many more appalling things were reported by the engineers of the Bagdad Railway, when they came back from their work on the section under construction or by German travellers who met the convoys of exiles on their journeys. Many of these gentlemen had seen such appalling sights that they could eat nothing for days.

The German Consul from Mosul related, in my presence, at the German club at Aleppo, that, in many places on the road from Mosul to Aleppo, he had seen children's hands lying hacked off in such numbers that one could have paved the road with them. In the German hospital at Ourfa there was a little girl who had had both her hands hacked off.

In an Arab village on the way to Aleppo Herr Holstein, the German Consul from Mosul, saw shallow graves with freshly-buried Armenian corpses. The Arabs of the village declared that they had killed these Armenians by the government's orders. One asserted proudly that he personally had killed eight.

(Dr. Martin Niepage, *The Horrors of Aleppo*. The full statement in English translation may be had from G. H. Doran Co., N. Y.)

III. GERMANY'S WAR AIMS.

[§56] WHAT GERMANS HOPE TO WIN BY A VICTORY.

By Charles H. Beard, Professor in Columbia University.

Herr Grumbach, with Teutonic thoroughness, has brought together a stout volume of papers and documents which prove that the dominant figures in Germany (with few exceptions) consider peace without annexations and indemnities in no other light than that of a humiliating defeat. Here are hundreds of extracts from German speeches, official declarations, party resolutions, editorials, pamphlets, magazine and newspaper articles (in the original tongue, with authorities cited), all showing that in almost every circle, high and low, throughout the German Empire the Russian formula has been a hated phrase. The persons quoted include the Emperor and the King of Bavaria, ministers of state, high imperial officers, important men of affairs, generals in the army (active and retired), professors, members of the Reichstag, members of the Prussian Landtag, socialists, publicists, and pamphleteers. All upper-class parties and all interests are fully represented; the Conservatives, the Center, the National Liberals, the Progressive People's Party, and the minor factions are all on record. As if with one voice they proclaim to the world that for Germany the territorial status quo ante is impossible, unthinkable. Against this doctrine can be marshalled only a few protests from Social Democrats and scattered individuals.

The Kaiser calls for peace that will offer to Germany "free seas" and "necessary military, political, and economic securities." The King of Bavaria declares that "a strengthening of the German Empire and an expansion beyond its present boundaries, so far as this is necessary to guarantee security against future attacks—such is to be the fruit of this war." The Duke of Mecklenburg demands a peace that will give the empire a mighty colonial dominion in Africa and a sufficient number of strongholds scattered throughout the world for coaling stations, wireless towers, and trading posts. Bethmann-Hollweg calmly informs us that the conditions before the war cannot be restored and that peace can only come when Germany is established in an impregnable position. He further adds that if anyone thinks that Germany will surrender the conquered territories of the west without guaranties that Belgium will not again become a vassal state of England and France, he is sadly mistaken. "This means," he continues significantly, "no status quo ante—Germany cannot again abandon the long oppressed Flemish people to alien dominion" (*Verwelschung*). The Secretary of State for the Colonies announces that Germany has no intention of surrendering her oversea dominions, but will, on the contrary, seek to strengthen and develop her colonial possessions.

The former Chancellor, Fürst Bülow, frankly holds that the simple restoration of the condition before the war would be not a gain but a loss (*nicht Gewinn, sondern Verlust*)—not victory, but defeat. Therefore he demands annexations east and west. "The French simply cannot understand the fact that what they regard as the brutal harshness of a conqueror is merely national necessity for us Germans. Perhaps the French will in the course of time acquiesce in the provisions of the Frankfort peace (1871) if it is at last realized that they are unchangeable, and especially if we succeed in developing our still unfavorable strategic position over against France." The poor French, they cannot understand that German brutality is at bottom necessitarian generosity!

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According to Ernst Haeckel's program: (a) Belgium is to be divided, the greatest portion to go to Germany direct, a second part to Luxemburg (which is to become a German state), and a third part [astounding generosity] to fall to Holland (b) Germany is to seize most of the British colonies and the Belgian Congo; (c) the northeastern provinces of France are to go to Germany; (d) the kingdom of Poland is to be restored and united with Austria-Hungary; (e) the Baltic provinces to be "restored" to Germany. Such was the reasoned answer which the learned doctor gave to the inquiring president of the Berlin Monist Association.

(Review of S. Grumbach's "Das annexionistische Deutschland" in *New Republic*, July 14, 1917).

[§57] PROJECT OF A MITTELEUROPA.

By Bruno Lasker.

Friedrich Naumann, as a member of the Reichstag, editor of *Die Hilfe*, founder and leader of the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, is one of the greatest powers in the Germany of today. Starting from an intense interest in legislative, social and fiscal reform, he did not, like Bryan in this country, and Lloyd George in England, take for granted the stability of his country's foreign relationships, but for long included in the objects of his political activity far-reaching aims of external economic and imperialist expansion. His *Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik*, published about ten years ago, was one of the most widely read expositions of the policy of pan-Germanism applied to the economic and diplomatic fields.

His book, while it carefully avoids to name the child of his desire, is propaganda for a greater German empire, taking in the whole of Austria and Hungary and their dependent states—with a distant view to incorporation of Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, the Kurland provinces of Russia, the Flemish half of Belgium, Luxembourg, of course, and possibly Poland—an empire loosely knit as was the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, yet dominated by the political ideals and actual control of Prussia. He is careful not to call his "Mid-Europe" an empire; but it is clear from his detailed considerations of necessary

future developments that he has in mind a constellation at least as coherent and as centralized as is the British empire with its vast self-governing dominions beyond the seas.

No one who believes in world empires or who accepts as a fact the assertion that the future progress of civilization is bound up with the maintenance of an equilibrium between two or more large and politically compact groups of nations, can logically dispute the soundness of Naumann's argument that the security of Germany lies in the renascence of that greater Germany which Bismarck tried to create, until he realized that a nationalized lesser Germany, if it could be formed without detriment to the grander idea, was an aim of more immediate promise. Now, a closer reunion with Austria would seem both an economic and a military necessity—would seem, for in this contention the author makes a number of assumptions which cannot be granted as valid beyond dispute.

One of them is that "after the experiences of the present war no isolated country can remain unintrenched"; that Austria and Germany, no matter what their present political relations, must face the alternative of cancelling their separate foreign offices and making a joint cause in every external issue affecting them both, or of entrenching their respective frontiers on the ridges of the Erzgebirge, the Riesengebirge and the Böhmerwald. He will admit of no other form of effective military preparedness. . . .

If the war ends with the creation of mid-Europe as planned by Naumann—federation, super-state, military and economic alliance, or whatever name may disguise its essentially imperial structure—the fate of the smaller nationalities of Europe will be sealed. The tragedy of Bohemia, of Poland, of Bosnia, of Alsace-Lorraine, of Schleswig—of every territory inhabited by freedom-loving peoples with cultural and political ideas of their own—will be re-enacted on an even larger scale. For the concentration of power in central Europe must also lead to a similar centralization in the rest of the world, threatening once more the political autonomy now almost assured for Ireland and the constituent nationalities of Russia.

Review by Bruno Lasker of Naumann's *Central Europe*, in *The Survey*, July 21, 1917.)

IV. MEANING AND OBJECTS OF AMERICA'S WAR.

[§58] WHY WE MUST FIGHT.

By Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior. (July 5, 1917)

[*Message to the Chautauqua Conference of the National Security League.*]

This is to be a nation in arms for an indefinite time. We cannot know how long. We have no delusions as to the way being easy; for if there is a horror or a terror or a cruelty that has not been used in this war there is but one explanation—it has not been thought of. The chivalry of war is a thing for the grim humor of a Dante to deal with. Those gentlemen of the middle ages who poured burning lead from besieged walls

upon their enemies were amateurs. We are scientists. The cunning Medici, who pressed a poisoned ring upon his enemy's finger, was a piker. We sweep a field of ten thousand young college students with poisoned gas. We make a harmless looking cloud that drifts across the hillside encompass and burn out the insides of the soldier. We turn night into day with artificial stars, so that we may spy out those who dare to give a glass of water to the groaning wounded in "No Man's Land." We spray with burning liquid those who come near us, and from a mile in the air let fall bombs on babies in school houses. The captured soldiers are tortured, not *a la* Iroquois, but *a la* Junker. The captured civilian is enslaved; not sold, simply starved. Thus does German science make war. To be a soldier now is to summon the skill and spirit of a scientist's hell and set it at work without curb of conscience or humanity.

And why is all this? Who caused all this? Was the world not a very agreeable place on August 1, 1914? Were we not playing the game of life with some degree of satisfaction when this upheaval came,—this lifting from the bottom of the sea of life the vilest and the most horrible of our abilities and qualities? What has caused this ring of fire and hatred and brutality to run round this smiling world? There is but one answer,—the will of Germany to make subject the world. No one has said that Germany should not live. The seas were as free to her as to us. Her people were multiplying rapidly; her marvelous and conquering system of industry was the product of disciplined purpose. But Germany could not have her way with Servia, with Belgium and with France, and so the world must be crucified.

The United States would not surrender to Germany what it had fought England to win,—our rights upon the sea. The United States would not stand aside with indifference until the world has been strangled into submission: The United States would not stay its hand until its own frontiers were not only threatened, but actually invaded. Our unwillingness to participate was no protection against plots and combinations that would forever force us into the business of making armies. And at the end we were to be left friendless and alone, at the mercy of the diplomacy of a Zimmermann and the aggressions of a Hindenburg and a Tirpitz. The great republics of the world would have gone down, and we would stand in isolated terror. To meet this invasion of our rights we have gone abroad where the war is being fought,—to keep it from being fought where the stubborn, short-sighted George III fought his war with us, in New York, New Jersey and Virginia. The power that threatens us in spirit and by act, that has told us where we can use the seas and to what extent, that promises a world made up of a ruling class and subservient soldiers, is in Europe, not in America—and there we have gone to meet it, with Pershing and with Sims.

(Special message sent to Speakers' Training Camp and Conference at Chautauqua, N. Y.)

[§59] "LIBERTY OF NATIONAL EVOLUTION"
VERSUS THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

By Elihu Root, Former Secretary of State. (Jan. 25, 1917.)

The German note proposing a peace conference used a phrase which aptly describes the concrete application of the principle about which I am talking. It said, "We were forced to take the sword for justice and for *liberty of national evolution*." Liberty of national evolution! It was national evolution that overran Servia. It was national evolution that crushed Belgium. And national evolution has not confined itself to the pathway to the Channel or to the pathway to the Bosphorus; it has extended over Asia and Africa, all over the world—except America, North and South—eager and grasping and resolute, gathering in under its flag, under its domination, under national control, *the territory of the earth*.

All nations have been at fault during this last half century. Many crimes have been committed; no nations that I know have been guiltless—none. Neither England, nor France, nor Russia, nor Germany, nor Austria, nor the United States. For we still have to answer for Mexico. But the world is partitioned—Asia, Africa, Australasia, the islands of the sea, all taken up—except America. And we stand here with the Monroe Doctrine; we stand here with the Monroe Doctrine against the push and sweep of that *mighty world tendency of national evolution* and to its progress under the principle that neither faith of treaties nor obligation of law nor rule of morality should stand in the way of a state that finds its interest to *take what it wants* for its national interest. How long will the Monroe Doctrine be worth the paper it was written on in 1823, if that condition is to go on? That Doctrine is that the safety of the United States forbids any foreign military power to obtain a foothold upon this continent from which it may readily make war upon the United States—that is the Monroe Doctrine; it is a declaration of what, in the opinion of the United States, is necessary for the safety of the United States. Now, that doctrine is not international law. It has been maintained by these things: In the first place, the men of Monroe's time never thought of such a thing as not being ready to fight for their rights. They were Belgians, those people. The second has been that the balance of power in Europe has been so even, so close, and everybody has been so doubtful about what the other fellows were going to do, that nobody found it worth while to take on a row with the United States. And, third, England's fleet.

Now, I ask what that Monroe Doctrine will be worth if we aren't ready to protect it? Suppose the result of this war is such that these foreign influences that have helped preserve the Monroe Doctrine disappear, and we aren't ready to defend it? Worthless! What will it mean if a foreign naval power—a real naval power, a real military power—obtains a naval base in the Caribbean or in those islands of the Pacific off Panama? Our interests in the Panama Canal will be as worthless to us as

the Bosphorus is to Russia today. And instead of having what we have spent four hundred millions to accomplish, the means of transferring our navy from ocean to ocean, our navy will be shut up again on one side or the other of the continent. And then we will have to live as poor, peaceable France has lived for the last forty years—with a sentinel always on the lookout for an approaching foe. Then the fancied security and sweet, comfortable ease of our people will be replaced by alarms and rumors of war and attack upon occasion. For the Monroe Doctrine was based upon sound wisdom, and the abandonment of it or the destruction of it will be the end of our security.

It seems to me that we have reached a point now where we can say that a prudent man—a man competent to be a trustee of property—will see that it is necessary for us to prepare to defend our rights. For why should not this principle of national aggression be applied to us? Why shouldn't it be applied to South and Central America and the West Indies? Here we all are, rich, undefended, supine—fair game for anybody who wants national evolution.

(Address before the National Security League's Congress for Constructive Patriotism.)

[§60] PAN-GERMAN PLANS FOR ANNEXATION IN SOUTH AMERICA.

By Otto Richard Tannenberg.

The German colonies in southern Brazil and Uruguay are the one bright spot in this gloomy picture of South American civilization. Here dwell some half million Germans; and it is to be hoped that by the reorganization of South America, when the half-breed population—a cross between the Indians and the Latin races—has disappeared, the vast basin of the La Plata will become German territory. The Germans in Southern Brazil—like the Boers in South Africa—have, on the average, twelve to fifteen children; so that, by this natural increase alone, the country is assured to us. In these circumstances is it not wonderful that the German people has not long since decided to take possession of this territory? For the people of the republics which have inherited the former domains of Spain and Portugal, it would be altogether a blessing to become subject to German power. They will soon be reconciled to our rule and be proud of their part in the world-wide glory of the German name.

(Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland*, 295; translation for this *Handbook*.)

[§61] THE REAL ISSUE OF THE WAR.

By Members of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium.

Of all Americans, the members of the Commission for Relief in Belgium have had the best opportunity to know what the spirit and the methods of German militarism are.

The chairman of that commission, Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, telegraphed Mr. Wilson as follows on April 3, 1917:

"We wish to tell you that there is no word in your historic statement that does not find a response in all our hearts. Although we break with great regret our association with many German individuals, there is no hope for democracy unless the system which brought into the world this unfathomable misery can be stamped out once for all."

Professor Vernon Kellogg, chief representative of the Commission in Northern France, and afterwards director at Brussels, thus describes how he, a pacifist, became convinced by his talks with German officers that this war must be fought to a decisive end:

"I say it dispassionately but with conviction. If I understand their point of view, it is one that will never allow any land or people controlled by it to exist peacefully by the side of a people governed by our point of view. For their point of view does not permit of a live-and-let-live kind of carrying on. . . . Perhaps I can state his argument clearly enough, so that others may see and accept his reasons, too. Unfortunately for the peace of our evenings, I was never convinced. That is, never convinced that for the good of the world the Germans should win this war, completely and terribly. I was convinced, however, that this war, once begun, must be fought to a finish of decision—a finish that will determine whether or not Germany's point of view is to rule the world. And this conviction, thus gained, meant the conversion of a pacifist to an ardent supporter, not of war, but of this war; of fighting this war to a definitive end—that end to be Germany's conversion to be a good Germany, or not much of any Germany at all. My 'Headquarters Nights' are the confessions of a converted pacifist. . . . The creed of the *Allmacht* [omnipotence] of a natural selection based on violent and fatal competitive struggle is the creed of the German intellectuals—all else is anathema and illusion. . . . As with the different ant species, struggle—bitter, ruthless struggle—is the rule among the different human groups. This struggle not only must go on, but it should go on, so that this natural law may work out in its cruel inevitable way the salvation of the human species. By its salvation is meant its desirable natural evolution. That human group which is in the most advanced evolutionary stage as regards internal organization is best, and . . . should win in the struggle for existence . . . and impose its kind of social organization—its *Kultur*—on the others, or, alternatively, destroy and replace them. This is the disheartening kind of argument that I faced at Headquarters. . . . Add to these assumed premises the additional assumption that the Germans are the chosen race, and the German social and political organization the chosen type of human community life, and you have a wall of logic and conviction that you can break your head against, but can never shatter—by headwork. . . . The danger from Germany is, I have said, that the Germans believe what they say. And they act on this belief. Professor [X] says that this war is necessary

as a test of the German position and claim. If Germany is beaten, it will prove that she has moved along the wrong evolutionary line, and should be beaten. If she wins, it will prove that she is on the right way, and that the rest of the world, at least that part which we and the Allies represent, is on the wrong way, and should, for the sake of the right evolution of the human race, be stopped, and put on the right way—or else be destroyed as unfit. . . . He opposes all mercy, all compromise with human soft-heartedness. Apart from his horrible academic casuistry and his conviction that the individual is nothing, the State all, he is a reasoning and a warm-hearted man. So are some other Germans. But for him and them the test of right in this struggle is success in it. So let every means to victory be used. The only intelligence Germans should follow in these days is the intelligence of the General Staff; the only things to believe and to repeat are the statements of the official bureau of publicity.

“There is no reasoning with this sort of thing, no finding of any heart or soul in it. There is only one kind of answer: resistance by brutal force; war to a decision. It is the only argument in rebuttal understandable of these men at Headquarters into whose hands the German people have put their destiny.”

(“Headquarters Nights,” in *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917.)

[§62] A WAR BETWEEN OPPOSING PRINCIPLES.

By Talcott Williams. (Feb. 8, 1915.)

We may as well understand that what we have long looked for, which through earth's mists men have seen as the coming of the dawn, the World State, is already here.

There is not a man in business who has not found himself affected by what has taken place. There is not a single man here or a single man between the oceans, who is not perfectly well aware that in a fashion he had never dreamed, in a manner he had never imagined, and which no statesman had predicted and no university had taught, there has suddenly dawned upon us all, that humanity is one, that all states are part of it, that we have ceased to look upon peoples, but instead we see humanity as a whole, and that every great act affects all humanity alike. Face to face with the World State we need to be aware that what we are watching is not a war between nations any longer. It is civil war. It is a war between two great opposing principles of humanity; one looking to the organization of the State from above, and the other looking to its organization from below. One believing that authority can be conferred upon a few to exercise for the benefit of the many, and the other believing that nobody is wise enough to exercise authority in behalf of anyone else except by their choice and their consent.

It will be seven centuries next June since the corner-stone of the second of those principles was laid in the Great Char-

ter signed by the barons and King John. The great question is whether this principle shall widen, until it is recognized by all the world.

We cannot avoid it if we would, and we would not avoid it if we could. The great service which the United States can do towards obtaining peace is to continue to stand upon the protest which it uttered against the violation of the neutralization of one country until it has secured the acceptance, in the reorganization of the World State which is at hand, of this principle by the entire world.

This is the task which is before this country; this is the task which is slowly establishing itself before you; and there is not a single man here who does not believe that upon this principle and upon this principle alone the United States should endeavor to secure peace. Peace, when it comes, must begin a World State ruled either by militarism or by Republics; and in that great conflict, although victory may be delayed, although sacrifice may be required, here, in this city, with Concord and Bunker Hill at hand, no man can doubt as to the final and ultimate result.

(Address before the Economic Club of Boston; in *National Economic League Quarterly* I, No. 1.)

[§63] THE WAR AND THE IRISH-AMERICANS.

By Rt. Rev. Mgr. James E. Cassidy, V. G. (July 29, 1917.)

For well nigh three long years, across the wide expanse of ocean with fearful fearing souls, we watched this consuming conflagration, and prayed that its fires might die away ere the whole world became a holocaust. Injury and insult, yea and infamy, we suffered, our peaceful souls revolting from this sight of humanity slaughtering itself, hoping and trusting and praying that means compatible with honor might be found to avoid our adding our portion to the sea of human blood that was alike crimsoning a continent and bleeding white a world of peoples.

Our rights were transgressed, our commerce interrupted, our properties destroyed, our safety jeopardized, our citizens slain and yet we kept the peace. We objected, we remonstrated, we protested, we threatened, but to no purpose.

Our patience and long-suffering was misinterpreted. Our horror of war and our love of peace were thought to be born of a lack of courage to fight. War was being made continually upon us; blow after blow was struck against our sovereign rights until the hour arrived when, all other means exhausted, we must either defend ourselves by force or forever forfeit our right to take our place among the nations of the earth. Even then, some, whose motive I shall not judge, counselled submission and continued toleration of wrong. Thank God, their counsels did not prevail. Dark though be the hour and sad though be our hearts as we face the bloody future, how infinitely darker would be the days, and how filled with shame

and ignominy the future, if we had been led by those who would have had peace at any price!

The words of our Lord in the Gospel: "What shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" (Matt. xvi: 26.) I cannot refrain from applying them to our national situation last April. For if our President and our Congress had not then acted as they did, we would have been a soulless nation, and shame and reproach and everlasting infamy would have been the profit of our peace. But the nation did not sell its soul for peace. We loved not war, but we loved dishonor less, and when compelled to choose we unhesitatingly, though regretfully, chose war, and in the chosen words of Holy Writ, "You go forth to war out of your land against the enemies that fight against you." . . .

Again, some would lessen your merits by maintaining that we should never have gone into this war. To these I have already given answer, but to these now I say in shorter words:

The time for discussion as to the propriety of our entering the war has passed. This is a representative government. We delegate others to represent us. We elect a President to lead us. Our President and our Congress, with much wider knowledge of events, and with as great abhorrence of war as we have, have decided that a state of war exists. Who are we that we should pit our individual judgment against the decision of those whom we have legally and voluntarily constituted our representatives? Democracy demands delegation of power and should we refuse to abide by the decision of those whom we have delegated to speak for us what confusion would come upon us! If Russia today is wrecked in ruins it is because this very exercise of individual judgment has made chaos of organized government, and if we were to pay attention to every individual judgment we, too, would shortly become another Russia.

Therefore, I say the time for individual judgment has passed. Whatsoever previous opinions we may have entertained, they should now be laid aside and we should all follow the flag in unquestioned and in unquestionable loyalty. You see, I dare to speak of matters rarely publicly discussed, nor have I yet said all.

There are too many of ancestry like to mine, Irish-Americans, if you will, whose judgment is blinded by their hatred toward England. Let them beware lest their animosity toward England be interpreted as disloyalty to the United States.

Out of the loins of a Fenian arrested in arms against the English I came. I was nursed at the breasts of as true an Irishwoman as ever came out of Ireland. Indelibly written in my soul is the story of England's rule of blood and iron in Ireland. But what has that to do with the honor of my own country? Incidentally and accidentally, we may be fighting for England, just as England is now fighting for us, but essentially and fundamentally we are not fighting for England; we are fighting for ourselves. Had Germany by its own overt acts, repeated again and again, not made it impossible for us to keep peace with honor, had she respected our rights, had she not murdered our citizens, she might have beaten England to her

knees and we would not have interfered. We did not go to war to save England; we went to war to save ourselves, to save our sovereign rights, to save all and everything that a nation in honor prizes.

You men of all births, for there are men of many bloods and births bearing a grievance against England, in your blind desire for retribution, you forget that in this war all must stand or fall together. If England stands, we stand; if England falls we fall; victory and honor or defeat and dishonor shall come upon all alike. And God forbid that there should be any so base and low and blind as to wish to strike at the heart of England through the soul of their own country. God forbid that there should be any who would rejoice at the losses of any of the Allies when they know that such losses mean only greater losses and multiplied deaths among you. Let this insanity pass forever from these States. . . .

The heroic figure [of Cardinal Mercier], the very personification of patriotism and love of country, I hold out to you as your model and your ideal. No enemy boast, no enemy bribe, no enemy threat, no enemy pressure, no suffering, no want, no pain, no loss, no fear has shaken him from his high resolve to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's. Far away across the wide Atlantic, he stretches out his arms to you for help against the common enemy.

(From a sermon at St. Mary's Cathedral, Fall River, Mass., to the Catholic members, Coast Artillery Corps, N. G. M.; reported in *Boston Transcript*, July 31, 1917.)

[§64] THE WAR AND THE GERMAN-AMERICANS.

By Otto H. Kahn. (June 1, 1917.)

What we are now contending for, by the side of our splendidly brave and sorely tried Allies, after infinite forbearance, after delay which many of us found it hard to bear, are the things which are amongst the highest and most cherished that the civilized world has attained through the toil, sacrifices and suffering of its best in the course of many centuries.

They are the things without which darkness would fall upon hope, and life would become intolerable.

They are the things of humanity, liberty, justice and mercy, for which the best men amongst all the nations—including the German nation—have fought and bled these many generations past, which were the ideals of Luther, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, and a host of others who had made the name of Germany great and beloved until fanatical Prussianism run amuck came to make its deeds a by-word and a hissing.

This appalling conflict which has been drenching the world with blood is not a mere fight of one or more peoples against one or more other peoples.

It goes far deeper.

It sharply divides the soul and conscience of the world.

It transcends vastly the bounds of racial allegiance.

It is ethically fundamental.

In determining one's attitude towards it, the time has gone by—if it ever was—when race and blood and inherited affiliations were permitted to count.

A century and a half ago Americans of English birth rose to free this country from the oppression of the rulers of England. To-day Americans of German birth are called upon to rise, together with their fellow-citizens of all races, to free not only this country but the whole world from the oppression of the rulers of Germany, an oppression far less capable of being endured and of far graver portent.

Speaking as one born of German parents, I do not hesitate to state it as my deep conviction that *the greatest service which men of German birth or antecedents can render to the country of their origin is to proclaim, and to stand up for those great and fine ideals and national qualities and traditions which they inherited from their ancestors, and to set their faces like flint against monstrous doctrines and acts of a rulership which have robbed them of the Germany which they loved and in which they took just pride, the Germany which had the good will, respect and admiration of the entire world.*

I do not hesitate to state it as my solemn conviction that *the more unmistakably and whole-heartedly Americans of German origin throw themselves into the struggle which this country has entered in order to rescue Germany, no less than America and the rest of the world from those sinister forces that are, in President Wilson's language, the enemy of all mankind, the better they protect and serve the repute of the old German name and the true advantage of the German people.*

Gentlemen, I measure my words. They are borne out all too emphatically by the hideous eloquence of deeds which have appalled the conscience of the civilized world. They are borne out by numberless expressions, written and spoken, of German professors employed by the State to teach its youth.

The burden of that teaching is that might makes right, and that the German nation has been chosen to exercise morally, mentally and actually, the over-lordship of the world and must and will accomplish that task and that destiny whatever the cost in bloodshed, misery and ruin.

The spirit of that teaching, in its intolerance, its mixture of sanctimoniousness and covetousness and its self-righteous assumption of a world-improving mission, is closely akin to the spirit from which were bred the religious wars of the past through the long and dark years when Protestants and Catholics killed one another and devastated Europe.

I speak in sorrow, for I am speaking of the country of my origin and I have not forgotten what I owe to it.

I speak in bitter disappointment, for I am thinking of the Germany of former days, the Germany which has contributed its full share to the store of the world's imperishable assets and which, in not a few fields of human endeavor and achievement held the leading place among the nations of the earth.

And I speak in the firm faith that, after its people shall have

shaken off and made atonement for the dreadful spell which an evil fate has cast upon them, that former Germany is bound to arise again and, in due course of time, will again deserve and attain the good-will and the high respect of the world and the affectionate loyalty of all those of German blood in foreign lands.

But I know that neither Germany nor this country nor the rest of the world can return to happiness and peace and fruitful labor until it shall have been made manifest, bitterly and unmistakably manifest, to the rulers who bear the blood-guilt for this wanton war and to their misinformed and misguided peoples that the spirit which unchained it cannot prevail, that the hateful doctrines and methods in pursuance of which and in compliance with which it is conducted are rejected with abhorrence by the civilized world, and that the over-weening ambitions which it was meant to serve can never be achieved.

The fight for civilization which we all fondly believed had been won many years ago must be fought over again. In this sacred struggle it is now our privilege to take no mean part, and our glory to bring sacrifices.

[§65] WHERE WOULD SIGEL STAND NOW?

By Franz Sigel, Jr.

To the credit of the German immigrants of later years let it be said that, as a class, they became citizens. Our naturalized citizenship has been drawn in larger percentage perhaps from these Germans than from any other element except the Irish, and there has not been a better, more law-abiding, more valuable class. But they stood aloof, they fostered a certain separateness from the every-day life of the nation; the American spirit touched them lightly. The recent crisis overwhelmed them; their political conceptions were a muddle of complicated loyalties. They could not, by the very confusion of ideas, think and act straight; they could not, because of the cloud of sentiment that obscured their political vision see clearly. The forces that brought them here were not the same that brought the earlier immigrants; the newcomers had not come to escape the tyrannies of a home land of over thirty almost absolute rulers; a love of freedom and liberty was not what had led them here to found a new, free home.

Their spirit ruled the home in which their sons grew up; in this home was heard much of Germany's new greatness and little of the basic difference in principle between government from the top down as applied in Germany, and from the bottom up as applied in our country. The father stayed here, became a citizen, his family was reared here. Because his was the equal privilege of grasping the "unlimited opportunity" the country offered, because he enjoyed the equal protection of the law, he prospered. Government protected him and his property with the same care that it

protected the native-born and his; it made no distinction of rights between him and his native-born neighbor.

The sons of these Germans have grown up here with all the advantage offered to all sons, not only of citizens but also those of resident aliens. It is conceivable that the home and social influences under which the son grew to manhood did not tend to develop so highly the average native-born's pride of country; he might not be convinced that the United States was the greatest nation of all time. Handicapped by what may be termed a congenital spiritual weakness that was not strengthened in the home life, and suddenly brought face to face with an apparent conflict between love of the land of his fathers and his duty as an American citizen, he found it difficult to steer a straight course. He was not fortified by the oneness of mind of the American whose ancestors had fought the British in the Revolution. The German spirit pulled hard at the heart-strings; it would have been unnatural had it been otherwise.

But although his difficulties have been great, by reason of home training and temperament, yet I am sure that now the die is cast and there is presented to him a clear-cut issue that permits of no question, he will at last see straight; he will see that duty does not require him to surrender reverence, worship if you will, for the great achievement of the German race in all fields, does not require him to forego his love for the German people, their language, literature and traditions, the fine and noble and good in the German nation and the German family life. . . . Beyond this, duty demands from him complete, unswerving devotion to his native land, the land of his birth, under all circumstances.

But what of the sons descended from that earlier generation, most definitely characterized by the spirit of the German immigrant of the decade 1850-1860? . . . Most, if not all, of these German "Forty-eighters" are dead, but many of their descendants, sons and grandsons, constitute a large part of our citizens. I am a full-blooded German descended from German "Forty-eighters." My father, General Franz Sigel, his brothers and my maternal grandfather were driven from Germany on account of their participation in the revolution of 1848 in Germany. My forebears had all sacrificed the home of their birth in their devotion to the cause of liberty. Later they fought for the Union and the freedom of the slaves. . . .

In April, 1861, my father enlisted in the same struggle. He is frequently referred to as one who did much for the nation in the crisis of '61; he is at times mentioned in the public press as one whose example might well be emulated now by the youth of German descent. What during his lifetime was his attitude on Americanism and "German-Americanism"? If we sons are to follow where he would have led, where does the path lead? . . .

Franz Sigel knew the Constitution of the United States

and what it meant for the rights of humanity long before he came to this country, and he knew it better than many Americans who were born and died here. His passion was the liberty of man. When he revolted against the government of Baden, he knew the goal he was aiming to reach.

. . .

In 1897, a few years before his death, he wrote: "Germany will survive the storms of another century—great questions involving its domestic and foreign policies, its social and economic conditions, its existing militarism, the status of its common people—these must be settled; they will not and cannot be avoided by foreign operations, by new burdens imposed on the people, nor by the mere *ipse dixit* of power."

. . .

There is prophecy in these words that may come true. Franz Sigel had not, in fifty years, forgotten "militarism," the "status of the common people." Germany was united, powerful, yes, but there were questions "still to be settled," not to be "avoided by foreign operations," by "new burdens to be imposed on the people," by "the mere *ipse dixit* of power." Did he not in old age dream the dreams of his youth, even yet not realized? Did he not still cherish, for the German people, the "common" people, the hopes of fifty years ago, and look toward their ultimate realization? And is the present not moving toward such a realization?

Does the life of Franz Sigel show that he had no hope for the release of the German people from the absolutism he combated in youth? Would he not now stand true to his lifelong convictions, true to the ideals for which he fought on two continents, true to the inscription on his tombstone, placed there at his written request—"An American Citizen and Soldier"? Would he not array himself on the side of America in the struggle to "make the world safe for democracy"? His article on "The American Republic" in the *International Magazine* concluded with the words: "If there are any utterances specially appropriate to the great task before us, they are those which breathe the spirit of the sturdy and heroic English sailor at Trafalgar—to apply the words of Nelson to our own situation—"The American Republic expects every man to do his duty'." I know he would repeat these words today.

In the fires of the Civil War the North and the South were welded into one great union of States. If the fires of the present war will weld the many nationalities and burn away the adjectives of nationalism from "American," then will there be a national profit that will more than balance the terrible sacrifices we shall be required to make.

Where do we, the sons of men like Franz Sigel and his companions in the struggle for liberty, stand? If we are to be true to them and the ideals for which they fought, we must stand today on the side of America and freedom against the German Government and autocracy. We shall not then fight against our blood kindred, but, in the broader sense, we shall fight for them, against a government not of

their own creation. We shall secure for them the right of self-government, the right of a people and not of a Kaiser, to find its place "in the sun"—the sun of liberty and equality.

If we are to emulate the example of Franz Sigel, what shall we do? Let him answer in the words of the last public speech he ever made in German to "German-Americans":

"Politically, I am an American and nothing else; but I am proud to be a German. I would consider myself less than a man were I to forget the tremendous sacrifices made by the immigrant Germans in defense of their new Fatherland. Shall this blood have flowed in vain? Shall we now attack this country to which we gave all we had to give? This country is our country; our interests are its interests; here we are, here will our descendants be, here we shall stay. The Union, now and forever."

("Sons of the Germans of '48 are for Democracy," by Franz Sigel, in the *New York Times Magazine*, July 22, 1917.)

[§66] A GERMAN LIBERAL'S RECOGNITION OF THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE ALLIES.

By Professor W. Foerster, of the University of Munich.

The kernel of the situation is the fact that the supreme object with which the nations of the Entente are waging war is that competition in armaments shall absolutely cease, and that an international reign of peace (*Friedensordnung*) shall be established; moreover, that the Entente is determined to fight on until, in one way or another, it can obtain from Germany a trustworthy guarantee for the realization of those objects, be it by means of a military defeat of Germany or by her economic starvation, or by a domestic transformation which will once for all put an end to the predominance of those classes and castes to which the Entente attributes an incurable preference for dealing with questions of international interests by purely military methods. All the rest of the Entente's demands, however exaggerated and unstatesman-like may be the terms in which they were advanced in the well-known Note, are most intimately connected with this international programme: they are intended to obviate all occasion for future conflicts by according to every nation, however small, the right to choose the larger State to which it wishes to be joined. . . .

Anyone who has grasped the fundamental idea of that international programme of justice, and who has remarked with what passion the nations of the Entente have espoused it, and especially how profoundly the New Russia is moved by it, will know this: That the cause of the peace of the world now decisively depends upon whether the overwhelming majority of the German people declares itself on principle and unambiguously against all annexations, and thereby attests its sincere acquiescence in the idea of a new interna-

tional order and its abhorrence of any continuation of the miserable old policy of armaments. . . .

So long as influential circles among us cry for the acquisition of the coast of Flanders, and thereby reveal that they do not desire a New Europe, but still believe in iron guarantees, so long will the nations of the Entente continue to fight; and a peace conference where Germany could "play her trumps" will simply be out of the question. He who does not yet see this is the victim of the most fatal delusions, although his language be that of Realpolitik. The peace that is coming will not be a matter of haggling and "trumping." No! This is the mightiest moral problem that has ever confronted humanity, and the inexorable moral condition of the conclusion of peace is so glaringly patent that, outside Germany, large sections of those even who are governed by material interests recognize that all future economic security and prosperity depend upon the fulfilment of that moral condition, which is, the final and unambiguous triumph of a new heart and mind. It is for this reason that the French nation, for example, would rather perish in the struggle for these new ideas of international justice than relapse into the hell of the old Europe. Any one who does not attach decisive importance to this psychological factor is making a false calculation, although he may employ all the jugglery in the world in grappling with the problem of peace. . . .

The annexationists advance their demands as strategic necessities; they demand securities for Germany without the slightest regard for the state of Europe which these securities would create. They are thus declaring themselves in favor of the continuance of the state of armed peace as it has hitherto existed—that is to say, for the permanent menace of war. And the peace which they propose would in reality be nothing but a truce. This sort of peace is precisely the kind that the whole world now arrayed against Germany rejects with desperate determination.

In *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of June 1, 2, 1917. Translated in *Nineteenth Century and After*, July, 1917.)

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CHAPTER IV.

Who Is Responsible for the War in Europe?

A.—SUMMARY STATEMENT.

[§68] The question of the responsibility for the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 concerns Americans at the present time less immediately than the matters dealt with in the two preceding chapters. Yet it is by no means of merely academic interest. For nothing throws so much light upon the spirit, and the probable future policy and conduct of the present ruling powers in Germany as the facts which establish their responsibility for this greatest catastrophe of modern history. Only a small part of that evidence can be presented here.

[§69] In 1912 four of the Balkan States at last joined forces against their ancient enemy, Turkey, the oppressor of their Christian brethren in Macedonia. To the surprise of all the world, they won a decisive victory over the German-trained Turkish forces, and all but expelled the Ottoman Empire from Europe. At the conclusion of these struggles, Serbia stood with greatly enlarged territory, with increased military prestige, and with intensified national feeling. Germany and Austria were thus confronted with a prospect of the development of a group of vigorous and independent states, chiefly Slavic in race, occupying the greater part of the Balkan peninsula, and supported by Russia, the traditional "big brother" of the smaller Slavic nations. But Germany had long been working out a program for the domination of the vast region stretching "from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf." Austria was to be a subordinate partner, linked to Germany in a close economic union, if not by still stronger ties; Turkey was rapidly becoming virtually a German protectorate. But the results of the Balkan Wars threatened to block this project of the Central Powers for expansions southeastward, and to cut them off from their tool, Turkey, which had, moreover, been weakened by its recent defeat. The Austrian government also feared the effect of the development of a strong Serbian state upon its own subjects of Serb race.

[§70] The evidence is abundant that, as soon as this situation became clear, Germany and Austria determined to crush Serbia and establish definitely their dominance in the Balkan Peninsula, and did so fully realizing—as the German White Book admits—that "a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field and might therefore involve" Germany—in other words, that

a general European war was likely to follow. In the spring of 1913 the German army was suddenly enlarged by a fifth; taxes of unprecedented severity were voted by the Reichstag (including an "Extraordinary Non-Repeatabe Contribution for National Defense" which amounted to about 1½ per cent of the capital of the larger property-holders); the gold reserve in the German "war-chest" was trebled; and in August Italy was invited by Austria (certainly not without a prior understanding with Germany), to join in military action against Serbia. Italy refused on the ground that she was bound by treaty only to a defensive alliance, whereas what was proposed was a war of aggression. (See §80.) Disappointed in their hope of Italy's co-operation, Germany and Austria continued their preparations.

[§71] In November, 1913, both the German Emperor and the Chief of the General Staff were reported to have said in conversation that war was inevitable. (French Yellow Book, No. 6.) In December a German military mission was sent to Constantinople, and its head assumed virtual command of the Turkish forces there. Throughout the winter and spring there were indications that Germany was making ready for an early war. As it was manifest that the other Powers were all absorbed in grave internal difficulties, and that no attack upon Germany was imminent, such measures could only mean that Germany was preparing for attack. Thus, the events of June and July, 1914, were not the causes of the war, but only a convenient opportunity for the execution of a long premeditated plan to establish Austro-German supremacy in the Balkans. A general European war, which was likely to result, might at the same time be expected to extend Germany's colonial empire at the expense of France.

[§72] On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne was murdered in the capital of Bosnia by an Austrian subject of Serb race. On July 23 the Austrian government suddenly presented an ultimatum to Serbia, alleging that this crime had been instigated by secret societies having their headquarters on Serbian soil and devoted to agitation against the Austrian rule in the recently annexed provinces. Demands involving extensive interference by Austria in Serbian domestic affairs were made, and an unqualified acceptance of them was required within two days. Though these demands were humiliating in the extreme, Serbia accepted all of them except two; these she did not reject, but offered to submit them to the Hague Tribunal or the Great Powers. It immediately became evident that Austria's object had been not to secure guarantees against the continuance of the agitation of which she complained, but to find a ground of quarrel with her neighbor. Serbia's submissive reply was rejected without examination. Austria declared war on the 28th, and began hostilities on the 29th.

[§73] This action was a plain challenge to Russia. Would she leave the smaller Slav state unsupported and helpless in the hands of Austria—and thereby also abdicate her long-recognized claim to a voice in the disposition of Balkan ques-

tions? While Austria declared that she contemplated no annexation of Serbian territory, it was evident that without formal annexation she could reduce her neighbor to the position of a vassal state. Russia, while refusing to abandon Serbia, asked only that some impartial method be found for determining the justice of Austria's demands—either by a conference of the Powers as proposed by England, by friendly mediation, or by a reference to the Hague Tribunal. Though England, France and Italy spared no pains to bring about some such pacific solution, Austria (up to July 30) refused all proposals of conference, mediation, arbitration or even delay, and insisted that she be permitted to wreak her will upon Serbia without interference. (See §79.) No convincing, or even plausible, evidence has ever been offered that she was not supported (if not inspired) in this attitude by her ally; the German White Book, indeed, declares plainly that Austria throughout had Germany's approval and backing.

[§74] On July 31 Austria-Hungary seems finally to have consented to discuss with Russia the character of the action to be taken against Serbia. This concession, however, was offered only after war had already become certain, in consequence of a new and preposterous demand made by Germany upon Russia, and rejected by Russia (July 29-30). The effect of this demand was (see the next §) to provide the Central Powers with a more plausible *casus belli* than the Serbian issue alone would have been, and to lay the foundation for the official German explanation of the outbreak of the war.

[§75] That Russia desired and deliberately provoked the war has been repeatedly argued by Germany's official spokesmen on the following grounds: Germany had early (July 26) warned Russia that "the ordering of general mobilization must make war with Germany inevitable." Yet on the night of July 30-31, at the moment when Austria (under the urging, it is alleged, of Germany) "had declared itself ready to enter upon a till then stubbornly declined discussion of the material contents of the note to Servia," the general Russian mobilization was ordered. In short, just when a peaceful solution seemed assured, the Russian government took the step which it knew would make war certain—(See article of Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Finance Minister, N. Y. Times, March 14, 1915; also the *German White Book* and speeches of the German Chancellor, Aug. 4, 1914, and Nov. 9, 1916.)

[§76] This argument falsifies the main fact, besides ignoring others. (a) Germany had warned Russia (July 26 and 29) not that a general mobilization, but that any "preparatory military measures" on Russia's part—even a partial mobilization "against Austria-Hungary"—would "mean war" with Germany. Again on the night of July 29-30 (*before* the Russian general mobilization was ordered) the German Emperor telegraphed the Tsar warning him not to mobilize "against Austria," and telling him that upon his decision (i. e., with respect to this point) must rest "the responsibility for war or peace." (See §81.) But Austria had al-

ready mobilized large forces and had invaded Serbia. Germany's demand, then, was that while Austria armed and overran Serbia, Russia should take no preparatory military measures whatever. If Russia had submitted to this demand she would not only have imperilled her own security, but would have surrendered, under duress, all claim and all ability to influence the settlement of the Serbian question. It was certain in advance that no Great Power, if capable of resistance, would, in similar critical circumstances, accept such peremptory dictation concerning its own internal measures of national defense. Since Russia, therefore, could not avoid partial mobilization against Austria, and since she had twice been warned that *any* military preparation by her would cause Germany to attack, she was bound to make her mobilization complete. Germany's threat and Austria's action operated together with certainty and precision to force Russia to take those military precautions out of which, when taken, Germany made a pretext for declaring war. (b) Germany, however, had already done what she declared war upon Russia for doing. It was then believed by the Russian authorities, and is now known to be true, that the German military preparations were much farther advanced than those of Russia. A great part of the German army was already mobilized (under another technical term) and was being directed towards the frontiers of Belgium, Luxemburg and France. (c) Meanwhile, in a last effort for peace, Russia had actually offered (July 31) to arrest her mobilization, upon two conditions: that Austria would march *no farther* into Serbia, and would "admit that the Great Powers may examine how Serbia can accord satisfaction to the Austro-Hungarian government without impairment of her rights as a sovereign and independent state." A favorable reply to this extraordinarily conciliatory offer would in all probability have averted war. (See §§81-83.) No reply to it was ever sent—except Germany's ultimatum, demanding of Russia *complete, immediate and unconditional demobilization*. (See §84.)

To this demand Russia returned no answer within the time limit set, and on August 1 Germany declared war.

[§77] The motives for Germany's shifting of the issue are not obscure. An attack upon Russia *directly* on the ground of the Austro-Serbian quarrel would have been a manifestly aggressive war. It would therefore have appealed less strongly to the more moderate element among the German people; and war could not constitutionally have been declared upon such a ground without consulting the Federal Council (Bundesrat). But by first manoeuvring Russia into complete mobilization, and then treating this step as a threat against the safety of Germany itself, it was possible to persuade the not too critical German public that war had been "forced upon Germany," and to plunge the empire into the conflict without awaiting the express consent of the other federated states. Moreover, there was hope that the third member of the Triple Alliance, Italy, might also be persuaded that this was a "defensive war," and that she was therefore

pledged to assist the Central Powers. The Italian government, however, was not deceived, and pointed out to its allies that the war was as clearly one of aggression as that which had been proposed to Italy a year earlier.*

[§78] On the same day Germany demanded of the Belgian government that it break its solemn treaty obligations and betray its neighbor, France, by permitting German troops to operate against France from Belgian territory. (§85.) Belgium, though facing destruction as the alternative, refused to sacrifice its honor. The German government was not disturbed by similar scruples. It had bound itself by special treaty to respect Belgium's neutrality, and its Minister at Brussels had on July 31 assured the Belgian government that this pledge would be observed.† But on August 3, upon the plea of "military necessity"—by which was meant only the prospect of military advantage—the German forces poured across the frontier, and there followed that month of "frightfulness" in Eastern Belgium which the world will never forget.

B.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS.

[§79] ENGLISH STATEMENT ON THE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

By Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (March 22, 1915.)

Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been wounded or maimed in Europe during the last few months. All this might have been avoided by the simple method of a conference or joint discussion between the European Powers concerned, which might have been held in London, or in The Hague, or wherever or in whatever form Germany would have consented to have it. It would have been far easier to have settled by a conference the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which Germany made the occasion for this war, than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of two years ago. Germany knew, from her experience of the conference in London which settled the Balkan crisis, that she could count upon our good will for peace in any concert or conference of the powers. We had sought no diplomatic triumph in the Balkan conference. We had not given ourselves to any intrigue. We had pursued impartially and honorably the end of peace. We were ready last July to do the same again. In recent years we

*To the same desire to make the war appear "defensive" in German and Italian eyes must be attributed the series of baseless charges of French acts of aggression, which constituted the official grounds of the declaration of war against France (August 3). The falsity of these charges is fully shown in a semi-official French work, *Le Mensonge du 3 Aout* (Paris, Payot, 1917), which is not yet translated into English. A summary of it by H. W. Wilson appears in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, June, 1917.

†*Belgian Gray Book*, No. 12.

had given Germany every assurance that no aggression upon her would receive any support from us. We had withheld from her but one thing: an unconditional promise to stand aside, however aggressive Germany herself might be to her neighbors. Last July France was ready to accept a conference, Italy was ready to accept a conference, Russia was ready to accept a conference; and we know now that after the British proposal for a conference was made, the Emperor of Russia himself proposed to the German Emperor that the dispute should be referred to The Hague. Germany refused every suggestion made to her for settling the dispute in this way, and on her rests now, and must rest for all time, the appalling responsibility for having plunged Europe into this war, and for involving herself and the greater part of a whole continent in the consequences of it—the fourth time within living memory, prepared and planned.

As to our own part. We had assured Belgium that never would we violate her neutrality so long as it was respected by others. I had given this pledge to Belgium long before the war. On the eve of the war we asked France and Germany to give the same pledge. France at once did so, but Germany declined to give it. When, after that, Germany invaded Belgium, we were bound to oppose Germany with all our strength; and, if we had not done so at the first moment, is there anyone now who believes that, when Germany attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and non-combatants, and ravaged the country in a way that violated all rules of war of recent times, and all rules of humanity for all time—is there anyone who thinks it possible that we could have sat still and looked on without eternal disgrace?

Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting?

In due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by our Allies in common with us, in accordance with the Alliances that now exist between us and are public to the world. But one essential condition must be the restoration of Belgium to her independent national life and the free possession of her territory; and reparation to her, as far as reparation is possible, for the cruel wrong done to her.

That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies are contending, and which is this:

We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working out their own forms of government for themselves and their own national development, whether they be great States or small States, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The German ideal—we have had it poured out by German professors and publicists since the war began—is that of the Germans as a superior people; to whom all things are lawful in the securing of their own power; against whom resistance of every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down; a people establishing a domination over the nations of the Continent; imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations, but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or leave this Continent

altogether than live in it under such conditions. After this war, we and the other nations of Europe must be free to live, not menaced by talk of supreme War-Lords and shining armor and the sword continually rattled in the scabbard and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our national destinies and activities controlled by the military caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim for themselves, and together we will secure for Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the different nations; the right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal liberty.

(Speech delivered by Sir Edward Grey.)

[§80] AUSTRIA'S PROPOSAL TO ATTACK SERBIA IN 1913.

By Giovanni Giolitti, Former Italian Premier. (Dec. 5, 1914)

I feel it my duty to recall a precedent showing how correct was the interpretation of the alliance by the [Italian] Government when the conflict began. During the Balkan War, on August 9, 1913, being absent from Rome, I received the following telegram from the late Marquis di San Giuliano [then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs]: "Austria has communicated to us and Germany that it has been the intention to act against Serbia, defining such action as defensive and hoping for an application of a *casus foederis* [case to which the terms of the treaty of alliance are applicable] by the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable. I am trying to agree with Germany concerning efforts to prevent Austrian action, but it may be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such eventual action as defensive, and, therefore, do not think that there exists a *casus foederis*. Please send a telegram saying whether you approve."

I answered Marquis di San Giuliano thus: "If Austria goes against Serbia, a *casus foederis* evidently does not exist. It is an action she accomplishes on her own account. It is not defensive, because nobody thinks of attacking her. It is necessary to declare this to Austria in the most formal manner, hoping that Germany will act to dissuade Austria from a very dangerous adventure."

(Speech in the Italian Chamber of Deputies: cited from Stowell, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914*, 470-471.)

[§81] GERMANY'S REAL CASUS BELLI: WAR IF
RUSSIA MAKES ANY MILITARY
PREPARATIONS.

(a) The Threat. (July 26, 1914)

In the course of the same day [July 26], the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 26th, the German Ambassadors at London, Paris and St. Petersburg were instructed to point out strongly the danger of this Russian mobilization. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

"But mobilization means war.

"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."—(Translated from the *German White Book*, German text.)

(b) The Threat Repeated. (July 29, 30, 1914)

(Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador in France):

St. Petersburg, 29th July, 1914.

Today the German Ambassador communicated to me the resolution taken by his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now we only began these latter as a consequence of the mobilization to which Austria had already proceeded, and in view of the evident absence on the latter's part of any desire to accept any kind of a pacific solution of its conflict with Servia.

Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany, it only remains for us to hasten our own armament and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war.—(*Russian Orange Book*, No. 58.)

(The German Emperor to the Tsar):

July 30th, 1 a. m.

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only

a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.—*German White Book*, Exhibit 23.)

(c) **Austria Does Not Regard Russia's Counter-Mobilization as a Hostile Act.** (July 30, 1914)

(French Ambassador at Vienna to French Minister for Foreign Affairs):

At an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko [Russian Ambassador at Vienna] and Count Berchtold [Austrian Foreign Minister] . . . M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards mobilization taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavors will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.—(*French Yellow Book*, No. 104.)

(Austrian Foreign Minister to Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg):

Since Russia is obviously mobilizing against us, we are compelled to extend our own mobilization; I, however, wish to point out expressly, that this measure should not be considered as a hostile act against Russia, but simply as a response to the Russian mobilization. I asked M. Schebeko to report the above to his government, which he undertook to do.—(*Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 50.)

[§82] **RUSSIA'S FINAL EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION**

(a) **Offer to Submit to the Decision of The Hague Tribunal.** (July 29, 1914)

Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented today by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.

(This telegram, sent by the Tsar to the German Emperor, was suppressed in the *German White Book*, which prints the rest of the despatches exchanged between the Tsar and the German Emperor. Its authenticity, however, was acknowledged by the German Government upon its publication in the Russian press, Jan. 31, 1915.)

(b) Proposal of Basis for Agreement with Austria.

(Proposal transmitted to Berlin by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 30, 1914.)

If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are an infringement of the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia undertakes to cease her military preparations.—(*Russian Orange Book*, No. 60.)

(Revised form of same proposal, transmitted July 31, 1914):

If Austria agrees to arrest the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed the character of a question of general European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to examine how Servia can give satisfaction to Austria-Hungary without impairment of her rights as a sovereign and independent state, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.—(*Russian Orange Book*, No. 67.)

[§83] LAST EFFORT OF ENGLAND TO AVERT WAR

(July 31, 1914)

By Sir Edward Grey.

It has occurred to me that Germany might sound Vienna and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, and the integrity of Servian territory. . . . All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward, which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

(Despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, *British White Book*, No. 111.)

[§84] GERMANY'S REPLY TO THE PROPOSALS OF
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND: THE ULTIMATUM
JULY 31-AUG. 1, 1914.

(a) (*German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in Paris, July 31, 1914*):

We have declared the state of threatening war, which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within twelve hours all military measures (*Kriegsmassnahmen*) against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour at which this inquiry is made. Utmost speed necessary.—(*German White Book*, Exhibit 25.)

(b) (*Russian Foreign Minister to Russian Representatives Abroad, Aug. 1, 1914*):

At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within twelve hours we have not begun to demobilize, not only against Germany but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilization.—(*Russian Orange Book*, No. 70.)

[§85] HOW THE WAR CAME TO BELGIUM.

By Baron Moncheur, Head of the Belgian Mission to the
United States (Aug. 3, 1917.)

Three years ago today, Aug. 3, 1914, my country was free. On Aug. 2, in the evening, my Government had received a most insulting ultimatum from Germany, demanding unimpeded passage for her troops and offering a bribe, to sell our honor and to disregard our plighted word.

We were given 12 hours within which to reply. The time was more than enough. Yet, there could be only one answer. The King summoned his cabinet and his ministers of state. They were all of one mind. In fact, there was absolute unanimity of thought in every Belgian mind, and there was not a dissenting voice in the council of the King. Belgium's reply was sent to the German legation before 7 o'clock in the morning of Aug. 3. You all know the substance of that reply. One sentence of the document reads: "The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duties toward Europe." Neither Belgium's liberty nor her honor were for sale.

This day three years ago was an anxious day in Belgium. We asked the diplomatic support of the powers who had guaranteed our neutrality, but we asked their diplomatic support only. A request for military support was, after careful consideration, deliberately deferred until Germany should have consummated her crime by sending troops into our territory.

We were careful to give her no pretext whatever for claiming that we had violated our neutral obligations in favor of her enemies until she had actually consummated her threatened crime.

The 3d of August was, therefore, a day of anxious waiting; but at half past nine on the morning of the 4th we received a telegram that Belgian territory had been violated by German troops at Gemmeunich, a little village close to the frontier and a few miles from Aix-la-Chappelle. The invading forces had been met by Belgian gendarmes on guard at this frontier post. Blood had flowed; the die was cast.

You all know what has happened since that fateful day three years ago. My country has been ravaged with fire and sword. Old men, women and children have been deliberately and ruthlessly massacred. Our war materials and our crops have been seized without payment, our factories have been destroyed, our machinery has been stolen and sent into Germany; and, crowning infamy of the centuries, our workmen have been torn from their homes and sent into slavery. The Belgian people still stand caged behind steel bars, formed of German bayonets. Those who have escaped fire and sword and nameless evils are still hungry, famished and enslaved, ground down beneath the heel of the tyrant. But their courage remains unbroken and unbreakable.

No true-hearted Belgian regrets the decision which was made three years ago. They are ready to lay down their lives for liberty. They know that in the end justice will triumph. As our King said three years ago, "A country which defends itself commands the respect of all the world and cannot perish."

(Address before the Mass. Constitutional Convention, Boston.)

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CHAPTER V.

What the Government Must Do to Make the War Successful.

A.—SUMMARY STATEMENT.

[§87] The first necessity in order to meet the war which has been forced upon the United States is to realize the prodigious task which thus suddenly arises. When the war began the United States had its disposal only about 100,000 trained regular soldiers and 70,000 trained seamen; plenty of rifles, but not a single big cannon such as are essential for modern warfare; not a single military airplane that could face German fire; not a trench bomb; not a man trained in trench warfare; no supply of ammunition for fortifications or ships that would last beyond a few hours' fight; few and small submarines; few motor trucks suitable for military purposes; no reserve of clothing, equipments, tents and other necessities for the soldier; no barracks and camps available for the housing and training of great armies; only 5,000 military officers and 3,000 naval officers, in the regular service. The militia had just broken down in the campaigns on the border of Mexico because the excellent material could not be properly equipped, transported, housed, fed or trained under the conditions then obtaining. The beginning of an adequate system of national defense is to look fairly in the face the state of things existing when a state of war was recognized by act of Congress on April 6, 1917.

[§88] The first step taken by Congress was to pass a loan bill for immediate emergencies. It developed into the Liberty Loan of 2,000 millions, which first brought home to the American people the immense money sacrifices that the nation must sustain. This loan must necessarily be followed by other loans, and still others, for the Government must face expenditures of 6, 8 or 10 billions in a single year of war. The duty of Congress is to provide bountifully, and at the same time to check extravagance and waste. Along with the loans come the taxes. New sources of taxation have been sought amounting to about 2 billions a year, in addition to the billion a year which had previously been raised. These taxes will necessarily take just so much out of the annual income of the country. They cannot be paid without sacrifice, and they must and will be paid. Common sense dictates that there should be no hanging back when it is a question of national defense.

[§89] The main purpose of this heavy expenditure is to keep men in the field and at sea where they may reach our enemies. Inasmuch as the men and officers actually on foot available for

immediate service on August 1, 1917, together counted up only about 800,000 men, it became necessary immediately to provide for larger levies by a selective draft of the able bodied men between 21 and 31. The first drawing, of July, 1917, provided for a first installment of 660,000 men for a new national army. At the same time began the construction of camps for their reception, and training camps for the officers who should drill the new recruits. The duty of the Government is to keep on with these calls from time to time, so as to create a force which will inspire respect in Germany and give support to the Allies wherever they are most needed. When fighting actually begins at the front the casualties, together with the sick, will diminish the numbers, and a reserve must be kept up in this country, out of which the ranks shall be constantly filled. There is no other way in which a war can be fought with any chance of success.

[§90] Parallel with the raising of money and of men must go a constructive organization of all the governmental forces of the country. The general staff of the army, which is the brain and organized will, must be given sufficient powers. A general staff must be provided for the navy on a similar basis. The bureaus of the War and Navy departments need increase, re-organization and strengthening. The President, under an act of Congress, has appointed an elaborate Council of National Defense. Every step taken by this Council, by the heads of departments, by Congress and by the President, in the direction of better organization, concentration of responsibility and efficiency from top to bottom of the whole service, must have the loyal support of the nation. One of the greatest dangers before us is that the strain upon our complicated and ordinarily rather slow government may prove too great. The only road to salvation is through putting great responsibilities on single, responsible heads for such great services as food supply and distribution, transportation, ship building, munition making, provisioning of the troops, conveying them across the ocean, and command of armies and navies.

[§91] In this process states, cities and local governments can help by giving aid at every point to the placing of loans, drafting and organization of troops and the various services of the national government. The state committees of defense should be especially active in arousing and keeping alive the sentiment of patriotism in the nation. Every effort should be made to elect strong men, who can see and understand the crisis, to state legislatures, to state offices. and to Congress. Every American should understand that the question is not simply that of defeating the central powers in Europe, but of maintaining for ourselves the permanent right to form our own government. The action of Germany in the conquered and dependent territory at the present moment is a warning to the United States of what we might expect if by some terrible reverse Germans were ever to get a footing within our boundaries. The fate of the Serbians and Montenegrins, the Armenians and the people of northern France and of Belgium, is a sufficient warning to us of the German conception of the way to treat a subject and helpless people.

[§92] It is the duty of all Americans to stand by the great principle that governments exist for the people, and not the people for their governments. But our government of the people must respond to the necessities of the people; it must awake to the new tasks of the time. No theories of government, no principle of the division of powers, no senseless terror of "a man on horseback," must deprive the American people of their right to a strong, efficient, serviceable government, which will turn its back on the obsolete and helpless military and naval methods of the past. We live in a new world, with new forces; we must organize to take our part in that world. This is the opportunity of centuries for the American government to show that it is competent to meet the gravest dangers and triumph over the greatest difficulties. We must prove that democracy can create and obey a government of power.

B.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS.

[§93] DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND SUCCESS IN WAR.

By Arthur O. Lovejoy.

Success in war requires quickness in decision, continuity of policy, secrecy in counsel, and concentration of control. All these things are foreign to the genius of representative government, which proceeds by the method of deliberate discussion, requires full publicity for all matters of public interest, exercises the liberty of changing its mind, and diffuses responsibility for governmental decisions throughout the people at large. War is an abnormal condition; democracy is the normal political order for civilized peoples; and it is not surprising that it is by nature ill adapted for the prosecution of war. There arise, however, junctures in human history in which democracies are compelled to wage war in defense of their own security, or of the principles to which they are dedicated. At such a juncture a wise democracy will promptly and unflinchingly modify its ordinary and normal processes of government, and the customary procedure of its political life, in such ways—though only in such ways—as may be needful to ensure success in the unwelcome business immediately in hand. It is possible in a time of crisis to be so tenacious of the form and habitual routine of democratic government as to imperil the cause of democracy throughout the world. When, then, the Republic goes to war, it must: (a) concentrate power and responsibility in the hands of its executive; (b) subordinate thoroughness of discussion to celerity of action; (c) accept loyally innumerable restrictions of individual liberty which in time of peace it would deem intolerable; (d) clearly understand and firmly resolve that these departures from its usual modes of action are to be regarded solely as exceptional and transitory means of meeting the peril with which democracy itself, with all the normal life of mankind, is threatened.

[§94] WHAT ADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS MEANS.

By Captains J. A. Moss and M. B. Stewart.

Fancy yourself on your way to work when you unfold your paper and read those headlines—(1,000,000 Volunteers). What does it mean to you? War, of course! But what sort of a picture does it bring to your mind? Let us look at it. One million men out of our male population. One man out of every forty-seven males—boys and men, young, old, able-bodied, decrepit. That is the first thing it means in the life of a nation.

What does it mean in the home, in the business, of the forty-seventh man we can only guess. What does it mean for those who face the task of finding those 1,000,000 men, taking them in hand, sorting them, arranging them, organizing them, arming, uniforming, training and equipping them—making them into a fighting machine?

Summed up, it is a task that would tax the finest organization and machinery that peace-time ingenuity could devise and years of patient preparation could effect. With disaster hanging over our heads, danger threatening us on every side, and the confusion of unpreparedness handicapping our every effort, it means a task that will strain the utmost shoulder-to-shoulder efforts of the nation to the breaking point. Let us glance at the round numbers that such a task rolls up in front of our eyes.

First of all, 1,000,000 men—a column of men, four abreast, over 400 miles long—1,000,000 men eager to fight in defense of their country and ignorant of the first principles of the soldier's trade. A million men who are nothing but a burden, to be cared for until they can be taught to care for themselves. A million men who cannot move without leaders, or raise a hand in defense until they have been taught.

What else does it mean?

750,000 rifles and bayonets for them to fight with.

265,000 pistols—little brothers of the rifle.

8,000 machine guns, the military scythe.

2,100 field guns to batter down attack.

165,000,000 cartridges to carry them into their first fight, and as many more for each succeeding fight.

2,500,000 shells and shrapnel for our field guns for every hour they are in action.

196,000 horses to carry them and pull their gun carriages.

127,000 mules to haul their supplies and pack their guns.

8,000 wagons to transport their supplies and ammunition.

1,000,000 cartridge belts for their ammunition.

1,000,000 first-aid packets to bind up their wounds.

1,000,000 canteens.

Each of them must have uniform and equipment:

1,000,000 shelter-halves to protect them from the weather.

1,000,000 pouches to keep them dry.

2,000,000 blankets to keep them warm.

2,000,000 pairs of shoes.

2,000,000 uniform coats, breeches, leggings, suits of underwear.

1,000,000 hats.

2,000,000 shirts.

4,000,000 pairs of socks.

1,000,000 haversacks to carry their equipment.

Finally they must eat:

1,000,000 pounds of meat each day.

1,000,000 pounds of bread each day.

2,000,000 pounds of vegetables each day.

3,000,000 pints of coffee or tea each day.

All this must be purchased, transported, prepared and cooked each day, and to eat it they must have:

1,000,000 cups.

1,000,000 plates.

1,000,000 knives.

1,000,000 forks.

1,000,000 spoons.

To provide for proper care, training and lead in battle they should have:

25,000 trained officers.

(Captain James A. Moss and Captain Merch B. Stewart, *Self-Helps for the Citizen-Soldier*.)

[§95] CONSCRIPTION THE ONLY JUST, DEMOCRATIC AND EFFICIENT WAY TO RAISE AN ARMY.

By the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. (April 21, 1917)

The volunteer method has never proved adequate and effectual for national needs, and will prove far less so now. War as now conducted is of a hitherto unconceived magnitude. Now millions of men are demanded where formerly a few thousands only were required. We must no longer think in terms of divisions, but in large groups of armies, each consisting of hundreds of thousands of men. In former times of national stress, far less perilous than this, the volunteer method has never furnished the men needed for emergency. History shows that, much to our detriment, we have begun our wars with this inadequate and ineffectual method, and have brought them to a successful conclusion only by resort to a system based on proper principles. The volunteer method failed this nation in the Revolution, and it was only the material aid of France that gave us our independence. It failed us in the war of 1812, and had it not been for drastic draft laws and the diversion created by the Napoleonic war we could not have concluded even such peace as we did. It failed the Confederacy in the Civil War, and that government, to its advantage, was quicker to perceive that fact than our own. It likewise failed the Federal Government, and volunteering having practically ceased by the end of 1862, was succeeded in the following year by the first of the draft acts. It failed us in the Spanish-American War, for the force then called for was never obtained.

The volunteer method has no fundamental legal basis for its

existence. The universal liability to render military service is based upon the fundamental concept of the relation of a free man to the state. From the earliest times, every free man, in legal theory at least, has been under the necessity of rendering military service to the state. The volunteer method grew not out of any legal principles, but was adopted doubtless as an expedient, having no other basis perhaps than that the need of the state on ordinary occasion has heretofore required the service of far less than the numbers available. The mere frequency of resort to this method of raising forces, which in its origin had nothing to sustain it but convenience, has resulted in causing us in some degree to forget the fundamental facts that every citizen capable of bearing arms has the bounden duty to render military service to the state. And the same frequency of resort has established the tradition that the volunteer system is the only system of raising military forces compatible with the maintenance of liberty. On the contrary, it is incompatible with that right and duty of equal participation in the affairs and burdens of state which characterizes American political institutions. To render military service to a nation is a higher duty than to contribute to its financial support. Fundamentally considered, therefore, military service is the highest duty of a citizen, and is in no sense to be regarded as a voluntary offering. . . .

The volunteer system does not accord with the principles of our institutions. It is undemocratic. It shifts the burden of national defense from the many, where it rightfully belongs, to the shoulders of the few whose condition in life or patriotism impels them first to offer themselves to accept the risks and hardships of war. The spirit of real democracy, which must lie at the basis of national defense, could not be better expressed than was done by the mother of two sons, who, in writing to urge that the system established by this bill be adopted, said: "It is the only just, equitable and democratic way; otherwise the flower of the country is sacrificed. We mothers with our sons want to defend this country, but we resent thus saving a lot of shirkers. This is the woman's point of view, but from the military standpoint it is also most efficacious."

In a word, the volunteer system which this measure is designed to supersede is undemocratic, unreliable, extravagant, inefficient and, above all, unsafe. The system established by this bill will have one other effect greatly to be desired in this nation, consisting as it does of varied elements of all races and tongues. It would directly and very effectually tend to the unification of our people by common association in a common cause, in furtherance of the principle that it is the duty, as it should be the desire, of all citizens, of whatever race or origin, to undergo all necessary sacrifice for the national good. It strikes down that opportunity, which the volunteer method deliberately induces, for the selfish and unpatriotic to remain at home in time of war and to profit out of the nation's adversity at the expense of those whose patriotism has impelled them to perform a citizen's duty.

This is no time to tolerate uncertainty in the raising and the

maintenance of the large numbers of men which the present emergency is likely to require, nor uncertainty in the methods to be adopted for the establishment of an adequate, efficient military service. The bill makes certain the raising and maintenance of the required forces with the utmost expedition. It establishes the principle that all arms-bearing citizens owe to the nation the duty of defending it. It selects only those who by reason of their age and physical capacity are the best fitted to receive the training and withstand the actual hardships of a campaign, and who, happily, can be taken with least disturbance of normal economic and industrial conditions.

(*Report of Senate Committee on Military Affairs*, recommending the enactment of the Universal Service Bill, submitted by Senator Chamberlain, of Oregon.)

[§96] A WAR PRESIDENT ON OBLIGATORY SERVICE.

By Abraham Lincoln.

The principle of draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that "the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies." It had been used just before in establishing our independence, and it was also used under the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shirk from the necessary means to maintain our free government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and our own fathers already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerate? Has the manhood of our race run out?

(From an Address to the American People, prepared in 1863 but never issued; quoted in *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1917, p. 924.)

[§97] ADVANTAGES OF THE SELECTIVE DRAFT.

By Representative Julius Kahn of California. (April 27, 1917.)

Under the proposed law there will be no stigma. Gentlemen who have spoken for the volunteer system have repeatedly asserted during this debate that it would be a stigma to conscript men into the service. Yes, if we passed a draft law similar to the laws that were passed during the Civil War, of course there would be a stigma. But under the selective draft system, where every man is treated alike, where every man of military age is compelled under the law to do his bit for the country, there can be no stigma or odium. Every man knows that his neighbor is going to be treated just as he is treated. If they had had during the Civil War an equitable draft, such as is proposed here, there

never would have been any trouble under it, and especially if such a law had been passed at the very beginning of the Civil War, there never would have been a moment's trouble or delay in filling all the regiments that were required to fight the war to a successful conclusion.

During the progress of that war that great man in the White House, the lamented Lincoln, wrote this letter to a mother up in New England. It is dated Executive Mansion, Washington, November 21, 1864, and is written to Mrs. Bixby, Boston, Mass.:

Dear Madam: I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the adjutant-general of Massachusetts that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how weak and fruitless must be any word of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save. I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost and the solemn pride that is yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.

Yours very sincerely and respectfully,

A. LINCOLN.

Why, my colleagues, why should that mother in New England have been permitted to make such a sacrifice to the Republic while somebody living near her probably made no sacrifice at all? My friend, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Facht), spoke to me a day or two ago and told me that in his district there was one family that sent nine sons to the war. Under the selective draft system advocated by the administration, that would not be possible. And it ought not to be possible in these days. Why should these nine men have been allowed to do the fighting for shirkers and cowards who refused to volunteer?

I am simply pointing out the evils of the volunteer system during the Civil War. Again I assert that I admire those soldiers who went to the fields of battle voluntarily. We owe them everything that the Republic can bestow upon them. During my membership in the House I have voted repeatedly to show the debt of gratitude that I feel the country owes them by giving my assent to legislation in their behalf.

(*Congressional Record*, 1267.)

[§98] HOW VOLUNTARY SERVICE WORKED IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

Condensed from General Emory Upton.

From the beginning to the end of the struggle almost 400,000 men were called out; yet notwithstanding this formidable number—on paper—the most men that Washington could get to-

gether for any one battle was 17,500, while as a rule the fighting strength of his command was so far below that number that an alert and aggressive enemy had many opportunities to terminate the war at one stroke. If, for illustration, Howe had struck at Boston the cause would have been lost. Washington fully expected the enemy to take advantage of his well-known weakness and to strike a crushing blow.

Blind to the difference between men enrolled and men developed into soldiers, Congress pursued its weak policy, and though in one year it summoned 89,600 men, Washington's fighting strength before Princeton and Trenton was only 4,000!

"To bring men," wrote Washington to Congress, "to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year. To place any reliance upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which, followed by a want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms) are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but also infuses the like spirit in others."

"It is needless to add," he declared later, "that short-term enlistments and a mistaken dependence on militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt. These, sir, are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence; this is the basis on which your cause will, and must, forever depend till you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy."

The cost of this mistaken policy in money and in discipline was enormous. Men came and went, consumed public stores, created a spirit of insubordination, often indulged in shocking lawlessness, and presently returned to their homes, having done little besides taking up the time of their superiors and being a charge upon the public treasury.

But deplorable as was the waste in money, it was nothing in comparison with other evils it spread. Two of the disasters are sufficient to show the far-reaching effect of the mistaken policy: In the campaign of 1775 the only important offensive movement undertaken by the Colonists was the invasion of Canada. General Montgomery crossed the frontier and occupied Montreal. General Arnold marched through the wilderness of Maine to Canada. They joined forces, attacked the stronghold of Quebec, and the assault failed. Sixty Americans were killed or wounded; between 300 and 400 were made prisoners; Montgomery lost his life. The failure was due to the circumstance that the attack was made at an inopportune time. The terms of enlistment of nearly all of Montgomery's men were about to expire, and he knew that they would immediately leave him; hence he determined upon a final stroke before his force was dissolved, al-

though his military judgment would have dictated otherwise had he been master of the situation.

The second misfortune occurred in 1777, when the American commander was unable to grasp the full fruits of the victory over Burgoyne at Saratoga. Ordinary military wisdom would have suggested the prompt transfer of the victorious army of 17,000 men to Philadelphia, where a British force of 10,000 was opposed by about the same number of Continentals and militia. A decisive defeat of Howe at Philadelphia, which this transfer would probably have assured, promised to end the Revolution then and there. But the transfer was not made, because Gates's volunteer army was again dissolving; and the war dragged on for five weary years more.

(Condensed from *Some Facts of American History*, based upon Upton's *Military Policy of the United States*.

[§99] WHY WE FIGHT ABROAD.

By Theodore Roosevelt. (July 26, 1917.)

At the outbreak of the war our people were stunned, blinded, terrified by the extent of the world disaster. Those among our leaders who were greedy, those who were selfish and ease-loving, those who were timid and those who were merely short-sighted, all joined to blindfold the eyes and dull the conscience of the people so that it might neither see iniquity nor gird its loins for the inevitable struggle. But at last we stand with our faces to the light. At last we have faced our duty. Now it behooves us to do this duty with masterful efficiency.

We are in the war. But we are not yet awake. We are passing through, in exaggerated form, the phase through which England passed during the first year of the war. A very large number of Englishmen fooled themselves with the idea that they lived on an island and were safe anyhow; that the war would soon be over, and that if they went on with their business as usual and waved flags and applauded patriotic speeches somebody else would do the fighting for them. England has seen the error of her way; she has paid in blood and agony for her shortsightedness; she is now doing her duty with stern resolution. We are repeating her early errors on a larger scale; and assuredly we shall pay heavily if we do not in time wake from our short-sighted apathy and foolish, self-sufficient optimism.

. We live on a continent. We have trusted to that fact for safety in the past; we do not understand that world conditions have changed, and that the oceans and even the air have become highways for military aggression. The exploits of the German U-boat off Nantucket last summer—exploits which nothing but feebleness, considerations of political expediency and downright lack of courage on our part permitted—showed that if Germany or any other possible opponent of ours were free to deal with us the security that an ocean barrier once offered was annihilated. In other words, the battle front of Europe is slowly spreading over the whole world. Unless we beat Germany in

Europe, we shall have to fight her deadly ambition on our own coasts and in our own continent. A great American army in Europe now is the best possible insurance against a great European or Asiatic army in our own country a couple of years or a couple of decades hence.

(Address before the Moose Convention at Pittsburgh.)

[§100] THE HARD FACTS OF THE WAR.

By Pomeroy Burton, British Expert in Publicity. (July 2, 1917.)

First.—That the war is nowhere near an end.

Second.—That its most serious phases are yet to come.

Third.—That it is and has been as much America's war as it is and has been France's and England's war ever since the first shot was fired.

Fourth.—That notwithstanding the warnings of the past three years, this country finds itself entering upon war against Germany amazingly unprepared.

Fifth.—That if a long war is to be averted, with its attendant world-wide suffering and a continuance of the ghastly fighting that is now in progress, America must quickly throw its full strength and resources into the struggle.

Sixth.—That the pressing and immediate reason for arousing this country to action on the greatest possible scale is that if anything were to go seriously wrong with the Allied war programme so as to affect sea-control, Germany would at once descend upon this country and exact a stupendous war indemnity, wreaking vengeance in true Prussian military fashion upon our defenseless women and children and establishing a permanent foothold on this continent.

Seventh.—That the vital Allied war needs of the moment are ships, food and aeroplanes in vast numbers; hence the urgency of getting the whole war programme moving without a single hour's unnecessary delay.

Eighth.—That much valuable time has been lost, and still more time is now being wasted in dangerous controversy, while the war goes swiftly on.

Ninth.—That the only safe basis of procedure, in view of all these circumstances, is to assume that this country alone is fighting Germany; that there is no British fleet to shield it and no other Allied armies to pound the German forces back while the United States is making ready for war, but that invasion is imminent, and that back of the Government's war programme must be the people's whole strength and fully aroused spirit in order to avert national disaster; and,

Tenth, That on America's promptness of action may depend the length, and *possibly the actual outcome*, of the war.

Address before the Speakers' Training Camp, National Security League, Chautauqua, N. Y.

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CHAPTER VI.

WHAT THE CITIZEN MUST DO TO MAKE THE WAR SUCCESSFUL

A.—SUMMARY STATEMENT.

[§102] While the governments at Washington and in the States of the Union are laboring on the problem of creating an army and enlarging the navy, every man, woman and child in the country has his own part in the war. In this respect there is no distinction between the native born and the naturalized citizen. They all have the same obligation to obey the laws, to pay their taxes, and to render to the country all the service that is within their power. They all have the same right to protection. Discriminations against American citizens simply because of their names or their race-descent are un-American and disloyal. Every citizen in the U. S. is entitled to the presumption that he or she loves the country, is opposed to its enemies, and will do his or her part in the struggle.

[§103] Aliens of the Allied powers are presumed to be friends and willing to do their share for the common cause. Aliens who have remained citizens of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey must submit to restrictions of their movements and employments necessary for the safety of the community—restrictions far less than would be applied in Germany against American citizens who should be found in great numbers inside Germany. Many of these "alien enemies" are, in fact, good Americans in spirit, who have not the slightest intention to injure the country in which they have chosen to live. But the spying and destruction of lives and property by order of German officials and by the direct hand of German citizens during the last three years make it necessary to keep all persons of questionable allegiance under surveillance.

[§104] One of the great duties of Americans is to unite in the national organizations for rousing the spirit of the people and for the care of sick and wounded soldiers and of families left destitute by the absence or death of their supporter. Every American ought to join the Red Cross, an immense nation-wide organization which takes the place occupied by the Sanitary Commission during the Civil War. It has the faithful and untiring aid of the military, naval and hospital authorities of the government. The hundred million dollars so splendidly supplied will before long be exhausted, and the community must make up its mind to subscription after subscription. Some people can aid by paying their dues and subscribing other sums; some people, especially the women, can give their thought, their work and their powers of organization to the great cause.

There cannot be too many bandages or comforts or supplies. The Red Cross is well organized and well officered, and has been made an official part of the military organization of the country.

[§105] The great patriotic societies ought also to have the enthusiastic support of hundreds of thousands of women. The Navy League, the National Security League, and some other similar societies have for several years been helping to educate the country on the need of preparedness and the best methods of national defense. Professional men ought to array themselves also in the special organizations of their brethren, such as the engineers and physicians. Everybody can increase his power by joining with his neighbors for a common cause.

[§106] Another field of patriotic effort is a share in the national duty of economy. Everybody ought to economize. When the taxes are raised, as they must be, when prodigious sums are taken out of the available capital in order to use them to save the country by destroying the opposing forces, the net national income will be that much reduced; it is impossible that everybody should have the same net income as before. Hence there must be a concerted effort to club together to facilitate saving. This applies first of all to the food supply, which must be carefully nursed; for it is as needful that our Allies and the troops who are fighting in the common cause should be fed out of our surplus as it is that men and munitions should cross the ocean. We Americans have always had a great abundance of cheap food, and the average consumption during the next few years can be very much reduced without anybody suffering. There is food enough for all, though the prices may be high. It is part of the duty of the individual to aid in preventing the taking of inordinate profits by the middleman, and in seeing that families who are on a small fixed income do not suffer.

[§107] The citizens can also help by taking part in the reorganization of labor, which will be necessary as soon as large numbers of men are withdrawn from their regular employments to go into the army. There will be a large demand for labor of every kind. Women will, as in France and England and other countries, be called upon to take the jobs of men who have gone to the front. There will be work enough and wages enough to support everybody, if proper pains are taken to see that everybody is placed where he or she can do the most good.

[§108] In this great national work the children have their part. Many of them will find special summer employment necessary because of the absence of workers. Both boys and girls can find interest and the opportunity of helpfulness as boy scouts or girl scouts, by whom necessary messenger service can be kept up. Children can aid in the household duties of canning fruits and vegetables, and otherwise joining in the food-saving service. Where fathers and brothers are at the front, the children must take responsibilities to help at home and keep the household going. Upon this point the "What Can I Do" committee of the National Security League is expected to make valuable suggestions and to organize the work.

[§109] It is clear, therefore, that the plain citizen, man or woman, native or foreign born, old or young, may "do his bit"; first by giving loyal support to all that the Government calls for as a part of the citizen's duty; second, by joining with others in societies and organizations intended to accumulate funds and mass efforts for some of the great needs of the time; and always by accepting the new tasks and responsibilities as they come in a cheerful and loyal spirit.

B.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS.

[§110] NO FIFTY-FIFTY ALLEGIANCE.

By Theodore Roosevelt. (July 4, 1917.)

Weak-kneed apologists for infamy say that it is "natural" for American citizens of German origin to favor Germany. This is nonsense, and criminal nonsense to boot. Any American citizen who thus feels should be sent straight back to Germany, where he belongs. We can have no "fifty-fifty" allegiance in this country.

This is a new nation, based on a mighty continent of boundless possibilities. No other nation in the world has such resources. No other nation has ever been so favored. If we dare to rise level with the opportunities offered us, our destiny will be vast—beyond the power of imagination. We must master this destiny, and make it our own; and we can thus make it our own only if we, as a vigorous and separate nation, develop a great and wonderful nationality, distinctively different from any other nationality, of either the present or the past. For such a nation all of us can well afford to give up all other allegiances, and high of heart to stand a mighty and united people, facing a future of glorious promise.

The obligation of single-minded Americanism has two sides—one as important as the other. On the one hand, every man of foreign birth or parentage must in good faith become an American and nothing else; on the other hand, if he thus in good faith, in soul and in body becomes an American, he stands on a full and entire equality with everybody else, and must be so treated, without any mental reservation, without any regard to his creed or birthplace or descent. One obligation is just as binding as the other.

(*New York Times*, July 5, 1917.)

[§111] NATIONAL SERVICE FOR EVERY MAN, WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL.

The United States Needs Men Who Are Willing

To serve in the army and navy.

To work in munition factories.

To man the ships of the merchant marine.

To serve in the Home Guards now being organized in the cities.

To contribute to the Red Cross fund for the support of the families of soldiers and sailors.

To till every available acre of soil.

To help the nation by adopting a policy of personal economy.

To preach and practise a new spirit of national unity.

The Country Needs Women

To give their sons to defend the nation.

To force the "slacker" to do his "bit."

To encourage their children to save their pennies for the Red Cross.

To sew and knit for the men who are at "the front."

To produce their own vegetables in their back-yards.

To keep a watchful eye on the family pocket book.

To serve as Red Cross nurses.

To work in munition factories.

To teach classes in American citizenship in the schools and churches.

To display the American flag from their homes.

To teach their sons and daughters to salute the national emblem.

To remember the President and the men of the fighting forces in their prayers.

To urge a new spirit of national unity.

Boys and Girls Can Help, Too.

Every girl who has no brother to give to her country can "adopt" some young man in the army or navy and write him a cheerful letter at least once a week. They can help, too, in the vegetable gardens and with the sewing and knitting. The boys can enlist in the Home Guards, help with the work on the farm so that the men may be released for military service or other work of national importance.

(Circular of a patriotic society.)

[§112] THE NECESSARY MEANS.

By Hiram W. Johnson and Others. (April 25, 1917.)

Believing that our country has entered the great war rightly, wisely, and of necessity, that it is our duty as a great free people to take our part in the defense of liberty, democracy and civilization against the attack of militarism, and that our sober purpose is to secure a just and lasting peace, we support with all our hearts and all our powers the war plan of the Government, declared by the President in his address to Congress on April 2.

We earnestly desire that the war may be brought to a successful, prompt and permanent conclusion; that our allies may receive from us whatsoever assistance will best sustain them in their vast sacrifices, and that our nation, playing its

part with honor, courage and effectiveness, may be spared all needless burdens and avoidable loss.

To carry forward the war plans of our government with full success, and thereby achieve the ends just named, we believe that the following measures are immediately necessary:

1. Universal military service, to insure equality of sacrifice in the national defense.

2. Universal industrial service of both men and property in support of the nation.

3. An official guarantee that the government will buy at stated prices all agricultural products offered, so as to encourage the largest possible production on our farms.

4. Government control of the price of the necessities of life, including rent, food and fuel, to stop undue increase of the cost of living.

5. Federal and State guarantees to the wage earners of America that their rights shall not be lost, so that the sacrifices that are required of them, in common with all other citizens during the war, shall not continue after peace is restored.

6. Government co-operation to maintain and develop the efficiency of law-abiding enterprises, thus preserving the foundations of our commercial prosperity. The tremendous struggle for the markets of the world which will follow the war must not find us unprepared.

7. A graduated income tax, by which an increasing part of the larger incomes shall be conscripted for public purposes, so that wealth may bear its fair share in the general sacrifice.

8. A limit upon profits on American and allied government orders, and a supertax on excess profits due to war conditions. To lend our allies \$3,000,000,000, and then exact the return of it in extortionate profits would be indefensible.

9. Conservation of grain so far as possible for food purposes.

10. The payment of as much of the cost of the war as can be met out of current revenues.

11. National and state legislation granting women equal political rights with men, thus completing the establishment of democracy.

12. The retention and control of all natural resources now held by the government, so that the foundations of national efficiency and industrial strength may not be impaired.

13. The workers of our country will make heavy sacrifices during the war. With peace will come industrial readjustment. A government commission should be organized now to prepare for the distribution of unemployed labor after the war and for government use of surplus labor. With far-sighted purposes, we should plan to carry forward into the coming peace the increased industrial power resulting from a reorganization of labor and capital made necessary by the war.

14. From common devotion to service to perpetuate and advance democracy there should be assurance of common benefit, so that out of the sacrifices of war America may

achieve broader democracy in government, more equitable distribution of wealth, and greater national efficiency in raising the level of the general welfare.

(Statement drawn up by Hiram W. Johnson, William Allen White, Gifford Pinchot, Raymond Robbins and others, *N. Y. Times*, April 25, 1917.)

[§113] "I DIDN'T RAISE MY BOY."

By Abbie Farwell Brown.

Not to be a soldier?

Did you then know what you, his mother, *were* raising him for?

How could you tell when and where he would be needed?

When and where he would best pay a man's debt to his country?

Suppose the mother of George Washington had said, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier!"

Suppose the mother of General Grant, or the mother of Admiral Dewey had said it, or the mothers of thousands and thousands of brave fellows who fought for independence and liberty—where would our country be to-day?

If the mothers of heroes had clung and sniveled and been afraid for their boys, there wouldn't perhaps be any free America for the world to look to.

Mother, you are living and enjoying America now—you and the boy you "didn't raise to be a soldier."

Thanks to others, you and he are safe and sound—so far.

You may not be to-morrow, you and the other women, he and the other men who "weren't raised"—if Americans turn out to be Sons of Cowards, as the Germans believe.

You want your boy to live and enjoy life with you—to make you happy.

You don't want to risk your treasure. What mother ever wished it? It is indeed harder to risk one's beloved than one's self. But there are things still harder.

You don't want your lad to meet danger, like Washington and Grant and Sheridan, and the rest whom you taught him to admire.

You'd rather keep your boy where you believe him safe than have your country safe!

You'd rather have him to look at here, a slacker, than abroad earning glory as a patriot.

You'd rather have him grow old and decrepit and die in his bed than risk a hero's death, with many chances of coming back to you proudly honored.

You'd rather have him go by accident or illness, or worse.

There are risks at home, you know!

Are you afraid of them, too? How can you guard him?

Is it you who are keeping him back?

Shame on you, Mother! You are no true, proud mother.

It isn't only the men who have got to be brave these days. It's the women, too. We all have much to risk when there's wicked war in the world.

Don't you know this is a war to destroy wicked war?

Don't you want your son to help make the world over?

This is a war to save our liberty, our manhood, our womanhood—the best life has to give.

Mother, what did you raise your boy for? Wasn't it to be a man and do a man's work?

Could he find a greater Cause than this to live or die for?

You should be proud if he can be a Soldier.

You must send him out with a smile.

Courage! You must help him to be brave.

We must help one another to be brave and unselfish.

For America!

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.)

[§114] WHY WE CANNOT HAVE BUSINESS AS USUAL.

By Frank A. Vanderlip, Member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and President of the National City Bank of New York. (May 17, 1917.)

The sooner the public gets over the idea that we want "business as usual," or can have "business as usual" during this great war the better for all. We want to stop all unnecessary work and unnecessary expenditures short off and concentrate on the immense volume of work which has to be done. Business men should get rid of any foolish fears that economy will bring on a general paralysis of industry or trade. There is no danger of not having work for everybody; the trouble is that there is more work in sight than can possibly be done, and the question is whether we shall cut off luxuries or necessities. The farmers are crying for labor and the whole world is crying for food; the great industries, like mining, lumbering, steel making, cloth making, transportation, shipbuilding, car building, etc., are clamoring for help; a million or two million men are wanted for the Army and Navy, and thousands of women will be wanted to take their place in shops and offices; the Army must be clothed and shod.

It is absurd under these conditions to talk of the danger of unemployment and to urge that the people shall go on buying what they do not actually need in order to keep labor from unemployment or to maintain business as usual. How is labor to be had to make uniforms unless it is released from making other clothes? How are looms to be had for blankets unless released from something else? How is steel to be had for ships, tin can and agricultural implements unless other consumption is curtailed? How are women to be had for offices unless released elsewhere? And finally, how are we to put \$7,000,000,000 or \$8,000,000,000 of purchasing power at the disposal of the Government unless we curtail our individual expenditures? The country should immediately awake to the fact that it has a great task in

hand and that it cannot carry on a war like this with one hand and continue to do all the business it did before with the other. No doubt some persons will be inconvenienced by being obliged to leave one job and look for another. In some instances they will probably improve their lot permanently; in some instances possibly they will not place themselves so well; but the sooner everybody recognizes the inevitable and plans for it the better. We can no more expect to readjust business from peace conditions to war conditions without some inconvenience and loss than we can expect to send an army to the front without sacrifice and loss.

All possible aid should be given in effecting the necessary shifts in employment. The government should be prompt in placing its contracts, and give some attention to their distribution with a view to taking up labor that is displaced, and there should be organized community effort to aid in these readjustments. The essential fact in the situation is that readjustment is unavoidable, but that any general state of unemployment is impossible.

(Official Bulletin, May 17, 1917, p. 5.)

[§115] THE FOOD QUESTION.

By Herbert C. Hoover, National Director of Food Conservation. (July 5, 1917.)

The weapons in this war are fighting men, munitions, food, ships and finance. If we are to defend liberty in this year, 1917, all these must be upon such a scale as will demand the energies of our people. In previous wars a small proportion of the community went to fight, another small portion was devoted to their support, but the great bulk of the nation did "business as usual."

Autocracy has been for years organizing its resources to the end that they have placed one out of seven of its population on the fighting line, and have so mobilized the civil population as to afford them complete support. They have suppressed production of every luxury and reduced even every necessity. Their arrogant confidence that they will become "masters of the world" is based upon their belief that the materialism, the selfishness, and the jealousy of individual interests in democracy make it impossible for it to organize such a strength. They do not deny the bravery of the men of democracy in battle, but they comfort themselves in the belief that we have not the self-sacrifice at home for their support.

Our problem is not alone to mobilize our civilian population for the support of our fighting men, but we also have the responsibility of the support of the fighting men of our allies. And food is not the least of their necessities. One of the great European statesmen has said: "The war will not be won by the last 500,000 fighting men, but will be won by the last 500,000 bushels of wheat." It is within our ability to

give this last 500,000 bushels, but only if we organize to produce, organize to save and organize to supply all.

We must feed our allies that their people may remain constant in the war. Liberty cannot be maintained upon the empty stomachs of the women and children. Through the drain of war our allies have steadily decreased in food production and other agencies also curtailed their supplies. Out of our abundance, by eliminating waste and extravagance, it is in our power, and in our power alone, to hold the wolf from the door of the world. Our obligation is greater than war itself—humanity demands it of us.

Eat without waste. We must save in all food. We must eat plenty, but wisely and without waste. If we save in our consumption and our waste we can increase our surplus to export; if we substitute other commodities for those we can export we can further increase our surplus.

Furthermore, by our economies we can save a major portion of the cost of the war. We can increase our ability to subscribe to liberty loans. If we can save food we can lower the price of living to our own people and relieve the strain and distress under which they labor to-day. We can only do this by organization so that there shall be no profiting from our economy, that all bear the burden equally.

The food administration is a volunteer organization to be endowed with powers by the Government. This volunteer organization is not to be limited to a few executives in Washington. We are solicitous, nay anxious, to secure as actual members of this volunteer effort every man and every woman, every boy and girl in these United States who will undertake the task with us. There is not dictatorship in volunteer effort. It is by that we can answer autocracy with democracy. It is as great in efficiency and greater in spirit.

(*Official Bulletin*, July 5, 1917, p. 2.)

[§116] HINTS TO FARMERS.

By Mrs. Horace Brock.

Save staple products and increase their production.

Eat sufficient food, nourishing food of a varied character to keep you in good physical and mental condition, but

Don't waste anything. Preach the doctrine of a clean plate and an empty slop pail.

Use no wheat breakfast cereals and cut in half your use of wheat flour and bread, substituting cornmeal, hominy, rice, barley, oatmeal and buckwheat. Wheat bread once a day, even bread or muffins once and rye bread once, is suggested.

Make two blades grow where one grew before. Growing of beans is specially recommended. Green beans salted away in crocks make a good green vegetable for winter. The lima and soup beans dried make nourishing vegetables, puree or soup, and takes the place of meat.

Keep chickens and a pig if you can. Twenty years ago every

one with a little place in the country districts of Pennsylvania bought a little pig in the spring, fattened it at small cost and sold it for a good price in the early winter.

Don't kill young animals—calves, pigs, lambs, chickens or ducks. There is great loss to the world in this, especially in the killing of calves and lambs. Be patriotic, no matter what it costs you.

Raise fish. If there is a stream or pond suitable for fish in your neighborhood apply to the State Fisheries for fish to stock it. They will advise you about it.

[§117] DON'T CAN—DRY!

By Hamlin Garland.

We were talking of food and boats—Hamlin Garland and I.

"Feeding Europe." I said, "isn't so much a matter of growing things, as of using all we grow. Why, the vegetables and fruit that rot on the ground on my farm every year—and it's not a wildly extravagant farm at that—would pretty near feed another family the size of mine. Our problem as I see it is only partly one of production. Above all, it is a problem of saving, canning and distributing."

"I'm not so sure about the canning," answered Mr. Garland. "Canning means water, and the idea of sending millions of tons of water to Europe seems rather foolish. It's foolish even to send potatoes in bulk."

"You can't send them by wireless," I protested mildly.

"No, but you can dry them," he answered.

"Powdered potatoes?" I asked in amazement.

"Why, yes," he replied with a reminiscent smile. "And they're good, too. When I was outfitting for 'The Long Trail' into the Yukon Valley in '98, I found myself deeply concerned with the question of food transportation. All our supplies for eight hundred miles of wild country had to be packed on the backs of our horses and every pound of extra weight counted against our speed.

"Naturally we ruled out canned goods—to pack water into the British Northwest was idiotic. We turned to dried fruits, flour and beans, and then to a new ration which had made its appearance in the western markets at that time. This new ration was 'granulated' potatoes and 'dessicated' eggs. The potatoes were in dice-shaped grains. The eggs resembled yellow bird-shot. A small can of these grains included, as I recall it, six dozen of eggs. In a somewhat larger can I bought the flaky residue of several bushels of carrots, parsnips and turnips.

"My partner was suspicious of 'dessicated' eggs. But as soon as we learned how to use them we were delighted with the result. A tablespoonful of the eggs, and two spoonsful of the potatoes when steamed in a skillet will sweat up into a fine savory mess.

"It beats rice for expanding," my partner said."

"By George, there's an idea there!"

"I think so myself," Mr. Garland answered slowly. "Ever

since the food problem was first agitated, I have been wondering whether such a ration could not be used for our soldiers and for the soldiers of our allies whom we may have to feed. Transportation is going to be a mighty problem, and the saving and shipping of fruits and vegetables in dried form may be one of the best forms of food conservation. Canned fruit is heavy, dried fruit is light. Potatoes are mostly water, heavy to ship and likely to bruise and rot, but 'granulated' potatoes could be sent in small compass anywhere, and so far as I know would keep indefinitely. Local factories could be established where the eggs and fruits and vegetables are most abundant, and in these ovens the water could be squeezed out and the food compressed for easy transportation."

"And you can really eat the stuff?" I asked incredulously.

"In our own case, with bacon and coffee." Mr. Garland replied, "it made a perfectly good ration, which we ate day after day with satisfaction. I forgot to say that dried raspberries also came in for use in our dietary." He chuckled with reminiscent enthusiasm. "Our ration was perfect."

"Perhaps you have a particularly robust constitution," I ventured.

"No," he said. "All the miners used the ration, because it was light, nutritious and easily transported. I am not at all sure that the granulated potato and the dessicated eggs may not be the solution of the food problem in Europe as it was on the Yukon."

"The granulated potato and the dessicated egg," I murmured unhappily.

"Mr. Garland laid his hand on my shoulder. "My boy," he said, "you will have to get used to worse things than dessicated eggs if we don't beat the submarines!"

"If we don't—You don't think there's a chance—?"

Mr. Garland looked grave. "I'm not a pessimist," he said, "and America's never been licked yet. But we need submarine-chasers, and here's the best one I know—DON'T CAN!—DRY! Remember it!"

I told him I would. And I do. Every time I see a potato or an egg. I think of it. The idea is beginning to get me.

It would be funny, wouldn't it, if the world should be made safe for democracy by the granulated potato and the dessicated egg?

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.)

[§118] WHAT OUR COUNTRY ASKS OF ITS YOUNG WOMEN.

By Mrs. Percy V. Pennybacker, Member of the Committee on Patriotism Through Education; President of the National Federation of Women's Clubs. (July 6, 1917.)

The bugle call has sounded. The women of our land are summoned to service in a "food crusade." It is hard for us in America to realize, in spite of word from our Government,

that we are in danger of food shortage. If we do our duty by our Allies and the neutral countries over seas there will be this fall a serious lack of meat, potatoes and white flour. In this dilemma the Government makes a direct appeal to women.

First, it asks that we help the men to produce more.

Second, that we eliminate waste. We are confronted by the appalling statement that during the last year there was wasted in the American kitchen the sum of \$700,000,000. Because it is better to face facts, let us confess that we have been a wasteful nation; nay, worse, we have not been ashamed of waste; worse still, we have taken a certain pride in our wastefulness. We have said, "We don't have to be close, we don't have to be stingy, we don't have to be economical in food." Oh, the pity of it—\$700,000,000 worth of food wasted while mothers in Belgium were begging bread for their children, while Poland buried all her little ones under the age of two because food could not be found to sustain life! We didn't intend to be cruel, we simply didn't know; but, knowing, we shall turn our energies toward reform. There is a concrete contribution that each of us can make, beginning to-day, toward the elimination of waste. A "war portion" should be our watchword at each meal. This does not mean hunger; it only means taking on the plate what we will consume, being served a second or third time if necessary, but wasting nothing.

Third, the Government asks that women substitute the cheaper foods for those that have grown costly. This calls for thought, for study, for planning; but she is an unworthy home-maker, a real slacker, who is not willing to put forth her best powers in her country's hour of need.

Fourth, we are asked to conserve all fruits and vegetables that are produced this summer, for we shall not feel the full brunt of war prices until cold weather comes.

It becomes the solemn duty of every woman to keep before her the fact that this food campaign is not one of short duration. As long as the war lasts we must "stand by our guns"; we must remember that for every man who goes to the front five people at home are needed to sustain him. Above all things, we must let it be known that no woman has the right to buy in large quantities and hoard food for the use of her family. Some one has well said that "such a woman is at heart a traitor."

There was never greater need for women to be sane than at this hour. There is no excuse for excitement or for hysteria. If our men are to give the best that is in them, we must keep the atmosphere of our homes sweet and serene. Remember, no sacrifice is a great sacrifice unless it is made *cheerfully*. Let there be no weeping, no complaining, no lamentation, when our loved ones answer the call to duty.

This is also a time for moral sanity and for lofty ideals. I wish I could burn into the heart of every young woman the remark that a distinguished military man made a few days ago: "The influence of young women on soldiers is terrifying in its strength; it is not what a woman says, it is not what a woman does, it is what she really *is* that counts. Men sense inmost beliefs. Men raise or lower their ideals as she dictates." This

is an awful responsibility, young women, but it is yours; you cannot escape it. In these days of distress, every woman should pass her soul in review before herself and ask: "What are my standards? Do I really believe that the Commandments were given for men as well as for women? Do I realize that I am in part 'my brother's keeper'?" In dress, in speech, in manner, in thought, are the young women of America doing their full duty to help our boys in the ranks to retain the loftiest ideals of womanhood, to live clean lives, to take as much pride in moral as in physical victory? The awful conditions that surrounded our training and concentration camps up to June, 1917, have been blots upon the history of civilization. Secretary Baker, of the War Department, and his aides are making every effort to secure the proper environment. It is the duty of every woman in this country to help, because the happiness of all is at stake—the salvation of the next generation is in peril.

(Address at Speakers' Training Camp and Conference, Chautauqua, N. Y.)

[§119] WHAT CAN SHE DO?

By Albert Bushnell Hart.

What can "*she*" do? How did Eve spend her time while Adam was hunting dragons? How did Calphurnia help when Julius Caesar was practising frightfulness on the Gauls? What aid did Mrs. Grant give while the General was fighting the Virginia campaign? What have heroic women always done when the war cloud descended upon their country and their men took up spear or cross-bow or rifle? Just the same thing that the women of America are to do during the continuance of this tremendous war.

"She" can keep the family going. The profession of most women is homekeeping, and there is no lessening of demand for competent mothers and sisters and aunts and sweethearts to feed the hungry, bring up the children and strengthen the hearts of the faint. Every country that goes into a real war fights on the base line of the home, from which aid, comfort and love flow without cessation to the men in the trenches. The great work of the home which is the preservation of civilization must go on, war or no war. If the father is where he cannot take part, the mother must take all the responsibility.

"She" can take a part in the industrial life of the country which will set hundreds of thousands of men free for the hard campaigning which they alone can perform. She has long been a workwoman in a factory, a saleswoman, a stenographer, a bookkeeper, a business woman—all those things she will keep on doing, and she will add innumerable tasks that are waiting for women to perform. In the great organization of the industrial forces of the country she will give indispensable help. The war cannot be successfully fought without her. New opportunities will open up to her, as telegrapher, department clerk or confidential secretary.

She will have the most glorious opportunity in the history of womankind to share in the constructive work of business and of war.

"She" is wanted as an actual sharer in warlike operations. She will furnish the nurses, the experts in cooking, the store-keepers, the accountants, the searchers for lost soldiers, the aids to the convalescent. She will offer to many a poor wounded fellow that touch of home and humanity which will coax him back to life. She will furnish courage to her man on the firing line and to some other girl's man in the hospital.

"She" will nerve the nation up to its work. She will hold the patriotic meetings and organize the women of her city or of her hamlet to work together for the common need. She will be brave in defeat, she will urge on after victory. She may be depended upon, whether maid, wife or widow, to bear her equal share of the sacrifices and sufferings, of the joys and triumphs of the national struggle.

(Special Service of the Vigilantes.)

[§120] YOU AND THE RED CROSS.

By Hildegarde Hawthorne.

The immense mission of the Red Cross is to give help. But in order to give the full measure of help it must have assistance in its turn. You must help the Red Cross if the Red Cross is to help our men when they are wounded, when they are sick, when they are worn and weary from the work of war in which so soon they will be plunged.

Try to see just one soldier with the eyes of your imagination. Some young man with his life before him, some older man who has laid aside the life so carefully built up and so dear to him to go out to this service; both, young or older, working for us at the bitterest work on earth. See him, bleeding from some terrible wound, staggering back from the trench, or lying lost in No Man's Land. See him suffering untold pain for the lack of an anesthetic. See him bleed to death for lack of a bandage. See him left unfound to die because there was no automobile ambulance to seek him.

And think this: If you had helped the Red Cross the Red Cross could have helped, might have saved him.

It is just that. Whatever you do is done for some suffering man or woman or child. The Red Cross takes it and uses it where the need is greatest. Behind the Red Cross it is you who bind the bandage, who set the broken bone, who give the soothing anesthesia, who carry back the wounded or dying man from the hideous torture of the field to the hospital. It is you too who refuse this succor if it is withheld. Not the Red Cross, for it can do nothing without you. The workers there in the dark zone of battle are making the supreme sacrifice. What will you sacrifice?

The service of our Red Cross is to go first to our own.

But these are not the only ones in the hell of war who need its help.

Do you know that the bones of little babies lie thick as leaves along the desolate roads of Poland? They are gone; neither you nor the Red Cross can help them now. But others still live. Through the Red Cross they can be saved, their little bones need not be scattered a sacrifice to the war—if you will give your help.

The world is in awful need. Between its suffering and you stands the Red Cross, desperately eager to lessen the pain, to save life, to give a little hope, a little peace, a little comfort where now there is none. To do this it must have money, and it is you who must give the money.

Look into it. Give just an hour to finding out what the Red Cross is doing, what it hopes to do, what the need is. You will hardly turn away unmoved if you give that hour. You will want to do something. You will do something.

Will you not sacrifice a little ease, a little money, a little time, when you understand that by so doing you will save some fine boy to live his life sound and strong, after his months of struggle and suffering, will restore to some man his health, will heal his shattered body, and bring him back to the sweet life he gave up for the sake of his country. When you realize that what you do, what you give, will save a starving child and its mother, will you not do and give all you can?

The Red Cross, that helps a world in pain, asks your help.
(*Special Service of the Vigilantes.*)

[§121] SAFEGUARDING CHILDHOOD IN WAR.

By Owen R. Lovejoy, General Secretary, National Child Labor Committee.

Many years ago when our country was in the throes of a terrible civil conflict and the ranks of the Confederate armies were depleted by war and famine and it was proposed that young children should be recruited, the President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, replied, "We must not grind the seed corn." Doubtless every American would echo this sentiment to-day. But in view of the information we have gathered from warring European countries let us realize that it is not only upon the field of battle that the germ of life is taken from the nation's seed corn. Our vision must be more discerning. In addition to the death from bullet and exposure and disease at the battle front, there is the breaking down of the education and health and other conservation standards at home. Our school rooms will be deserted, agencies protecting the health, the morals, and the prosperity of children will suffer for lack of funds. The exposure of little boys to the rigors of industrial life in factory, coal mine, sweatshop and truck garden will be based solely on the high motive of patriotic service and defense of the flag. The childhood of the present generation will suffer irretrievable loss unless those of us who have dedi-

cated ourselves to the protection of these defenseless ones keep our heads clear and our motives unmixed, determining that whatever happens all other treasure, all other forms of wealth, all other methods of defense shall be sacrificed before we compel the children of America to pass through the fire.

(*Child Labor Bulletin*, May, 1917.)

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CHAPTER VII

World-Peace After World-War.

A.—SUMMARY STATEMENT.

[§123] The supreme hope of the American people in this war is that they may help to bring it to such an issue that no future generation will have cause to fear so dreadful a catastrophe. We are fighting in order to win, first, a just peace at the end of the present conflict; and beyond that, such a lasting reorganization of the relations between peoples that it will hereafter be impossible for any nation to set the world on fire.

[§124] The object of Germany in 1914 was undoubtedly to force a peace in which the power and authority of Germany should be so full and so wide that no one for many years to come would dare dispute her dominating position in the world. The military deadlock prevented Germany from realizing these hopes; hence the Germans brought into operation the new weapon of submarine warfare against merchantmen, which finally brought the United States into the war. In December, 1916, the Germans announced that they were willing to enter upon peace negotiations. They have, however, as yet given only vague and equivocal indications of the terms they were willing to accept, and as late as July, 1917, the Imperial Chancellor refused to adopt the formula of "no annexations and no indemnities."

[§125] The Allies have been more outspoken, and have (December 30, 1916) expressly declared that they would not return to the *status quo ante bellum*, i. e., would not accept terms of peace which merely left the several countries with the same territorial boundaries as on August 1st, 1914. The Allies declare that such an outcome would really be a German victory, since it would mean that Germany would be the gainer by having begun the war and having carried it on by the lawless methods which she has employed. For it would leave Germany the most powerful State in Europe, controlling directly or indirectly a belt of territory stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, through Central Europe and Western Asia. Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria would thus remain within the sphere of German influence; Serbia and Rumania would be prostrate and helpless; and Turkey would be little else but a German province. The responsibility of the German authorities for the Armenian massacres was a proof that even the civilized Christian people of the Turkish empire could not expect protection from German overlords. The Allies have also taken the position that the terms of peace must give recognition to the demands of subject and sundered nationalities, such as the Poles, for reunion and some form of self-governing national existence.

[§126] By supplying fresh forces, the United States has much increased the probability that the German project of a vast European and Asiatic Empire will fail. It is absolutely contrary to the interests of the United States to see such an empire created. It is in keeping with the traditions and principles of the United States to recognize the right of nationalities to be free from oppressive and alien rule; and with the aspirations of many of these nationalities for a more democratic government, the American republic cannot but be in hearty sympathy. On the other hand, the United States is not interested in any merely territorial ambitions which any of the European powers may entertain.

[§127] Everyone recognizes that any peace that can be made at the end of this war is likely to be temporary, unless it can be transformed into a general world-peace. Simply to go back to the conditions of 1914 might stop the bloodshed that is now going on, but would leave a likelihood of its beginning again within a generation. The United States has long been one of the foremost of all nations in efforts to promote universal peace, as is shown by the large number of arbitrations and arbitration treaties to which the United States has been a party. Yet the present war has shown a fundamental weakness in all the plans for universal peace hitherto attempted; for Germany has demonstrated that it is possible for any great world power, which is sufficiently strong and ruthless, to compel its immediate neighbors to go to war; and in the present entanglement of most of the powers in alliances and ententes, if two great powers fall out, they may drag a score of other nations into war.

[§128] Four possible plans for world-peace have been proposed (for three of these see also extracts in this chapter): (1) A world tribunal, on the general plan of the Hague Court established in 1907, to which quarrelsome powers were expected to bring any controversies over their rights and plans. (2) The same plan, supplemented by an International Council of Conciliation and frequent world conferences to frame and codify rules and international law. (3) A League of Nations to Enforce Peace, the principle of which is that none of its members shall go to war with another until it has first submitted its case to a tribunal and the tribunal has reported thereon. Only this period of delay of one year for conciliation and judicial report would be compulsory, the nations being left free at the end of that time to make war if they saw fit. The proposed compulsion, when necessary, would be exercised by economic and military pressure from the other nations in the League. (4) A world federation, having both a legislative and judicial body, and with power to enforce the decisions of the latter body upon refractory nations is also conceivable, but no feasible plan has yet been suggested.

[§129] Both Germany and the principal allied powers have during the war assented to the view that there ought to be some world organization which would prevent future wars. The great difficulty is, however, that many parts of the earth are still in an undeveloped state of social and political development, as in Africa; and that so many hundreds of millions of civilized people

are subjects of colonies ruled by distant nations. Thus the problem of devising a practicable plan of world organization, which will realize both peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another, is far from a simple or easy one. Yet there is no problem before mankind which so imperatively demands solution. The influence of the United States is pledged to world peace, and the best time in the history of mankind to urge it will be at the peace negotiations which—at some time or other, no one can say just when—will bring to an end the frightful calamity which otherwise will destroy the civilization of the world.

B.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS.

[§130] THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE.

By President Woodrow Wilson. (Jan. 22, 1917.)

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind; not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterward, when it may be too late.

No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements consistent with their political faith and the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend. . . .

Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those

that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there, of course, cannot be; nor any sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoise of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of rights among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. . . .

But mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it.

If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not only a balance of power but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace. . . .

(Address before the Senate; *Congressional Record*, 1742.)

[§131] PLAN OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE.

By Walter L. Fisher, Former Secretary of the Interior.

The League to Enforce Peace does not propose to prevent us from fighting if we wish; it merely requires us to go before a board of arbitration, or a council of conciliation before engaging in war. It does not undertake to enforce the award of the one or the recommendation of the other. This hideous world war may make it possible to go much further than this in international reorganization, but the strength of this movement at present lies in the moderation and simplicity of its proposals. It seeks to do today what can be done today in the way that is available today. It leaves to tomorrow the adoption of methods and the accomplishment of objects that tomorrow alone may make attainable. Quite sufficient for the day are the difficulties

thereof; and the advocates of this league of peace do not overlook or minimize them. They simply do not regard them as insuperable. Confident in the power of a great purpose and in the resources of statecraft, they are the proponents of a principle; not the draughtsmen of a treaty.

They propose a league open to all who accept its conditions—a league which binds its own members not to engage in war between themselves until they have first submitted their difference, if this difference is justiciable (which means determinable upon established principles of law or equity), to an international court or board of arbitration, or to a council of conciliation if the difference is one involving a conflict of national interests or policies not justiciable in their nature, such as the Monroe Doctrine or our policy with respect to oriental immigration. The nations joining the league agree to use their economic and if necessary their military forces against any of their number who begin hostilities without first resorting to the methods thus provided for the avoidance of war. In order that the field of adjudication may be steadily enlarged, the signatory powers are to hold conferences from time to time to formulate and codify the rules of international law, the results to be binding unless rejected by some power within a stated period. . . .

Here then is a proposal, which, so far as it goes, as useful as it may prove, whether it succeeds or fails in accomplishing all its advocates expect, is at least a move in the right direction. It will at least diminish the causes and the occasions of war. Therefore we, the people of the United States, desiring peace, willing to take our part in the great family of nations, should be willing to contribute whatever is necessary to further the most practical plan which has thus far been suggested for avoiding another unspeakable catastrophe such as the one now plunging the world in misery; and thus to aid those forces which work for civilization and for the peaceful progress of mankind.

(Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., *Annals*, July, 1914.)

[§132] PLAN OF THE WORLD COURT LEAGUE.

A World Court is absolutely necessary. Had such a World Court been in existence in August, 1914, the present terrible struggle would probably never have occurred. Unfortunately for Europe, unfortunately for the world, it was not. How such a court may be created, whether by action of four or five of the mightiest of the nations of the world, or by the common agreement of all nations, of how many judges it shall be composed, the methods to be pursued in the selection of judges, the powers to be vested in the court, the kind of disputes which may properly come under its jurisdiction, above all, the grave question as to the methods through which the solemn decisions of the great tribunal shall be enforced, whether by the creation of a great international police force, backed by the combined armies and navies of the world, or through economic pressure brought to bear upon a recalcitrant nation—a pressure that might easily become more effective than force of arms—are questions concern-

ing which men hold varying opinions and, surely, this is neither the place, nor the hour, for their discussion.

Our simple contention is that the establishment of a great court of the nations is a project the feasibility of which few men now question, and the necessity of which still fewer will deny. *War must be prevented.* Upon that proposition all men, save those who believe that war is a necessity for the preservation of a nation's virility are beginning to unite. For it every church in America, every peace society in the land, every man, every woman, familiar with the horrors of war, would stand up and be counted.

Such a court for the trial of cases decided to be justiciable, that is, cases purely legal in character, supplemented by international boards of conciliation and arbitration and of international congresses or conventions for the determination of the questions proper to be submitted to the tribunal, and by the creation of some body charged with the execution of the decisions of the court—a work the court could not of itself perform—would, in our judgment, as a World Court, soon acquire the dignity, the prestige, the authority, the respect, the obedience associated in the thought of America and the world with the Supreme Court of the United States of America—the greatest court of the world today.

But, however desirable, however feasible, however necessary, such a court may be for the peace of the world, nothing is clearer than the fact that under present conditions it cannot be brought into being save at tremendous cost of money, energy and time.

Not in a day, not without tremendous effort, can the old ideas that, from time immemorial have obsessed the minds of men, be displaced. Not without campaigns of education, not until the great ideas of the majesty and supremacy of law, for nations as well as for individuals, shall be more fully recognized, not until righteousness shall be more fully enthroned in the minds of men, not until the great maxim of "equal justice to all, to rich and poor alike, to the strong and to the feeble—the square deal for every man"—shall have taken deeper root in the life of the nations of the world, will nations do what individuals refuse to do, namely, submit to law, whether national or international.

(*The World Court*, July 1916.)

[§133] THE FAILURE OF PACIFISM.

By Robert Goldsmith.

The failure of pacifism—for it can hardly be denied that pacifism has failed—clears the ground and makes room for saner and more practical efforts. There is no denying the fact that a good deal of pacifist sentiment was hardly distinguishable from mild-mannered sentimentality. The disciples of this school were unquestionably sincere enough and perhaps were rigorously logical, but they refused to look the facts of life in the face and

to deal with men and nations as they actually are. They were naive. Their plans were visionary and their schemes chimerical. "The peace movement," writes Ellen Key in her most recent book, "that has only appealed to the emotions has never put the axe to the root of the problem. . . . So long as it was only a proclamation of Christian humanitarianism, it never built on a foundation of reality." These pacifists too often thought of countries and statesmen in the abstract, gave free rein to their imaginations, and dreamed of a day when blessed peace would cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. Their ignorance of real politik was both profound and comprehensive. They evidenced but little genius for practicality, and dogmatically refused to compromise. Like Brand in Ibsen's drama, they could have "all or nothing," and because they could not have all, they were perforce obliged to take nothing, or, what is infinitely worse—war. Maybe the time will come, in the far future when human nature will not merely acknowledge the wrong and waste and folly of war, but will go ahead and actually forge its swords into plough-shares, remodel its ships into schools and transform its arsenals into factories that produce the goods the people need. But that time has not yet come, and we shall gain nothing but disappointment by deluding ourselves with fantastic visions. It can hardly help to speculate on when, if ever, this desired day will dawn.

Because pacifism has failed in its endeavor to prevent war, it must now, willingly or involuntarily, make way for statesmanship, for a new kind of statesmanship. The pressing task now is to make statesmen out of pacifists and pacifists out of statesmen. We shall have to quit gazing into the heavens and turn our attention to the actual problems that confront men and nations in a real world. We shall have to lay aside every weight of vain visioning and run with patience the long race. We shall have to substitute willing for wishing and cultivate a talent for details. We shall have to organize the world for peace and not for war. We must be ready to reckon with the facts as they are, and with human nature as it is. It will probably be conceded without discussion that this particular kind of "pacifism," this new statesmanship, has not yet had a tryout. Whether or not it can succeed in preventing war is still unsettled and uncertain. We shall know more about that a decade or a century hence.

(A League to Enforce Peace, 1917.)

[§134] THE TWO PROGRAMS AT A GLANCE.

The World's Court League.

Favors a League among nations to secure:

1. An International Court of Justice for all justiciable questions not settled by negotiation.

2. An International Council of Conciliation, in addition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

3. World Conferences meeting regularly at shorter intervals than heretofore: To establish the Court and Council; to formulate and codify rules of international law valid for all nations which approve them.

4. A Permanent Continuation Committee of the World Conferences with such powers as the Conferences may grant.

(The World Court.)

The League to Enforce Peace.

Favors a League of nations to secure:

1. A Judicial Tribunal for all justiciable questions not settled by negotiation.

2. An International Council of Conciliation.

3. Conferences of signatory powers from time to time: To formulate and codify rules of international law valid unless vetoed by some signatory power within a stated period.

4. Joint use of economic forces against a signatory power which refuses to submit any question to court or council before committing hostilities; joint use of military forces against a signatory which actually begins war before such submission.

[§135] DEMAND FOR PEACE ONLY AFTER SURRENDER OF GERMANY.

By Franklin H. Giddings.

There is only one issue out of this war that can bring world peace, and that is the surrender of the Central Powers to the allied powers—surrender as complete as that of Great Britain to the American Colonies; as that of the seceding States through General Lee at Appomattox.

Why? Because (1) Germany has asserted in philosophical disquisition and by arms that a people which regards itself superior in race to other peoples, which assumes that it has a culture superior to the culture of other peoples, may impose itself on other peoples by force of arms. Do we suppose that there can be peace in this world until that idea is sincerely repudiated by the people that have advanced it? (2) Because Germany has declared, and by arms supported her declaration, that international covenants and agreements may be disregarded at the convenience of one of the parties thereto, under the plea of military necessity. On what grounds can we assume that a power which takes and defends such a position could be trusted to observe the agreements presumed in a world organization for the development of international co-operation and the settlement

of international disputes? (3) Because the only guarantee of a repudiation of military conquest as a means of territorial expansion will be offered when the great powers, including Germany, actually begin to reduce their armies. Promises won't answer. The thing must be done. Can we imagine that Great Britain, France and Russia will begin to reduce their armies at the end of this war unless Prussian militarism is disavowed by Germany herself and her acts match her words, and do we not know that from the first it has been the declared purpose of the Allies to push this war until Germany stands ready to do that very thing? Do we not know that this is what the Allies are fighting the war for? Have we not yet grasped the idea that England and France stand ready to make peace any day, any hour, when they can have assurances (that any sane man can trust) that they won't have it all to do over again within at least the next two or three generations? Those assurances will be given when Germany throws up her hands. No assurance short of that pacific gesture will be worth a scrap of paper.

The issue is one of the most clean-cut, straightforward, uncomplicated issues ever presented to a clean-cut, straight-thinking intellect. What we have to strive for is peace—peace that will stay peace—peace that will be the real thing, and not a pious registration of sentiments and good intentions.

(*N. Y. Times*, December 19, 1916.)

[§136] A FEDERATION OF NATIONS.

By Lord Northcliffe.

I have a strong conviction that with peace will come a close federation of the nations who are now fighting the great fight for freedom. You have only to look at the spectacle of what I might call the United Nations of Great Britain to-day to see the effect that the war has upon the co-ordination of peoples and nations of widely conflicting temperaments and national structures. You see democratic Australia, a near socialistic New Zealand, a vast country like India, with its feudal princetains and other rulers; a free South Africa, and what is nothing less than the Republic of South Africa, all pouring their blood and treasure out upon the battlefields of France, linked by a common feeling of empire and sustained by a common hope of liberation from the militarism that sought to dominate the world.

A close federation of the nations now fighting the good fight will be the only insurance against the autocracy that made this war possible and the horrors that the armies of the autocrat perpetrated on innocent non-combatants. The world must be made free for democracy.

(*New York Times*, June 29, 1917.)

[§137] REMOVAL OF INTERNATIONAL MISTRUST.

By G. Heymans.

There is another question we must consider when this war will have drawn to a close and Peace sheds its benign influence upon the wounds that have been inflicted: how long will it last? For how long will the nations of Europe be left in peace, to try and restore the havoc of the past few months as best they may? How long will it be before our Continent is subjected to another such attack of frenzy that will claim fresh victims and alienate the nations anew? And above all, for how long, time after time, shall we have to ask this question: When shall we, or shall we never, see peace unbroken by war?

It appears to me that in principle at any rate the latter question admits of a feasible answer. A peace which shall outlast war will settle down when the mutual mistrust between the States has been removed. In that mistrust and in nothing else lies the actual menace to peace. Much has been said concerning conflicts of interests that can only be solved by the power of the sword; if one looks closer, the conflicts appear to be, nearly without exception, the outcome of mutual suspicion. What reason is there for a State to make conquests if not to get more defensible frontiers, to increase the army and strengthen its finances, and so to be better protected against the dreaded attack of a neighbor? Why come forward to the assistance of allies, even though the cause be unjust, unless there is a similar obligation on the allies to come forward to help in case of need? Why desire the possession of harbors and colonies if not from the fear that those of other States may be closed? What objection can there be to the rapid economic progress of a neighboring country except that it thereby becomes an increasingly dangerous rival? Such is the prevailing situation everywhere. If a State had no cause to fear outside attack, or impediments to progress, it is difficult to conceive a motive warranting in the remotest degree the catastrophes attendant upon war. Experience teaches us plainly that the serious conflicts of interest disappear immediately when several States unite into a federation, which excludes mutual attacks and governs the rights which the citizens of one State are entitled to in another. Look, for instance, at the relations existing in the federations of Germany, Switzerland and the United States of North America. There war has practically ceased to exist. The histories of these federated States furnish the empirical confirmation of what has already been urged, and an example for the future at the same time. Wherever the States have united into a federation they have abandoned their mutual mistrust of each other and ceased to make war, and it will not be until the civilized nations recognize federation as the sole means of disbanding mistrust that a lasting peace can be secured.

(*To the Citizens of the Belligerent States.* Amer. Assoc. for International Conciliation, 1915.)

[§138] THE TEST OF EVERY PLAN OF PEACE.

By President Woodrow Wilson. (Aug. 27, 1917.)

TO HIS HOLINESS BENEDICTUS XV., POPE:

In acknowledgment of the communication of your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated Aug. 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:

Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of his Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts, and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the status quo ante-bellum and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

It is manifest that no part of this program can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment, controlled by an irresponsible Government, which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier, either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also, and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world.

This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan

proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world.

Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments—the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people, of course, included, if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing Government, on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world—to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient, and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to

set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on.

We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

(From the Department of State.)

[§139] A MESSAGE TO AMERICA.

By Romain Rolland

My faith is great in the high destinies of America. And it is clear to me that the events of today make more urgent than before that these be realized. On our old Continent, civilization is menaced. It becomes America's solemn duty to uphold the wavering torch.

You have great advantages over the European nations. You are free of traditions. You are free of that vast load of thought, of sentiment, of secular obsession under which the Old World groans. The intellectual fixed ideas, the dogmas of politics and art that grip us, are unknown to you. You may go forward, unhampered, to your future; while we, in Europe, sacrifice ours, daily, to quarrels and rancors and ambitions that should be dead. Europe has found no better channel for its genius than to revive these quarrels; to submit, over and again, to the tyrannies that they impose. And each time that Europe attempts to solve them, it succeeds merely in strengthening the web that binds it. Where it should strike clear of its shackles, it forges still more iron meshes. Like the *Atrides*, it works out its tragedy under a curse. And like them, again, it prays for its release in vain, to some indifferent god.

In conclusion, writers and thinkers of America, we expect of you two things. We ask that you defend the cause of Liberty; that you defend its conquests; and that you increase them. And by Liberty I mean both political and intellectual liberty. I mean the incessant rebirth and replenishment of life that it enfolds. I mean the wide River of Spirit that never stagnates, but flows on forever.

Also, we ask that you so master your lives as to give to the world a new ideal for lack of which it bleeds—an ideal, not of section and tradition, but of Harmony. You must harmonize all of the dreams and liberties and thoughts brought to your shores by all your peoples. You must make of your culture a symphony that shall in a true way express your brotherhood of individuals, of races, of cultures banded together. You must make real the dream of an integrated entire humanity.

You are fortunate. Your life is young and abundant. Your land is vast and free for the discovery of your works. You are at the beginning of your journey, at the dawn of your day.

There is in you no weariness of the Yesterdays; no clutterings of the Past. . . .

Behind you, alone, the elemental Voice of a great pioneer, in whose message you may well find an almost legendary omen of your task to come—your Homer: Walt Whitman.

Surge et Age [Rise and Act].

(*The Seven Arts*, 1917.)

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EXPANSION OF GERMAN DOMINION.

GERMAN EMPIRE AFTER THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR



GERMAN DOMINION 1917



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